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Abstract 
The key theme of the thesis is that the rise of finance (financialisation) in 
Ghana has done very little, if any, in the fight against poverty. It has, however, 
resulted in rising financial profits, financialising poverty and stagnating the 
real sector of the economy. 
The thesis analyses financialisation in a low middle-income country. The 
focus is to investigate the impact of the exponential growth of finance on 
poverty alleviation in Ghana. It adopts a political economy approach to the 
changing behaviour/conduct of banks, industrial enterprises and households. 
Different strands of thoughts are reviewed in their understanding of 
financialisation. The theoretical framework is set vis-à-vis the empirical 
reality to assess whether the Ghanaian economy is financialised. 
It has been presented in this thesis that Ghana is indeed a financialised 
economy. However, it demonstrates several unique characteristics for 
different sectors because of its subordinate/inferior status shaped by imperial 
relations between states in the world market. 
The thesis found rising profit for the banking industry, but limited lending to 
industrial enterprises for long-term investment. However, what is unique in 
the context of Ghana is excessive lending to the government. The capital 
structure of firms in Ghana composed of mainly internal funds, as banks are 
reluctant to lend to firms due to the lucrative returns on less risky government 
securities. Banks then demand high collateral from firms together with high 
interests on capital. These obstructive factors, coupled with other 
contradictions in the political-economic arrangement, impact high cost on 
firms and therefore limit their ability to make enough profit. Consequently, 
firms employ less labour and are unable to pay higher wages, resulting in 
chronic poverty. 
This thesis presents that financial inclusion policy as a way of empowering 
the poor makes poverty a financial problem, which requires new credit 
relation- the financialisation of poverty. The thesis, therefore, argues that 
poverty should be viewed as a monetary and non-monetary problem.   
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Part One 
Introduction and Theoretical Review 
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 : Introduction to the research 
1.1 Introduction 
Ghana's post-independence achievements in improving life expectancy, infant 
mortality, and literacy rates occurred during the period up to the mid-1970s. Since 
then, progress has generally slowed and in some cases, reversed. The leading causes 
of this chronic underdevelopment have been a subject of debates over many years. A 
nation blessed with abundant natural and human resources, Ghana's slow economic 
development has been one of the most baffling paradox. Inexplicably, there is no 
agreement concerning the key factors obstructing economic progress in Ghana. 
However, there is no doubt that the country has experienced many obstacles- internally 
as well as externally, which undermined sustainable economic development- some of 
which were self-inflicted and others because of its subordinate/peripheral status in the 
modern world system1. Thus, the development crisis could be understood to reflect the 
country’s history, geography, domestic policies as well as the global geopolitics. The 
confluence of these factors has left the country stuck in chronic poverty.  
The recent stable political-economic arrangements cast doubt on some of the previous 
findings that have investigated the weak economic development in Ghana (Quartey, 
2008; Adusei, 2013). This draws attention to the fact that the major obstructing factor(s) 
slowing down economic progress have not been identified and addressed. This thesis 
is then set to investigate those impeding factors integral in the inconsistencies in the 
contemporary political-economic arrangement that have resulted in somewhat 
economic growth without sufficient development in Ghana.  
The policy response of the Washington Consensus2 to the problem was to provide the 
needed financial assistance on condition of strict austerity plus deregulation. The 
implementation of these measures led to the reduction of the workforce in the public 
 
 
1  The internal factors include the inconsistent political-economic arrangements adopted post-
independence, the political instability, inept government, corruption, unfavourable weather 
(especially in the early 1980s), and lack of social capital. The external factors include imperialism and 
antagonistic international relations (see for instance, Emmanuel, 1972; Arrighi, 2002) 
2  The Washington Consensus is the market-based economic policy prescriptions supported by 
prominent financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US 
Treasury. 
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sector, abolishing government subsidies, public sector wage freeze and rising 
unemployment in the economy. Moreover, the neoliberal globalisation policies of 
trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of state companies 
resulted in severe socio-economic dislocation, poverty and inequality at the 
macroeconomic level.     
The recent government developmental agenda is to emulate the success story of East 
Asian miracle, which saw them growing faster than all the regions in the world. The 
transition from poverty to prosperity will require Ghana to turn back on the old 
economy, which has been dependent on the neoliberal market mechanism, aid, and the 
production and export of primary commodities. The institutional restructuring, 
modernising the agricultural sector to enhance productivity and growth and investment 
in manufacturing and industry will enable the sustained economic development that 
will improve the standard of living of the people. 
1.2 Research background 
The relationship between development in the financial system and economic 
development has received much attention throughout the modern history of economics. 
For example, Smith's (1776 [1723-1790]) central principle was the increasing returns 
on investment, which he argued helps to induce capital accumulation and economic 
well-being through the division of labour. Smith asserted that the growth of profits 
accrued from the division of labour will further accelerate capital accumulation, the 
foundation of the wealth of a nation. Karl Marx (1867 [1818-1883]) was concerned 
with the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production and argued that 
there is a tendency for capital to accumulate and become concentrated in the hands of 
a tiny minority, with no natural limit to the process. Marx contended that the inherent 
class struggle in the capitalist system would, in the end, destabilise the capitalist mode 
of production. Bagehot (1873) emphasised the significance of the financial system 
(investment banks) in economic development and outlined the importance of banks in 
inducing innovation and growth by providing credit for productive investments. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1911) posited that financial deepening is essential in accelerating 
economic growth (development). He argued that for production to materialise, it 
requires bank credit and that one can only become an entrepreneur by previously 
becoming a debtor. Schumpeter's bank-based hypothesis argued that the entrepreneur 
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requires credit - purchasing power before any goods can be produced. The 
entrepreneur is, therefore, a debtor in the capitalist system. Keynes (1930, 1933) also 
stressed the significance of bank credit in economic growth, but supported active and 
direct government control of investment. Robinson (1952: 86) on the other hand, 
argued that development in the financial system follows economic growth, and 
expressed this causality argument by stressing that 'where enterprise leads, finance 
follows’.  
The endogenous growth studies have argued that financial sector deepening impacts 
positively on economic growth and development. They argue that active government 
participation in the financial sector has a regressive effect on the equilibrium growth 
rate (King and Levine, 1993). These arguments can be considered as an antidote to 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance hypothesis3. Despite the severe drawbacks 
of the 'irrelevance theory', advocates of the theory suggest that there is no relationship 
between finance and growth. Lucas (1988) contends that economists severely 
overstress the significance of the financial system in the growth debate. This presents 
the conundrum of finance-growth-poverty nexus. This suggests that the channels 
through which financial development impacts on growth are not well understood. 
Crotty (2005), Stockhammer (2013), Lapavitsas (2013) and Storm (2018) have argued 
that financial sector development adversely affects performance of the real sector of 
the economy. They posit that contemporary managerial activities are geared towards 
maximising the share price of their companies and distributing a huge part of 
company’s profits to shareholders as dividend. This thesis aims to investigate the 
relationship between financial sector development and sustainable economic 
development from the perspective of the effects of financial liberalisation on capital 
structure and poverty. 
Ghana's economy is characterised by dualism- with capital intensive in the mining and 
quarrying sub-sector (including oil) which demonstrates developed modern economy 
and an underdeveloped informal/agricultural sector in which overwhelming majority 
of the population remain dependent. The existence of this 'great divide' with a large 
 
 
3 A detailed analysis of Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypothesis is found in chapter 5. 
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underdeveloped informal sector and more affluent formal sector identifies Ghana as 
an example of 'uneven and combined development'4.  
The dominant role of governments in the financial sector was highlighted by many 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries in their development agenda post-independence.  
State banks were established with directed credit allocation to sectors seen as essential 
to national development. Foreign banks and domestic private banks were restricted, 
and large reserve requirements were implemented. 
In line with the post-war developmental agenda, Ghana adopted active government 
intervention in the economic process of mobilising capital, which was deemed as 
important for driving economic development. The Keynesian hypothesis drove this 
active government participation that market economy is prone to mistakes and errors, 
which could lead to severe depressions without government stimulus in variations in 
private investments. Nevertheless, the concerted efforts to bring about economic 
development did not yield the needed fruits for many SSA countries. The confluence 
of the late 1970s global stagflation, global recession, and the bushfires that destroyed 
many foods and cash crops in Ghana forced many to believe that active government 
participation in the economic process may be inferior to an alternative market-based 
policy, which was being promoted by Hayek and the Mont Pelerin Society5. Thus, a 
retreat from the Keynesian economic model, the active state intervention, and the 
welfare policies. 
Developmental agenda in the 1970s turned to economic liberalisation pioneered by 
McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). They posit that periphery countries require 
economic liberalisation to be able to develop. This tradition, together with Hayek and 
Friedman’s epistemological claim that the market is omniscient, persuaded many 
 
 
4 This refers to the tenacious differences in levels and rates of economic development across sectors in 
an economy. A term used by Trotsky (1906) when investigating the developmental possibilities for 
industrialisation in the Russian Empire - Results and Prospects- it is a concept in Marxian Political 
Economy aimed to describe the dynamics of human history involving the interaction of capitalist laws 
of motion and starting world market conditions whose national units are highly heterogeneous. A more 
recent contribution has been given by Justine Rosenberg (2013) in his debate on the 'philosophical 
premises' of uneven and combined development. 
5 This is a post-war international classical liberal association consisted of economists, philosophers, 
historians and other intellectuals with a goal of promoting free-market and open society. 
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periphery countries to adopt these free-market ideologies willingly or were forced to 
accept it by the Washington Consensus. 
Fortunately, following the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy, Ghana 
experienced sustained economic growth. For example, from 1983 to 1990, the 
economic growth averaged 5%, and between 2000 and 2015, average growth was 8% 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2017). Paradoxically, these economic growths in Ghana 
have benefited only a tiny minority, whereas the overwhelming majority of the 
population, the growth has only been available on credit. Thus, while the country gets 
richer, most people are no better off. Low and middle-income segments took on more 
debt to finance everyday life activities such as food shopping, health, education and 
housing encouraged by the deregulation in the financial market. For instance, between 
2013 and 2017, GDP per capita increased by 11%, while the national poverty rate fell 
sharply between 1990 and 2012/13 from 51% to 24.3%. However, poverty incidence 
declined marginally to 23.2% between 2012/13 and 2016/17, with extreme poverty 
incidences worsening in five out of the ten regions in the country. Ironically, national 
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient rose from 41.9% in 2005 to 42.3% in 2013, 
and further increased to 43.0% in 20176 (Bank of Ghana, 2018; Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2017). The worsening inequality over the period illustrates that few people 
benefit from growth rates in the country with sharp rural-urban divide. 
The Ghanaian economy, having undertaken Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) 
initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1983, 
welcomed the various waves of financial sector reforms. These reforms- Financial 
Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP1 in 1983, and FINSAP 2 in 1990) resulted 
in liberalisation and deregulation of interest rates and exchange rates, eradication of 
state-directed lending, recapitalisation of banks and restructuring of distress banks by 
off-loading non-performing loans to the public sector and loans guaranteed by the state, 
and most importantly, encouraging foreign bank entry. The structural transformation 
of the banking industry was significant as new banks entered the market with rapid 
growth in bank branches. The competition of banks resulted in new products offering, 
 
 
6 The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality in income (consumption) in a country. A 
numerical value of 0 indicates perfect equality, while 100 represents absolute inequality.    
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which included electronic banking, asset-backed lending, mortgage financing, and the 
recent surge in Mobile Money services (MM)7. 
The liberalisation and deregulation of the financial markets coupled with the monetary 
and fiscal discipline fostered the growth of capital movements, where domestic legal 
and illegal capital flight compensated by foreign capital inflow. The capital inflows 
into the mining and quarrying sub-sector (including oil) are in the form of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), while finance and communication sub-sectors attract mostly 
portfolio inflows in search of undervalued assets and high domestic interest rates. 
The various waves of reforms have resulted in exponential growth in the financial 
market, making it undoubtedly the most vibrant sector in the country. The growing 
dominance of the financial sector has drawn attention to the rise of finance and its 
implications for sustainable economic development. The recognition of 
financialisation in Ghana is, however, limited. Initial examples emphasise the linkages 
and the nature of the integration of the Ghanaian economy with the global financial 
markets (Esso, 2010; Quartey and Prah 2008).  More recently, Adu et al. (2013) and 
Adusei (2014) presented their assessments of the financial sector as the driving force 
of the Ghanaian economy. However, their examinations were inadequate on the 
impact of the financial sector development on productive investment, especially on 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) and the overall welfare of the population. 
That is, the changing conduct of the capitalist agents- banks, industrial enterprises and 
households within a changing world market was ignored. In light of these, this research 
will examine the effect of financialisation on firms' capital structure and its impact on 
sustainable economic development, in particular poverty indicators. The investigation 
will illuminate the inconsistencies of the political-economic arrangement on Ghana's 
capability to develop. 
 
 
 
 
7 A detailed analysis of this is in chapter 6- Financialisation, financial inclusion and mobile money.  
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1.3 Research objectives 
The perennial underdevelopment and the inadequacies of the previous studies to 
identify and address the key factors undermining economic development in Ghana 
have been derived primarily from the focus and in some cases, the methodologies 
espoused. Kotz et al. (1994) remark that although past studies have recognised lack of 
sufficient profit as a critical factor obstructing the capitalist accumulation process, 
many researchers failed to acknowledge the significance of the political-economic 
arrangement in the expectation of the rate of profit. 
Many past studies have been criticised for being instigated solely on the hypotheses 
of empirical investigations that are commonly guided on episodic events or in a 
specific era, which may not have historical connotations that might also influence 
economic development in a country. For instance, the scholarly work of McKinnon 
(1973), and Shaw (1973) hypotheses that transformed economic policy of the growing 
underdevelopment of periphery countries and the bank-based state participation 
economic policies covered a period of just 25 years8. This thereby failed to account 
for the historical elements that some of the periphery countries might have experienced. 
Consequently, episodic and solely empirical investigations are deemed insufficient in 
relation to distinctive events such as historical developments that could have a lasting 
influence on the countries examined.       
This thesis will, therefore, be designed to probe the contradictions of the contemporary 
political-economic arrangement, together with historical developments that are 
undermining sustainable economic development in Ghana. 
In view of the increasing financialisation, it is essential to ascertain how 
financialisation becomes transplanted and the impacts on poverty in Ghana. This 
research seeks to discover the existence of financialisation and how it is emerging in 
the periphery and more importantly, the impact of financialisation on poverty 
reduction programmes in Ghana. The main objective is to test the relationship between 
 
 
8 See Price (1974) for a critique of McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) hypotheses. 
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increasing financialisation and trends in poverty using household data, which is a 
crucial variable in measuring poverty as a social condition. This thesis seeks to address 
the following research questions:  
1. What are the similarities and differences of financialisation in the periphery 
countries, in terms of causation, nature and impact?  
2. Is Ghana a financialised country?   
3. What is the impact of financialisation on household incomes and employment? 
Studies of financialisation away from the core countries is essential to ascertain the 
uniqueness and discrepancies in various geographical settings. The historical and 
social characteristics of economic processes embedded in Marxist political economy 
necessitates the uniqueness of the ascendency of finance in different national settings.  
Peck and Theodore (2007) argue that it is only by means of a comparative 
investigation of particular social backgrounds that are susceptible to develop their 
hypothetical reproductive features, can new theoretical contributions be made to the 
study of financialisation. Consequently, given Ghana’s peculiar historical trajectory 
and integration into the global economy, it is important to examine the rise of finance, 
or as it is generally characterised, 'the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic 
and the international economies (Epstein, 2005: 3) in Ghana.     
1.4 Contributions to the field of Ghana studies 
Many of the previous research that have investigated the impacts of the inconsistency 
in the political-economic arrangements have done so by investigating their impact on 
the core countries as well as the emerging or semi-periphery economies with little 
focus on the periphery countries, in particular, SSA (excluding South Africa)9. The 
 
 
9 For the emerging economies, see, for instance, Palma (2013), and Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2013). 
For the core countries, notably the US., see, for instance, Stockhammer (2004); Krippner (2005, 2011); 
Crotty (2005); Orhangazi (2008); Davis and Kim (2015), and Kiely (2018). See Lapavitsas (2013); 
Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013); Fouskas and Gökay (2019) to name a few that focused primarily on the 
European Union. All these authors discussed the consequences of neoliberal ideologies on real sector 
investment. 
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few studies on Africa, for instance, Roy-Mukherjee (2015), and Udeogu (2018)10 did 
not incorporate the changing conduct of the capitalist agents- banks, industrial 
enterprises and households. Given the geography and variations between financial and 
economic structures in these economies and Ghana, it will be inaccurate to rely on the 
conclusions drawn from these researches to account for the experiences in Ghana. This 
thesis posits that as an international phenomenon, financialisation must reproduce the 
hierarchies of imperial relations11, ensuing in a unique nature of financialisation in 
Ghana. Even though integrating the essential trends as observed in the core countries, 
financialisation in the periphery will produce unique features. The original 
contribution is therefore to offer a comprehensive assessment of the nature and 
distinctive features of financialisation in the periphery, with a focus on Ghana. 
Crucially, espousing an indispensable hypothetical approach to financialisation, the 
uniqueness of Ghana and its common features with the core will be exposed. The 
sectoral meaning of financialisation— banks, industrial enterprises and households 
will be examined, giving a robust insight into the transformation of the Ghanaian 
economy in the last four decades. Furthermore, research on this historically specific 
geographical setting will contribute theoretically to studies on financialisation in 
general, helping to determine its prominent features better.   
The literature also contrasts the interests of predatory finance against those of the real 
economy and focuses on capital flow from the core to the periphery. In contrast, this 
thesis will examine the existence of financialisation and how it is emerging in the 
periphery. This requires an international theory of financialisation and the 
understanding of the core-periphery12 relations of that theory.  
This thesis is expected to make significant contributions and bring a new perspective 
to the debate on financialisation and poverty to the understanding of how 
financialisation affects capital structure and poverty. It will argue that financialisation 
 
 
10 Roy-Mukherjee (2015) discussed the socio-economic causes integral in the Arab uprisings and the 
spread of neoliberalism in North Africa. Udeogu (2018) focused his discussion on the Nigerian 
economy.  
11 This refers to the hierarchies of the world order- the core-periphery relations. 
12 This thesis adopts the Core-Periphery relation, which is based on Immanuel Wallerstein's world-
system theory. Core countries are the Advanced Western/Capitalist Economies, while the periphery 
countries are the less developed countries. Semi-periphery countries are the industrialising/emerging 
economies which are positioned between the core and periphery economies.    
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in the periphery takes a subordinate/inferior form because of imperialism, dependency 
and the nature of finance in Africa13. This has crucial implications for investment, 
economic growth, employment, inequality and poverty. It is believed that useful 
evidence for the development of sensitive policy interventions to help reduce poverty 
will emerge from this work.  
Generally, this thesis contributes to the field of Ghana studies by filling the gaps that 
exist in both the theoretical and empirical literature on finance-growth-
poverty/development debates in Ghana. It will deviate from the orthodox economics 
approach of examining Ghana's predicaments solely based on factors internal to the 
economy, but instead place it in connexion with the world system and impose 
historical evidence on theoretical logics, an approach typically known as the Marxist 
method of analysis.14  
1.5 Scope and limitations of the research 
This thesis focuses on the contradiction of political economic arrangement on Ghana’s 
ability to develop. Nevertheless, focusing on Ghana alone restricts the generalisation 
of the research findings. However, it does not take away/obstruct the validity of the 
outcomes. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) and Ang (2008) discovered that cross-
sectional studies do not explain the main underlying factors concerning a specific 
country. The cross-section studies lop countries with different identities together, 
thereby concealing the uniqueness and its historical trajectory that account for the 
social formation of each country. Therefore, to better understand and explain the main 
factors concerning a country’s underdevelopment, it is essential to study an individual 
country in juxtaposition with the world system than cross-section for the sake of 
generalisation, which will have limited specificity and policy relevance.  
The second limitation of the thesis is the focus purely on the framework of the 
political-economic arrangements and the historical elements as the main factors 
 
 
13 Financialisation in the periphery has specific characteristics reflecting the dominant role of the core. 
Lapavitsas (2013) asserts that there has been no return to formal imperialism, but financialisation in 
the periphery countries has had a subordinate character deriving from the hierarchical and 
exploitative nature of interaction in the world market.   
14  Mandel [1968: 18] defines this approach as the integration of dialectical rationalism with the 
empirical grasping of facts; i.e. a critical, materialistic, dialectical interpretation of history.   
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undermining sustainable development of the Ghanaian economy. The study 
deliberately put less emphasis on administrative, nepotism, ecological and other 
indeterminate constraints, not because they are not necessary, but rather most of these 
factors have mainly been deliberated without success to the problem of 
underdevelopment. Besides, if the contradictions of the political-economic 
arrangement are tackled first, then administrative competency for gallant actions could 
be a viable entry point for any effective reforms that could stimulate economic 
progress in the country. As noted by Smith ([1776] 2005: 331), the growing commerce 
and manufacturing bring together an order, good governance, liberty and security of 
the population. Thus, rising employment and incomes of the population will reduce 
inequality and poverty as well as decrease nepotism and corruption, which will induce 
shared economic prosperity for all. 
For the empirical analysis, data for the period from 1965 to 2017 were used to 
circumvent structural breaks as well as the availability of data for such period. 
Moreover, although reliable sources of data were used, questions could be raised about 
the validity of these sources15. Thus, the findings from the empirical sources may 
contain some elements of errors regardless of the careful considerations. To improve 
the validity of the data source, attempts are made, where possible, to substantiate data 
from various sources to limit the extent of data anomaly. These sources of primary 
information, which largely rely on surveys and semi-structured interviews, were 
augmented by academic literature on the relationship between the financial sector on 
the hand, and industrial enterprises and households on the other. However, despite 
these attempts to improve reliability and validity, it does not entirely eradicate the 
findings from any data anomaly. 
Thus, the threat posed to the findings of this thesis (albeit non-generalisation) is the 
pure focus on Ghana and the possible unreliability of the empirical data sources. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has many advantages, albeit a few shortcomings. 
 
 
15 Most data used in this thesis were collected from official sources – the World Bank database, the 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the PENN World data, the IMF World Economic Outlook 
database, Bank of Ghana, Ghana Statistical Service. Ghana Investment Promotion Council. United 
Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank Enterprise Survey for 
Ghana (2013). 
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1.6 Research methodology 
Different methodological choices have framed the theoretical and empirical work 
carried out throughout this thesis. The aim is to contribute to an in-depth understanding 
of financialisation and to fill the gap on how financialisation affect firms’ capital 
structure and poverty in Ghana.  
This research is grounded on the principle that particular methods of investigation are 
not inexorably connected to a specific methodology. This permits the option for 
different methods, through the alteration of their practice and understanding, to be 
combined in the study (Downward and Meaman, 2007).  With such a mixed-method 
approach, Sayer (2000) argues that the main test is to balance the selected methods 
with a suitable level of abstraction and with the material under study; this is the key 
challenge in this thesis. 
This study makes original contributions to both the theoretical and the empirical 
understandings of financialisation. The thesis attempts to grasp the 
developments/patterns and forms of financialisation across the core countries 
empirically and corroborate the phenomenon as it is emerging in Ghana, with specific 
emphasis on the impact of financialisation on firms' capital structure and poverty. The 
design of a middle-range theory requires a theorisation of banks, industrial enterprises 
and households, and their changing behaviour/conduct with each other within the 
economy. The empirical examination and preciseness of the concrete exhibitions of 
financialisation in Ghana require a multiplicity of data sources and deductive 
techniques that are available at the international, regional and national levels, and the 
incorporation of various sectoral vantage points. For these reasons, a mixed-method 
approach, unified within the contradiction of a critical political economy, is most 
suitable. 
Three different methods of empirical analysis are used in this thesis. National account 
data are analysed to document and evaluate the theory of financialisation, as outlined 
in chapter two and its subordinate/inferior nature examined in chapter four. Inter and 
intraclass relations will be analysed in chapter five to grasp and present 
financialisation as it manifests in the shape and form that it does in the Ghanaian 
economy. Lastly, econometric analysis using annual time series data from 1965-2017 
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will be employed to test financialisation and economic development (finance-growth-
poverty nexus) in Ghana. 
The reason to have profound structural and political changes as historical marks of 
study is initiated in the succeeding financial transformation of the Ghanaian economy, 
with the opening to the global economy and national financial sector adjustment 
programmes. However, it will be wrong to be inflexible and rigidly follow this 
periodisation as many of the processes identified had its historical origin years or even 
decades before 1965. Furthermore, the innate economic structures from SAP explains 
much of the political and economic routes acquired subsequently. The thesis will, thus, 
incorporate historical examinations that go back from 1965 whenever it proves 
relevant to clarify ensuing economic developments. 
The dynamic Granger causality test is used in examining the direction of causality 
between financial deepening, economic growth and the poverty alleviation. This 
econometric technique is applied due to its favourable response to both large and small 
samples of datasets (Odhiambo, 2009, 2014). 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into three parts and nine chapters. Part one (Introduction) 
comprises two chapters- the introduction to the research in chapter one, which 
presents the research background and discusses the methodological choices that 
framed the thesis. The theoretical debates on neoliberalisation and financialisation are 
presented in chapter 2. This chapter examines the rise of neoliberal ideologies and the 
emergence of financialisation in the core countries.  
Part two (Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Ghanaian Economy) 
starts with chapter 3 that examines the theoretical and empirical debates on finance-
growth nexus. Chapter 4 is the case study of Ghana, which details the political and 
economic developments, which have shaped economic and financial sectors since 
independence in 1957. The chapter starts with the reasons that forced Ghana to adopt 
neoliberal’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and details the paradox of 
financialisation in Ghana - under-financed, yet financialising. Chapter 5 provides an 
overview of financialisation and firms' capital structure. It further examines the 
empirical challenges facing firms in Ghana that have contributed to the perennial 
underdevelopment of the country's real economy over the years. Notably, it presents 
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the various consequences related to the contradictions of the political-economic 
arrangement that have undermined Ghana's capital accumulation process over many 
years. This chapter presents graphically the impeding factors undermining economic 
development with data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (2013). Chapter 6 
presents the issue of poverty and its measurement conundrum. The passionate debate 
about the impact of neoliberal globalisation on poverty ends the chapter. The second 
part of the thesis ends with Chapter 7, which provides the theoretical and empirical 
evidence of financialisation and households, and the ascendency of financial inclusion 
and mobile money.  
Part three of the thesis presents the econometric analysis conducted in relation to 
finance-growth-poverty nexus. This is discussed in chapter 8. The thesis ends with 
chapter 9, which contains the summary of the main findings, and draws on the general 
conclusion and policy implications. It provides the specificities of financialisation in 
Ghana and offers some tentative theoretical contributions to a more substantial 
theoretical approach to investigation on financialisation in the periphery countries. 
The chapter ends with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
The hope is that these will present a holistic picture of the myth that 
financialisation/globalisation alleviate extreme poverty in Ghana. 
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 : Neoliberalisation and Financialisation: the 
debate 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the thesis with the research background together with 
the research questions and the scope of limitations. The thesis contributes to the field 
of Ghana studies by providing the specificities of financialisation in Ghana. This 
chapter documents the rise of neoliberal capitalism and the emergence of the 
associated financialisation. The chapter starts with the shift from the Keynesian-
Fordist mass-production mass-consumption economic principles and management to 
the mid-1970s neoliberal era, and the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism. The rest 
of the chapter focuses on the theoretical debates of financialisation by examining the 
historical background of the emergence of financialisation. Four strands mark the 
literature, which attempts to explain the prominence of financialisation. These are 
stagnation of production theory; French Regulation school theory; post-Keynesian and 
the rise of the rentier; and the trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance.     
2.2 The rise of neoliberal capitalism 
The last four decades have witnessed the dynamic transformation of financial markets 
and their dominance in the world market. This is probably the most in-depth and most 
extensive change in the history of capitalism in recent eras. Finance, profiting from its 
impalpability and technological innovations, of late, has upheld itself as the hegemony 
of neoliberalism/globalisation/financialisation. 
Changes in capitalism have both long-term structural and short-term precipitate causes. 
This means that to have a clear sense of the emergence of neoliberalism 16 , it is 
imperative to first look at a broad picture regarding the configuration of the world 
economy in a long-term historical perspective. That is, how the world economy was 
organised before neoliberalism, its contradictions and trends, as well as the kind of 
 
 
16  Neoliberalism could be summed up as replacing governments role of guiding and regulating 
economic activity with market-based policies through privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
public services, eliminating state social programmes and the dominant role of capital with the help 
from the state. 
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shifts that were taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Transformation of this 
extent and complexity do not emerge by accident. Therefore, it is relevant to 
investigate by what means and paths the new economic alignment was pulled from.  
It has been argued by David Harvey (2005) that this newfound ideology was pulled 
from the shades of relative obscurity, a particular policy that went under the name of 
neoliberalism and changed it into the dominant guiding principle of economic thought 
and management. This newfound ideology (neoliberalism) - its origins, rise and 
consequences for poverty as a social condition, is the primary concern of this thesis. 
A standard view in the political economy is that the rise of neoliberalism is elucidated 
by the increasing role and power of finance in the political economy (Kiely, 2005, 
2018; Lapavitsas, 2013; Storm, 2018). 
The capitalism that transpired from the great depression in 1929 in most of the core 
countries was in sharp contrast to the pre-war forms of capitalism. The state took on a 
more active and interventionist role- the state grew more prominent in the performance 
of the economy. Although there were some variations reflecting the particular history 
of each country, the common features among them include a peaceful, rule-based 
collective bargaining relationship between capital and labour17. The use of fiscal and 
monetary policies to tame the business cycle and the government actively intervened 
in the private sector and control over the financial sector. The term ‘regulated 
capitalism’ according to Kotz (2010, 2013) seems an apt one for that period. He lauds 
the regulated capitalism for being a success. No major depression occurred, despite 
the business cycle not being fully eliminated. The core countries showed the fastest 
growth of any long period-1948-1973. Income inequality in the US declined with the 
income share of the bottom 20% rising from 4.9% to 5.5%, while the wealthiest 5% 
saw a reduction in their share of income to 15.5% from 17.1%. Thus, the income gap 
was not widening but slightly closing.  During this period, Mader (2015) argues that 
poverty was viewed as a lack of access to quality employment and consequently, 
policy intervention was to address this.  
 
 
17  Varieties of capitalism is the institutional foundation of organising a capitalist economy- the 
coordinated market economy models and the liberal market economy models (See Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Ordoliberal as the coordinated market economy model and neoliberal as the liberal market 
economy model. 
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State regulations of banks during this ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’- 1948-1973 meant 
that there was little to no financial speculation in the period in the core countries. 
Banks and other financial institutions performed their traditional role of supporting 
industries with long-term fixed-rate lending and households with home mortgage 
loans, and holding them to maturity as described by Schumpeter (1934: 74)18. Thus, 
the banker in Schumpeter’s view stands between those who wish to form new 
combinations and the possessors of productive means. The banker then becomes a 
phenomenon of development, nurturing the process of accumulation and steering the 
pace and nature of economic growth and technological progress (Mazzucato and Wray, 
2015). Kotz (2010) argues that during this period, there were no significant financial 
panics or crises, and there were no bank failures in the core countries. These roles 
played by the bank-based financial systems - where banks and industrial enterprises 
form long-term relationships, have inside knowledge and are in a position to exercise 
strategic influence on firms, impose rationality on their decisions and prioritise the 
repayment of their debt.   
The business cycle of the Golden Age peaked in 1973 marked the end of the sustained 
and shared economic prosperity. Kotz (2010), Kiely (2018) and Storm (2018) posit 
that accelerated inflation coupled with high unemployment compromised the peaceful 
relation between capital and labour to break down; the average rate of profit began a 
long decline in the core countries. A general sense emerged that things were getting 
out of control, while the effort to re-establish economic stability using Keynesian tools 
failed. In response to this crisis of post-war regulated capitalism, the institutional form 
of capitalism along with the central economic ideas changed with surprising rapidity.  
During this period of regulated capitalism, new capitalist institutions also emerged at 
the global level. The most notable ones were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (now the 
World Bank). The Bretton Woods system19 of fixed exchange rates among the major 
 
 
18 Schumpeter (1934: 74) called the banker ‘the ephor of the exchange economy’- someone who create 
credit to finance new investments and innovations. 
19 The Bretton Woods conference, in 1944, established the rules for commercial and financial relations 
among the world's major industrial states. The Bretton Woods system prevailed from 1944 to 1971 and 
coincided with the Golden Age of Capitalism. It is important to recognise that the Bretton Woods system 
was a hegemonic system, dominated by the global hegemon, the USA, and worked mainly in favour of 
the United States. 
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trading currencies, with the US dollar, backed by gold at a fixed rate, served as the 
major trading and reserved currency. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was 
established to allow and manage nation-states the right to exercise significant control 
over cross-border capital movements (Kiely, 2005, 2018; Kotz, 2013). It is essential 
to acknowledge that, although these capitalist institutions operated supposedly on the 
global scale, many countries in the periphery (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
were under the colonial rule and did as the colonial masters said. Until 1957 when 
Ghana gained its independence, its apparatus was under the control of the British 
government.      
Neoliberalism, according to Harvey (2005) and Kotz (2013), is associated with the 
trilogy of liberalisation, privatisation, and stabilisation 20 . However, neoliberal 
capitalism involves a broader set of ideological and institutional changes than the 
trilogy outlined. Kotz (2013) argues that neoliberal capitalism did resolve the 
problems that undermined regulated capitalism in the early 1970s; but however, 
cautioned that neoliberal capitalism steered a period of economic expansion with high 
financial profits, while at the same time planting the seeds of the global financial and 
economic crisis that broke out in 200821. He concludes that the neoliberal model was 
fully incorporated at the international level of cross-country trade and capital flows, 
where the role of the IMF and the World Bank changed, and new neoliberal global 
institutions were constructed. As we shall see later, the IMF and the World Bank were 
the vehicles that transplanted neoliberalism in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
It could be argued that neoliberal restructuring was aimed at all the institutions that 
had bolstered the bargaining power of labour and other popular groups. Kiely (2005, 
2018) argues that it dismantled the progress made by organised labour in the core and 
ended labour-friendly and development-friendly regimes. By doing so, it restored 
effective control to capital. The result was a reverse of the falling rate of profit, which 
 
 
20 Liberalisation refers to freeing up markets and firms from regulation (that had sustained capitalism 
during the Golden Age). Privatisation involves but not exclusive to selling off state-owned enterprises 
but also contracting out public services to private firms. Stabilisation covers the cut in government 
social programme and tight fiscal and monetary policies.  
21  See David Harvey (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism- (Chile’s experience) - The first 
experiment of neoliberal state formation according to Harvey, was in Chile, after general Pinochet’s 
coup on the ‘little September 11th’ 1973 which was followed by economic expansion and later financial 
crises. 
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began a long-term rise in the early 1980s in the US and Europe (Kotz and McDonough, 
2010). It is essential to recognise that profit in the real sector of the economy has been 
in decline while financial sector profits are on the rise.   
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system enabled the rise of the neoliberal project.  
This was after the US ended the convertibility of the dollar to gold in the early 1970s, 
a move that brought about the free-floating of exchange rates, stimulating international 
capital flows (Harvey, 2005; Fouskas and Gökay, 2012). These combined factors in 
the 1970s (stagflation, the falling rate of profits, the fall of Bretton Woods system and 
the development of sophisticated mathematical tools for valuing financial assets) gave 
the political opportunity to try a new economic project that has been prepared and been 
promoted by the elite, the media, think tanks, and business forums (Harvey, 2005). 
Thus, neoliberalisation is neither an accident nor produced by the economic conditions 
of the 1970s. This was constructed through lobby groups, corporate-sponsored 
foundation and research institutions. International grouping emerged, which was 
associated with imperialism (see Miller and Dinan, 2008). In short, there were grounds 
to believe that the regulated capitalism- bank-based (Keynesian) system is inferior to 
an alternative market-based (Hayekian) system. 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Mont Pelerin Society pioneered the view 
of this supremacy of a market-based (neoliberal) policy by claiming that ‘the market’ 
is an omniscient way of knowing, the one that profoundly goes beyond the capability 
of any individual thinking as well as the state (Friedman, 1966; Hayek, 1967, 1976). 
For them, the principles and the mechanism of the market should be implemented in 
all realms of life. This would be accomplished by the financialisation of everything22 
in everyday life because market discipline and rationality could be achieved through 
financial logic and constraints on economic agents. In short, Hayekian legacy endorses 
and promotes neoliberal narratives and discourse. This advocates that authority-even 
sovereignty be ceded to markets (financial markets in this context) because the market 
is seen as an impartial and unequivocal referee, gathering and signalling information 
that is essential to economic decision making and harmonising these decisions. Thus, 
 
 
22 This is used in this thesis to represent the shift in financial intermediation form banks to financial 
markets, as well as the emergence of financial market logic into sectors where it was previously non-
existent. 
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and as a judge, objectively enforcing market discipline and market rationality on 
economic agents will lead to efficient outcomes for the society (Storm, 2018). In other 
words, the market represents the only proper form of knowledge, and all other modes 
of reflection constitute bias and opaque judgement. Individual values and preferences 
are mere opinions, but collectively, the market transforms these into prices and 
objective facts. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system permitted relatively free movement of 
goods, services, and capital across national borders. This encouraged cross-border 
integration of the production process. As the global production system emerged, so 
did the financial system. Kotz (2013) argues that the global financial system became 
interdependent and intermeshed with the production system. The global integration of 
the production and financial systems was propelled by technological changes in 
transport, communication and data processing, but could not have developed without 
the institutional changes that allowed unregulated cross-border economic transactions. 
The globalisation of the production and financial systems meant that competition 
increased on a global scale. This forced many domestic Small and Medium scale 
Enterprises (SMEs) into bankruptcy in many periphery countries.   
This global competition also encouraged both horizontal and vertical mergers and 
conglomerates. A wave of innovation occurred in financial services to produce not 
only for the more sophisticated global interconnections, but also for new kinds of 
financial markets based on securitisation derivatives, and all types of futures trading 
(Kiely, 2018; Storm, 2018). Neoliberalisation has meant, in short, the financialisation 
of everything. This deepened the hold of finance over all other areas of the economy, 
as well as over the state apparatus and daily life (Harvey, 2005:33) - power shift away 
from production to finance. Harvey adds that: 
“Since the 1980s it has not been uncommon for corporations to report losses 
in production offset by gains from financial operations (everything from credit 
and insurance operations to speculating in the volatile currency and futures 
markets).” 
Another feature of neoliberal capitalism is the dominant neoliberal ideology. Harvey 
(2005), Kotz and McDonough (2010), Lapavitsas (2013) and more recently Kiely 
(2018) and Storm (2018) assert that neoliberal thought is characterised by the 
glorification and justification of individual choice, market relations, and private 
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property; a view of the state as inherently an enemy of individual freedom and 
economic efficiency; and an extreme individualist conception of society. Neoliberal 
capitalism asserts that an unregulated market system is optimal and that government 
intervention to correct market failures only worsens the situation and destabilises the 
private sector. Kotz (2010) and Dardot and Lawal (2017) remark that it will be difficult 
to underestimate the important role played by neoliberal ideas in glorifying the policies 
and institutional transformations that took place in this period, both at the international 
level and the nation-state. Thus, in the era of neoliberalisation, the state/government 
can only do wrong. This exemplifies Margaret Thatcher’s point that ordinary citizens 
will always spend the pound in their pockets better than the state/government. 
However, while individual freedom in the market is guaranteed, so is the responsibility 
and accountability for their action and inactions, decision-making and well-being. This 
belief extends to all walks of life such as education, healthcare and pension. The 
successes or failures of an individual are measured in terms of entrepreneurial virtues 
or personal failings. The state is assumed not to be responsible for the successes or 
failures of the individuals. Failures are attributed to individual decision-making, not 
the lack of state provision. Macleavy (2011) posits that this has led to the ‘race-to-the-
bottom or beggar-thy-neighbour' policies in which responsibility for the provision of 
political priorities is loosened further and further downwards until what ensues is a 
new form of citizenship in which societal rights and responsibilities transform 
personal deficiencies such as unemployment into failure of the individual rather than 
society. This Western-styled neoliberal individualism has spread to the periphery 
countries where the poor individuals of society who are least capable of bearing the 
liability have been left behind to fend for themselves. 
In contrast, Tickell and Peck (2003) and Dardot and Lawal (2017) believe that 
neoliberalism is a process of mobilising state power in the contradictory expansion 
and reproduction of market like rules. They refute neoliberals' argument of minimal 
state intervention and argue that neoliberalism involves the shifting of state 
intervention to new forms of governance supported by market competitiveness, 
flexible labour policies and commodification regimes such as carbon trading, fiscal 
austerity, and public spending on supply-side inputs. Hall (2008:2) extends this by 
arguing that during the recent (2008) global financial crisis, the total value of the re-
nationalisation of banks and insurance firms in the core countries, is approximately 
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equivalent to reversing about half of all privatisations in the world over the last three 
decades. He further adds that the UK government liability to the debts of Northern 
Rock alone is more than the combined total value of all the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) schemes in the UK and the rest of EU over 
the last 17 years. Ben Fine (2009) questions why the world-leading neoliberals (the 
USA and UK) introduce socialism for bankers/capitalists and capitalism for the rest 
of us. This suggests that private sector companies can walk away whenever profits dry 
up leaving the public to pick up the pieces. Thus, neoliberalism appears to nationalise 
risks but privatise rewards.     
Alongside neoliberal capitalism is ordoliberalism, which Dardot and Laval (2017) and 
Storey (2017) describe as ‘the German form of neoliberalism’. This emerged as a 
distinct school of thought post-War era with competition within the framework of the 
market economy as the central principle of the ordoliberal philosophy23. However, 
what sets ordoliberals apart from neoliberals is what Michel Foucault (2010) describes 
as permanent vigilance, and active state intervention to foster and protect individuals 
and firms. Wilhelm Ropke (1982) argues that the state must not be a bystander but as 
a referee actively intervening and enforcing rules of the game by imposing penalties 
for anti-competitive behaviour. Thus, the driving principle of ordoliberal is the 
watchful state intervention and nurturing the competitive market environment. By 
contrast, neoliberals argue that state intervention distorts markets and that market 
competition will arise naturally as long as the government intervention is limited. 
Ordoliberals argue that markets on their own will not operate freely as described by 
the neoliberals.  
Another feature of ordoliberalism is what David Woodruff (2016) argues as the 
‘proper assignment of liability to market actors. He remarks that as a competitive 
market economy reward risk-taking entrepreneurs for their effort and innovation, it 
should also punish those who fail the tests of the market for their errors/mistakes. Thus, 
ordoliberal underpin legal as well as moral principles. However, the social market 
economy- ordoliberalism bears some features of neoliberal economic thought and 
 
 
23 Storey (2017) argues that the pure ordoliberalism has been less influential in Germany and European 
economic policy than often assumed. See Fouskas and Gökay (2019) examination of how 
ordoliberalism was transplanted at the European level. 
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practices. In line with the overall neoliberal outlook, Foucault (2010) and Bonefeld 
(2012) argue that the ordoliberal project is to embed entrepreneurialism as a character 
trait into the society as a whole. Therefore, individuals take responsibility for their 
welfare, and where individuals are inadequately enterprising, their dignity is seen as 
undermined through their reliance on the state. This prompted Hayek to argue that the 
core ordoliberal projects do not deviate so much from the broader neoliberal principles. 
Story (2017) then queries the form of state intervention ordoliberals envisage in 
carrying out their tasks. Fouskas (2018) sums up the neoliberal-ordoliberal arguments 
as the two forms of imperialism and authoritarianism because they are not stand-alone 
domestic policies.  
Emphasising the hostility of neoliberalism, Palma (2009) and Kear (2012) argue that 
financialisation underwrites neoliberal narratives and discourses, which promotes 
individual taking responsibility for their own welfare through private insurance, risk-
taking, active investment and the accumulation of private property to benefit 
themselves within the controls imposed by financial markets and financial norms. The 
next section presents the debates on financialisation.    
2.3 Theoretical debates of financialisation 
The transformation of the behaviour/conduct and role of industrial enterprises, banks, 
and households constitutes the foundation of financialisation. Investigating these 
relationships theoretically and empirically, and therefore ascertaining a more in-depth 
content of financialised capitalism and how it manifests itself in the periphery and 
Ghana, is the task of this thesis. The concepts and the methods deployed for the 
purpose are derived from Marxist Political Economy as well as Post-Keynesians 
traditions.  
The term financialisation has been widely used in political economy and other 
disciplines such as sociology and geography. Its prominence reflects the ascendancy 
of finance for more than four decades. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) argues that the 
financial sector had become increasingly more significant in the 1950s and 1960s, 
although it was working within the regulatory framework of the Bretton Woods system. 
He asserts that the decades following the late 1970s experienced an extraordinary 
expansion of financial markets, which resulted in the rapid growth of financial profits, 
permeation of economy and society by financial relations, and the domination of 
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political, social and economic policies by the financial sector. He adds that the 
productive sector in the core countries during the same time experienced slow growth 
performance with profit rates below the levels witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
stagnant growth in real wages and rising high unemployment. Lapavitsas (2013) 
concludes that an asymmetry emerged between the sphere of production and the 
ballooning sphere of circulation (p.3). He argues that the rise of finance was due to the 
collapse of the Bretton Wood system in 1971. 
What is clear is that as the literature of financialisation matures, the multi-
dimensionality of it becomes evident. The literature offers both contradictory as well 
as a complementary nature of accounts drawn from diverse disciplines and sub-
disciplines. This may be due to a corollary of disciplinary methodology. What is 
espoused herein, therefore, includes a subjective account of the relative emphasis 
given by different writers in their assessments of the emergence and manifestation of 
financialisation. Even within political economy, it is important to distinguish between 
Keynesian and post-Keynesian accounts of financialisation, which places more 
emphasis on the ascendency of the rentier due to the neoliberal economic policy 
adopted by the state, and Marxist accounts of financialisation which tend to emphasise 
its material roots. That is, even within the same discipline, they often overlap in the 
accepted elements of the phenomenon, but disparity may exist over the causality and 
emphasis. 
Financialisation is a revolving term which is difficult to define (See Orhangazi 2007; 
and Lapavitsas 2013). However, the frequent occurrence in all definitions has been the 
rise of fictitious finance at the expense of the real economic sector. For instance, Palley 
(2007:2) sees financialisation as a process whereby financial institutions and markets 
gain more significant influences over economic policy. Greta Krippner (2005:174) 
defines financialisation as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue mainly 
from financial channels rather than trade and commodity production. Tabb (2013) 
defines financialisation as the dominance of the financial sector in the totality of 
economic activity; such that financial markets dictate non-financial corporation and 
household behaviours and significantly shapes the whole economy. Stockhammer 
(2013) describes financialisation as the broad aggregate change in the relationship 
between the financial sector and the real economic sector. For these authors, 
financialisation is such broad, interconnected, but distinct phenomena as the 
26 
 
globalisation of financial markets, the rise of financial investments and incomes accrue 
from such investment. Thus, political economists and other disciplines have captured 
the exponential growth of financial markets and financial intermediaries in the concept 
of financialisation.  
For this study, financialisation will designate the dominance of the financial sector in 
both scale and complexity and becoming more important as a share of national output, 
such that the financial market dictate the behaviour of industrial enterprises (firms) 
and households. Thus, the changing conduct of banks (financial market), industrial 
enterprises24 and households in a changing world market. This thesis will contribute 
to the debate around the impact of financialisation, capital accumulation process and 
poverty alleviation in the context of Ghana.  
The next section examines the historical background of the emergence of 
financialisation in the neoliberal era. Four key strands stand out the literature, which 
tries to construe the emergence of financialisation 25 . These are stagnation of 
production; French Regulation School theory of financialisation; post-Keynesians and 
the rise of the rentier, and the trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance. 
2.4 From stagnation to financialisation     
The work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1968) on ‘Monopoly Capital’ is central to 
‘stagnation to financialisation’. The central theme of the work is generation and 
absorption of surplus under conditions of monopoly capital26.  Baran and Sweezy see 
themselves as updating Marx’s work in light of the emergence of monopoly capital in 
contemporary capitalism. The authors argue that classical works on monopoly capital 
have failed to integrate the monopoly factor into the mechanisms of the capitalist 
system. They distinguish between two stages of capitalism. The first stage in this two 
stage-model is the competitive phase of capitalism, where small firms compete on 
innovation and cost to survive. Firms with a large amount of capital enjoy a 
 
 
24 In this thesis, banks will proxy for financial markets. This is because banks remain the core of the 
financial system in Ghana. Industrial enterprises represent all non-financial corporations. 
25 Financialisation and globalisation will be use as identical concepts similar to the work of Fouskas 
and Gökay (2012, 2019). 
26 For the concept of economic surplus, see Baran, P., A., (1957). The Political Economy of Growth, 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
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competitive advantage through increased productivity that allows them to force other 
firms that are not competitive out of business or are taken over by their competitors. 
This competitive struggle for survival, takeovers and mergers led to oligopoly and 
monopoly stages of capitalism. Thus, the authors contend that giant corporations have 
substituted the small and competitive markets as the dominant form of capitalism with 
the ability to set prices and regulate production and investment. Baran and Sweezy 
(1968) argue that in order to understand contemporary capitalism, it is crucial to 
abandon the competitive model and put monopoly at the centre of the analytical effort 
(p.6).  
Since oligopolies and monopolies can control output and price, profits will rise as the 
system develops. This means that the period of falling profit will be replaced by rising 
surplus-value 27 . Baran and Sweezy (1968) posit that in the monopoly stage of 
capitalism, price is no longer the weapon for capitalists to compete. Monopolies and 
oligopolies realised that price-cutting and price war are self-defeating then engaged in 
a new form of non-price competition- marketing and sales techniques (p.115).     
As capitalism matured and accompanied by the explosion of oligopolies and 
monopolies, the exploitation of labour intensifies, which results in an ever-increasing 
surplus value. This means that avenues should be found to absorb this ever-increasing 
surplus in either production or consumption, other than that it will lead to stagnation 
of the productive sector. Although Keynesians and post-Keynesians’ view of the 
emergence of financialisation differs from (Baran and Sweezy) Marxists, this evidence 
supports Keynes’s analysis of deficient aggregate demand, and this has been 
acknowledged by Baran and Sweezy (1968) in monopoly capital (p.143). With the 
ever-expanding surplus value that cannot be easily absorbed through consumption and 
investment by the productive sector or wasteful activities associated with trade, led to 
a shift in investment from the real economic sector to the financial sector. More 
recently, Foster (2007) advanced Sweezy and the Monthly Review analyses by arguing 
that financialisation resulting from the stagnation tendency of monopoly capitalism 
 
 
27 Baran and Sweezy (1968) define rising surplus as ‘the difference between the total output and the 
socially costs of producing the output’ p76. 
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led in turn to neoliberalism. He argues that ‘what we have come to call neoliberalism 
can be seen as the ideological counterpart of monopoly-finance capitalism’ (p.9).   
The Monthly Review School theory of monopoly capital offers a readily analysis of 
the periodic events of the late 1970s and the consequent occurrence of financialisation. 
By the 1970s, surplus absorption had grown into difficulty, the situation had exploded, 
and the threat of stagnation hung over the countries in the core. Consequently, capital 
began to seek for refuge in the sphere of circulation and, above all, in the sphere of 
speculative activities of finance (Baran and Sweezy, 1968; Lapavitsas, 2013, Kiely, 
2018). Lapavitsas posits that financialisation has occurred as a crucial mode of sucking 
up the investible surplus that flooded the realm of production by directing it to the 
sphere of finance. For him, slowing down of the rate of growth, the growth of giant 
MNCs and financialisation are the three periodic events of capitalist accumulation in 
the twentieth century. These three events are complexly interrelated, as the growth of 
monopolist Multinational Corporations (MNCs) led to the surplus value that cannot 
be easily re-absorbed through investment by the productive sector resulting in 
stagnation- the stagnation led to financialisation. 
Baran and Sweezy, and the Monthly Review School approach to financialisation has 
many remarkable strengths. The two-models of capitalism – from competitive 
capitalism to monopoly capitalism and the emergence of financialisation to absorb 
surplus value. Here financialisation is seen as a flight of capital from malfunctioning 
productive sector into fictitious finance. 
Despite the remarkable work of these scholars, they have not critically examined the 
causes of financialisation at the level of capitalist enterprises and financial institutions, 
other than updating Marxist argument of monopolisation (Lapavitsas, 2013). The 
closest that the Monthly Review current has been, according to Lapavitsas, is that 
financial asset tends to become inflated as non-financial institutions channel surplus-
value to finance and creating a speculative bubble. In addition, if these giant 
corporation capitals have been seeking an escape route from stagnation by engaging 
in financial speculation activities, it could be argued that there are good economic 
reasons for the monopolies and bankers to change their behaviour/conduct, which has 
to be specified accordingly. The tendency towards monopolisation is significant in this 
regard, but as Lapavitsas (2013) puts it, also too general to account for the specific 
character of the economic transformation commencing in the mid-1970s.   
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Another weakness of Baran and Sweezy and the Monthly Review current claim is that 
the emergence of financialisation signals a periodic shift in the balance between the 
sphere of production and circulation, in favour of circulation. Lapavitsas (2013) argues 
this is a departure from the theory of financialisation and suggests that analysis of 
financialisation ought to incorporate the agents of the capitalist economy- industrial 
enterprises, banks and households. He concludes that ‘for if financialisation is not 
specifically related to the operations of the capitalist agents, its content will remain 
ambiguous’ (Lapavitsas, 2013:18). However, unfortunately, the examination of the 
Monthly Review current and other Marxists output that treats financialisation as the 
escape of capital from the stagnation of production does not offer this critical analysis. 
This thesis will, therefore, close the gap by providing a specific thorough investigation 
of the changing conduct of industrial enterprises, banks and households in Ghana.           
Another strand of analysis within Marxist Political Economy emphasising the role of 
productive stagnation is drawn from the work of Fernand Braudel (1981). Braudel 
argues that structural cycles of the ‘longue duree’ mark the expansion and contraction 
of hegemonic powers. The declining phase of production –the autumn is associated 
with a rise of finance. Arrighi develops the concept of a systemic cycle of 
accumulation. He presents a structuralist model of the development of the capitalist 
world system. Arrighi (1994, 2007) adopted Braudel’s framework to classify four 
systemic social cycles of accumulation, or century-long periods of hegemony based 
on combinations of economic power with territorial state power, each epoch involving 
increasing scope, higher intensity, and shorter duration. Each of these cycles begins in 
one of territorial state a productive advantage and places it in the centre of the world 
system and the position of hegemonic power. Arrighi (2007) posits that the capitalist 
world economy contains a hegemonic power that develops in a cyclical pattern. As the 
prowess in production and trade of one hegemonic decline, the sphere of finance grows, 
and another hegemonic succeeds the declining hegemony. Financialisation, according 
to Arrighi, thus represented a sign of autumn28 in the cyclical trajectory of hegemonic 
power. One hegemony's autumn is another hegemony’s spring. The hegemony 
historical path has traversed Italy (Genoa), the Dutch, Britain, and the US (Arrighi and 
 
 
28 A term coined by Braudel and frequently used by Arrighi to represent a declining hegemony. 
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Beverly, 1999). Arrighi and his collaborators argue that the crisis of the 1970s 
signalled a declining of the US hegemony and posits a future emergence of new loci 
of power, particularly in East Asia. In each instance, the ascendant power has occurred 
partly as a consequence of abetting itself of the financial resources of the declining 
hegemony. 
Although, Arrighi’s historical systemic cycles of accumulation gives some insight into 
the emergence of financialisation, a degree of caution is necessary. The theory is at 
odds with contemporary realities. First, the rise of finance in the US has not been 
accompanied by a flight of capital to new rising centre of power, but as we shall see 
later, an inflow of capital from the rest of the world, particularly from the periphery 
countries to the US. This prompted Panitch and Gindin (2003) to argue that Arrighi 
confuses Asian countries’ ownership of US treasury bills with a structural shift in the 
distribution of power.  
Arrighi’s thesis, like Baran and Sweezy, associates the emergence of financialisation 
with declining productive dynamism, and thus fading hegemonic power. However, it 
does not elucidate the mechanism and pattern through which profit derives from 
finance. To demonstrate both the nature and the sources of financial profit, it is 
important to critically examine the activities of the agents whose conduct defines 
financialisation – industrial enterprises, banks and households. Orhangazi (2011) and 
Lapavitsas (2013) remark that category of financial profit is hard to establish and that 
it is not an accident that the nature and sources of financial profit hardly exist in either 
classical or political economy or Marxist economics. They posit that once the 
theoretical analysis goes beyond the primary state that surplus is available which seeks 
investment in finance, the sources and nature of financial profit in terms of the 
aggregate flows of value in the contemporary capitalist economy is ignored.  
Another major drawback of Arrighi’s theory of financialisation is a replacement of the 
current hegemony- the US. In ‘The Long Twentieth Century’, he suggested that Japan 
might inherit the mantle as the next hegemony, an idea shared by Boyer (2000). 
However, in Adam Smith in Beijing, Arrighi proposed China to be the next hegemony 
based on flexible accumulation and outsourcing. Neither of these suggestions work 
well in contemporary capitalism. Lapavitsas (2013), and Fouskas and Gökay (2012) 
argue that the US has been a net borrower in recent decades with much of the money 
coming from Japan and China. The autumn of US hegemony whether due to 
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financialisation or not, has rather resulted in an inflow of capital to the US and 
conspicuously, from some of the poorest countries in the periphery. Lapavitsas (2009, 
2013) argues that this is due to the role of the US dollar as the quasi world money, and 
this has imposed costs on the periphery countries. This is an aspect of 
subordinate/inferior financialisation, which will be discussed later in the context of 
Ghana and SSA29. 
Certainly, the focus of the work of Arrighi, Baran and Sweezy, has been on the 
performance of the core countries, particularly the United States and the UK. All the 
arguments deliberately deal with the issue of global instead of solely national 
accumulation. However, lacking are the more fine-grained of analysis of the changing 
behaviour/conduct of the agents of capitalism (industrial enterprise, banks and 
households) both within countries and across borders, and their specification within a 
changing world market. Consequently, the discussions fail to analyse the uniqueness 
of the rise of finance in the periphery, in particular, SSA. Since the evidence provided 
from the review does not account for the emergence of financialisation across the 
world market, this thesis argues that the tendencies of financialisation should not be 
limited to a few archetypical financialised economies. Consequently, the thesis sets 
out a testable hypothesis that financialisation should be observed as a worldwide 
phenomenon. However, it is not expected that countries will experience a similar 
fashion across the world.  Instead, as argued by Powell (2013), the fundamental 
tendencies of financialisation will manifest itself unevenly across countries, and the 
impact will depend on the domestic institutional arrangements and the hierarchical 
nature of each nation's insertion into global processes of accumulation. Another tenet 
that explains the emergence of financialisation is the French Regulation School. 
 
 
 
 
 
29 See chapter four, section 4.5 for Financialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa- Reverse of net capital flow. 
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2.5 French regulation school theory of financialisation 
The Regulation theory sets out yet another scholarly argument from which to analyse 
heterodox approaches to financialised capitalism. This theory is influential in the 
debate of finance-led-growth regimes. It looks at how institutional frameworks, which 
are the manifestations of social relations, stabilise a particular accumulation, how they 
enter into crisis, and how they renew themselves (Boyer and Saillard, 2002). The 
Regulation school approach to financialisation came in part from the search for a 
replacement ‘regime of accumulation’ to Fordism,30 which they argue ended in the 
1970s. Chesnais (2001) had suggested a new regime of accumulation with financial 
dominance. In his later writing, Chesnais (2006) ponders whether a new finance-
dominated regime is developing after the weakening in productive accumulation and 
destruction of the capital-labour comprise seemingly embodied in the Fordist growth 
regime. Regulation School uses the post-war mass production, rising wages 
accompanied by rising productivity as Fordism- and the crisis of the 1970s weakens 
the element characteristics of the period of Fordism. Thus, a new regime of financial 
accumulation might emerge. Lordon (2000) suggests that financialisation regime of 
accumulation was replacing the loss of material basis of Fordism regulation. 
Boyer (2000) argues whether finance-led growth is a viable alternative to Fordism and 
posit a model. He argues that since the demise of the Fordist regime of accumulation, 
a search has begun to investigate a possible successor of mass production and mass 
consumption. Boyer proposed a vision of the future of capitalist growth, which he 
viewed as becoming increasingly influential in the late 1990s. Cross countries 
acquisition and capital movement, pressures on corporate governance, diffusion of 
equity among a more substantial proportion of the population; in his view, all these 
changes pointed to the emergence of finance-led accumulation regime. This he 
labelled as a new mode of regulation ‘new economy’- the new regime is characterised 
by labour-market flexibility, price stability, developing high-tech sectors, booming 
stock markets and credit to sustain the rapid growth of consumption, and permanent 
optimism of the expectations in firms. The ability and how each country adopts and 
carries out this model would be a critical factor in the nation's macroeconomic 
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performance (Aglietta 2008).  Boyer opines that household behaviour has undergone 
a significant shake-up with the Fordist post-War. Undoubtedly, wages and salaries 
continue to be a crucial component of reward for labour; however, Boyer identifies 
two new mechanisms emerging. 
On the one hand, under pressure for shareholder value, the wage bill has to respond 
quickly to any divergence between expected and actual returns. Depending on the 
exact content of the capital and-labour compromise, the related flexibility may affect 
wages, working hours or even job security. However, on the other side, some workers 
may have access to financial gains through equity holdings, or more likely by the 
intermediation pension funds. As a result, the prospect of gains in the financial market 
has a direct impact on household decision to save or spend. Boyer referred to the equity 
base as patrimonial31 because wealth, as measured by the financial market, tends to 
influence household consumption of both durable and non-durable goods, and 
indebtedness to banks (Boyer, 2000; Michel Aglietta and Antoine Roberioux, 2004).  
The structuralist influences are apparent in regulation theory as it stresses the 
significance of specific institutions over and above production function. Boyer (2000) 
identifies five distinct, but interrelated socio-economic institutions, and how they are 
organised to examine the different forms capitalism has taken. These include i) how 
the competition is organised between firms; ii) the monetary institution- the functions 
of money and circulation; iii) the relation between the state and the economy; iv) the 
international economy insertion; and v) the wage-labour nexus- wage determination, 
flexible labour market. 
Moreover, Becker et al. (2010) distinguished among productive and financialised 
accumulation based on the sectoral direction of investment. These are extensive and 
intensive accumulation based on whether workers consume goods that are bought 
primarily in the market, and whether the increase in surplus-value is due to increase 
work intensity; and lastly, introverted and extroverted accumulation, determined by 
the direction of output towards domestic or international markets. Drawing on case 
studies from South America and Eastern Europe, Becker et al. (2010) postulated 
 
 
31 Aglietta and Roberioux (2004) introduced the concept of ‘patrimonial capitalism’ where income 
accrues via shareholding and could reimburse stagnant wages. 
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further types of financialisation. These include financialisation based on fictitious 
capital in the core, which meant inflation of financial prices; financialisation based on 
interest-bearing capital, which meant the expansion of banks, and high-interest rates 
in the periphery. They further distinguish between ‘elite' financialisation in the semi-
periphery countries- the involvement of new bourgeoisie and the upper-middle-class; 
and ‘popular' financialisation- which meant that workers and other middle class have 
also been drawn into the realms of financial operations. Regardless of the validity of 
these categorisations, drawing a distinction among varieties of financialisation is 
significant in examining the phenomenon in its entirety. For instance, the World Bank 
and the IMF financial inclusion policy has drawn the underserved, the unbanked and 
the rural poor in Ghana into the realms of the financial sector. 
Although regulations accumulation regimes concept acknowledges the systemic 
importance of the rise of finance in recent decades, the specification of the 
financialised regime is not precise than that of the Fordist regime of accumulation. 
However, even the Fordism regime of accumulation, Robert Brenner and Mark Glick 
(1991) argue whether it ever accurately captured the character of accumulation in the 
core countries, including the US in the period outlined. It is therefore essential to note 
that doubts surrounding the notion of the Fordist regime since the US economy is the 
standard reference for the regulation school when it comes to Fordism. Lapavitsas 
(2013) posits whether the regulation school analysis of financialisation goes beyond a 
reworking of the theories of shareholder value and the dominance of the stock market.   
While the above discussions have been rooted in Marxists tradition, Post-Keynesians 
also provide yet another current that explains the emergence of financialisation.    
2.6 Post-Keynesianism and financialisation  
Post-Keynesian theory of the providence of financialisation shares some similarities 
with Marxist analysis, but also has some decisive differences. The post-Keynesian 
theory focuses on how the growth of financial markets has paved the way for financial 
fragility and instability. The scholarly work of Hyman Minsky (1996, 2008) has been 
the cornerstone of Post-Keynesian financial analysis. Many post-Keynesian writers 
argue about Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) to explain the rise of 
finance in the economy. The hypothesis offers both empirical and theoretical aspects. 
The empirical aspect is that from time to time, capitalist economies show inflation and 
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debt deflations 32  which could be possible to spin out of control. The theoretical 
argument begins with the description of the economy as a capitalist economy with 
high-priced capital assets and intricate, sophisticated financial systems. Thus, in the 
capitalist system, there exist private property and private ownership of the means of 
production. For Minsky, the capitalist financial system is a complex of inflows and 
outflows of money transactions.   
Minsky (1996) identifies three distinct income-debt relations, which are labelled as 
hedge finance, speculation finance, and ponzi finance. Hedge finance units are those 
finance which can meet all their contractual payment requirements. That is, borrowers' 
expected stream of income cash flows would be sufficient to repay principal plus 
interest. Speculative finance units are where revenues only repay interest without the 
principal. Such units need to roll-over their liabilities by taking on new debt to meet 
commitments on maturating debt. For ponzi finance, the revenues are insufficient to 
fulfil their contractual payment obligations of either repayment of the principal and/or 
interests due. Here a new loan should be taken in order to service existing debt. Thus, 
the FIH is a theory that exhibits the impact of debt on system behaviour and also how 
debts are validated. Thus, income-debt relations will eventually be dominated by ponzi 
finance. Firms' willingness to fund investment is conditioned by both the cost of 
borrowing and future profit from the investment. Any rise in interest rates could lead 
a firm whose income-to-debt nexus was initially branded as a hedge, to become 
speculative and eventually ponzi. To avoid mass insolvency and bankruptcies will 
require the injection of liquidity by the government and the central bank 33 . The 
particular mix of these three income-debt relations reflects the historical development 
of the economy and shapes long-term expectations. When the ratio of speculative and 
ponzi finances increase as a share of total liabilities, firms and the economy become 
sensitive to interest rate variations and changes in asset prices. The economy then 
becomes unstable. If access to credit dries out (credit crunch) for whatever reason, 
inability to meet debt obligations will trigger a process of deleveraging, which, in turn 
will cause asset prices to fall (Minsky, 2008). 
 
 
32 See Irving Fisher (1933) for the classical description of debt deflation.   
33 See Maria Ivanova (2013) for a summarised criticism of the Financial Instability Hypothesis.  
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Minsky (1996) further outlines five stages of American capitalism, which are 
commercial capitalism; industrial capitalism and wild-cat financing; financial 
capitalism and state financing; paternalistic, managerial and welfare state capitalism; 
and money manager capitalism. It is the fifth stage-money manager capitalism that 
Minsky posits a large amount of financing occurring without financial intermediaries.  
This, he argues, was due to a consequence of neoliberal privatisation and pension 
system, resulting in the ascendancy of institutional funds and shareholder value 
orientation in the financial system. Wray (2011) believes that the money manager 
capitalism spells out a structural shift in the core countries, including the rise of 
financial engineering and shadow banking, pressure for deregulation and less 
supervision, and most importantly, increasing household debt. Palley (2011) argues 
that Minsky's money manager capitalism proposes a ‘super-cycle', which allows more 
and more financial risks into the system. The cycle, according to Palley, involves twin 
developments of ‘regulatory relaxation' and ‘increased risk-taking'. These 
developments increase both sides of the balance sheet- increasing both the supply of 
and demand for risk. 
Minsky’s FIH and the money manager capitalism offer a scholarly analysis of policy 
changes in the US, but very little if any direct insight into the dynamics of 
financialisation in the peripheral economies. As pointed by Lapavitsas (2013), there is 
a minimal discussion on Minsky's work on the long-term balance between finance and 
the real economy, and the broader implications of the money manager capitalism were 
not critically analysed. Maria Ivanova (2013) adds that Minsky’s theory is vague as to 
the factors that trigger substantial changes in the behaviour/conduct of the financial 
actors and the working of the financial systems over the economic cycle.  
The post-Keynesian literature on financialisation is generally based on the rise of the 
rentier layer, and in particular, money lender as a rentier. Keynes referred to the rentier 
as a parasitical economic entity that extorts profit due to the scarcity of capital and 
might, therefore depress investment and profitability for active capitalists. The 
objective of the rentier lies in the perpetuation of financial profits at the expense of 
productive investment and broader welfare. He concludes that successful capitalism 
requires the euthanasia of the rentier that could be attained through a low-interest rate 
(Keynes, 2006: 24).  
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The rise of the rentier in recent decades has been linked with a series of policy 
initiatives undertaken by the core countries (see Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000; Epstein, 
2005; Epstein & Jayadev 2005; Crotty & Lee, 2005; Lazonick, 2013).  Although this 
literature deliberately deals with the issue of global in its view, the links between the 
growth of the rentier layer in such a varied range of institutional context are not 
critically analysed primarily in SSA and other peripheries.    
The ramification of the rising power and dominance of the rentier is the 
transformations in corporate governance, in the name of Shareholder Value 
Orientation. Managerial capitalism assumes that managers’ preference is growth, 
while shareholders are dividend out of profit. This principal-agent conflict was 
resolved through some fundamental institutional changes. These changes include the 
use of performance-related pay and stock options as managerial compensation, and 
the growth in mergers and takeovers (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000).  Lazonick (2010, 
2013) argues that firms move from an outlook of retaining and invest to one of 
downsizing and distribute as a consequence of executive stock options, share buybacks 
and the increased mergers and takeover activities.  Sharing evidence from France, the 
US and the UK, Stockhammer (2004) posits that there is an inverse relationship 
between the part of income given out in dividends and interests and real economic 
sector investment. Orhangazi (2008) and Crotty (2003) find evidence from the US that 
rising financial profit since 1980 has reduced real economic sector investment and 
increased dividend payouts, and share buybacks have led to firms substituting own 
capital with borrowed capital and thus shortening planning horizon and increased 
uncertainty. This has increased firms’ debt-capital ratio, forcing firms to reduce costs 
by cutting wages and reducing labour and real sector investment. 
Within post-Keynesians, financialisation characterises the ascendency of the rentier 
because of the neoliberal economic policies espoused by the state in the last four 
decades. The dominance and power of the rentier have supported financial profit at 
the expense of industrial profit, and therefore, financialisation has induced poor 
performance of investment and output in the core countries. Like Marxist, post-
Keynesians recognise the connection between stagnating production on one hand and 
financial expansion on the other in the era of financialisation. However, the critical 
distinction between post-Keynesians and the Marxists is the fact that, post-Keynesians 
consider the rapid expansion of the financial sector at the expense of the production 
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sector is due to inappropriate economic policy in the core countries. That is, policies 
such as shareholder value orientation have directed investment into finance rather than 
production sector of the economy. Thus, the ascendency of the rentier has a dismal 
impact on the real economic sector. Marxists, on the other hand, argue that the 
expansion of finance is due to the malfunctioning production sector. Thus, both post-
Keynesians and Marxists agree on the falling rate of profit in the real economic sector 
but differ on the causation.   
For post-Keynesians, the ascendency of the rentier layer symbolises financialisation, 
and this is because of the inappropriate economic policy. However, these inappropriate 
policies are inadequately specified and critically addressed. Jan Toporowski (2010, 
2011) posits that economic boom and shared prosperity in the golden age of capitalism 
enlarged middle-class, particularly in the US. These middle-class demanded higher-
yielding assets for savings. He argues that the privatisation of pension fund endorsed 
these funds to be channelled into corporate securities. As more inflows flooded the 
stock market, the share prices rose. The capital gain is therefore paid by the next buyer 
or the institutional investor, who is more interested in the capital gain than investment 
in long-term sustainable profits from production. This process, therefore, increases 
firms borrowing, and further results in higher interest and dividend obligations than 
their cash-generating capacity in expanding. For such firms that are over-capitalised, 
holding financial assets against liabilities is safer than investment in plants and 
machinery that tie up funds and slow returns. In view of this, corporations invest in 
financial assets and engage in mergers and acquisition rather than investing in 
production. Toporowski (2008) further adds that households also manage their 
liquidity with excess capital.  Households hold increasing bank debt against real estate 
and financial assets, with house owners relying on housing inflation rather than income 
for consumption.   
Toporowski provides a significant/scholarly examination for the understanding of 
financialisation in the US without the covert rentier layer. However, he believes that 
financialisation is cyclical and argues that financialised capitalism is over 
(Toporowski, 2009: 146). It is worth acknowledging that the impact of capital market 
inflation in the core countries or the peripheral countries was not sufficiently clarified 
in detail, although presumably capital market spillovers and the changing investment 
trends of the multinational corporations would figure prominently. Thus, the successes 
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of financial markets inflation retard the performance of the under-invested industrial 
sector. This is because financial innovation continues to mobilise financial resources 
in order to sustain the rising assets price. Toporowski (2009: 153) argues that in an era 
of finance (financialisation), finance mostly finances finance. The absorption of 
financial resources in the financial market to buy financial assets will eventually result 
in financial inflation.     
Another thread in the literature is the rising inequality in the era of financialisation. 
Post-Keynesians link rising inequality to a neoliberal policy agenda, which has 
strengthened a small minority whose wealth comes from financial profit34 (See Stiglitz, 
2013). Stockhammer (2012) has extended this argument globally, where he posits two 
growth models- debt-led and export-led. In the debt-led growth economies, 
households maintain consumption levels through borrowing due to falling or 
stagnating wages. In the export-led growth countries, suppressing wage supports 
international competitiveness, with profit recycled. The two groups are 
complementary, because the current account deficit of debt-led countries and capital 
inflows of the former match the current account surpluses and the capital outflow of 
the latter. That is, financial deregulation has permitted one group of countries to run 
protracted current account deficit. However, it is difficult to position Sub-Saharan 
Africa specifically in any of these models proposed by Stockhammer. Stagnant wages 
characterise the region, yet it is less internationally competitive due to the export of 
primary commodities whose demand is price inelastic and the high importation of 
manufactured goods from the core countries. This has resulted in current account 
deficits for most countries in the region. On the debt-led model, lack of collateral 
security in the region impedes household ability to borrow, to finance, or to smooth 
out consumption. The confluence of these factors is the rising of chronic poverty in 
the region. Another tenet of financialisation is the trans-nationalisation and the 
liberalisation of finance. 
 
 
34 Palma (2009) seminal work describes the class and race implications of the inequality.  
40 
 
2.7 Trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance 
Financialisation has also had significant impacts on the international dimension. The 
liberalisation of global capital flows has led to increasing fragility of exchange rates, 
often resulting in a violent exchange rates crisis. Central to neoliberal reforms are 
deregulation and liberalisation of the financial systems. This public policy is based on 
the standard neoclassical economic theory that financial globalisation would allow 
capital to be re-allocated to its most efficient use. Accordingly, Stockhammer (2012) 
questions the implication for core-periphery capital flows and the impact on growth 
and development indicators, especially in the periphery. The earlier proponents of 
financial globalisation and liberalisation, Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), and later 
Mishkin (2006) argue that alleviating financial restrictions will allow market forces to 
determine real interest rates and can have a positive impact on economic growth as 
interest rates rise toward their equilibrium in a competitive market. This tradition 
argues that artificial interest rates ceiling such as what was being used in Ghana pre-
structural adjustment period in 1983 reduces savings, capital accumulation and results 
in inefficient allocation of resources. They contend that financial liberalisation 
encourages higher interest rates, which will stimulate more savings that could provide 
a source of funds for investments in the real economy and bring about economic 
growth and development. This has informed global economic policies, especially 
through IMF's structural adjustment programmes imposed on periphery countries, in 
particular, SSA.  
The classical economist assumption of higher interest rates leading to more investment 
has been challenged. Keynes ([1936] 2006) argues that a rise in a rate of interest 
intended to encourage higher savings which could be directed to real production will 
instead have the effect of reducing real investment. He remarks that withholding 
consumption (i.e. savings) would depress the business of producing for current 
consumption without necessarily stimulating the business of making ready for some 
future act of consumption automatically. That is, the insufficiency in effective demand, 
culminating from too much household savings, will constrain rather than promote the 
process of production. He asserts that the capitalist agent must usually save from his 
existing profit- ‘real savings' before investing in the future.  It can then be argued that 
real savings by the capitalist agents is primarily determined by the increased demand 
for the products, which will influence the amount of capital that is invested in the 
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productive process.  Therefore, if individuals deferred consumption, it will depress 
today's investment and will subsequently reduce the rate of real savings and invariably 
reduce the scale of future investment.  Keynes’ ([1936] 2006) argument is that it is the 
rate of profit that induces investors to accumulate capital wealth and even to require 
any loanable funds at any interest rate. That is the scale of investment dependent on 
the relation between the rate of interest and the rate of profit, with the rate of profit 
dependent on the individual’s ability to spend on the capitalist products. Arrighi (1994) 
sums it up as the reason why capitalist agents invest money in a given input-output 
combination is to make a profit.   
The globalisation of finance disrupted SSA domestic approach to financial systems. 
Global financial markets enable governments and large corporations in the periphery 
to benefit from offshore borrowing and capital markets. Thus, borrowers searching for 
funds are no longer limited purely to domestic markets as they can raise funds from 
the global financial market. Likewise, investors with surplus funds can reach out to 
borrowers in both domestic and international markets. Valdez and Molyneux (2015) 
argue that the purpose of international financial markets is matching of those who want 
capital with those who have capital. This reduces borrowing costs and ensures efficient 
global financial markets.  
However, as Mundell (1968) points out, capital account liberalisation has reduced the 
independence of policymaking in the periphery countries. Capital movements disrupt 
any changes in monetary policy, particularly in the periphery. Hanson et al. (2003) 
suggest that countries could adopt a floating exchange rate system to offset the impact 
of capital flows. However, adopting a floating exchange rate in SSA has encouraged 
financial contracts to be denominated in foreign currency, notably the US dollar 
onshore as well as offshore. 
In contrast to the neoliberal account, Stockhammer (2012b) argues that financial 
globalisation and liberalisation have led to frequent exchange rate crises caused by 
unpredictable capital flows, and long-lasting global imbalances. Fluctuations in 
exchange rates are increasingly determined by global capital movements rather than 
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals such as growth, inflation, and current account 
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positions. It is normally profitable to take part in interest arbitrage35 in a liberalised 
international market than investing in the real economic sector. This interest arbitrage 
means that higher interest rates in the periphery countries induce capital inflows from 
the core. Any changes in interest rates will lead to a sudden and sharp capital outflow 
with a devastating effect on the exchange rates. Incidents of exchange rates crises as a 
result of capital inflows followed by sudden and sharp outflows have been a common 
feature in the semi-periphery countries (Epstein, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Reinhart and 
Reinhart, 2008). The effects of exchange rates volatility as a result of rapid capital 
movements on macroeconomic have been felt severely in Mexico 1994, Turkey 1994 
and 2001, South Asia crisis 1997-1998, Argentina 2001, and have all led to a severe 
recession with some long-lasting with double-digit fall in real GDP (Stockhammer, 
2004, 2012a). 
Despite these risks and potential disadvantages, periphery countries were forced to 
liberalise the capital accounts as part of the conditionalities for structural adjustment 
loans. The World Bank and the IMF policy of privatisation and deregulation through 
SAP created a climate where domestic (periphery) bourgeoisie are freer than ever to 
transfer their nation’s wealth into financial markets and financial institutions of the 
core countries. As we shall see later, on the net basis, capital has been flowing from 
the periphery to the core and majority of studies are unable to give sufficient evidence 
in support of financial globalisation and growth benefits (Stiglitz, 2000; Kose et al., 
2009; Stockhammer, 2012; Lapavitsas, 2013; Powell, 2013). However, some 
advocates of financial globalisation argue that the benefits materialise indirectly, and 
direct impact will show up if more sophisticated methods were used (Mishki, 2006). 
Furthermore, in contrast to the orthodox economics vision, financialisation has 
resulted in the growth of financial investment and financial profit with adverse 
repercussions for the real economic sector. This has occurred in both core and semi-
periphery countries (Orhangazi, 2011). 
The literature on trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance, unlike stagnation 
of production, incorporates analysis of changes in the peripheral countries. It offers 
 
 
35 That is, to borrow in one country or currency and invest in another country or currency (sometimes 
called carry trade). 
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specific empirical insight into the commonality and divergence between how these 
developments are witnessed in the core and the periphery. For most periphery 
countries, deregulation and liberalisation of their economies were through the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).  
2.8 Financialisation and poverty alleviation: banking the unbanked 
It is essential to consider the transformation of global economic alignment to 
appreciate the macroeconomic context in which microfinance and financial inclusion 
imposed itself as a new frontier of capitalist development. The weakening of industrial 
capitalism and the growth of finance-led regime of accumulation on the one hand and 
the new channels through which credit has been flowing to the private sector; the 
predicament of social reproduction caused by neoliberal economic austerity measures 
and the spread of new market-based alternatives to the classical social safety nets. In 
this context, Harvey (2010) and Marazzi (2010) argue that expanding access to 
microcredit and loans have been the solution associated with falling effective demand 
as a result of neoliberal economic policies.    
In the era of neoliberal capitalism, financial inclusion is commonly portrayed as a 
useful poverty alleviation tool, which is also facilitating the democratisation of the 
financial market. The growth of microfinance36 and the recent emergence of financial 
inclusion, a new frontier of global development in the periphery countries have given 
rise to the debate about whether neoliberal restructuring of banking the unbanked are 
actually benefiting the poor. Mader (2015) argues that financial inclusion has 
expanded the financial sector by transferring the social and creative skills of the 
unbanked, underserved and the poor into financial products. That is, the unbanked 
have been fully integrated into the global financial market, and neoliberal's omniscient 
market-based projects have replaced the government programmes aimed at the poor. 
The new market-oriented poverty alleviation strategies place on individuals and 
households to be more responsible and develop an investor mentality by either 
accepting market conditionalities or by contracting debt. 
 
 
36 Microfinance is a type of financial services providing small credit/loan to the most vulnerable 
customers who lack access to traditional banking services. 
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Consequently, this neoliberal ideology acts as a moral force aimed at changing the 
behaviour and conduct of the poor and those at the margins. Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2008) argue that financial inclusion systems equalise opportunities by reducing 
inequality and famished off poverty while at the same time stimulating economic 
growth. Thus, finance is seen as the only way of improving the welfare of every citizen, 
and not just the poorest households. Therefore, the prudent way of alleviating poverty 
is to encourage and incentivise the impoverished households to access financial 
products to induce borrower behaviour (Rojas-Suarez, 2016). The free-market 
argument is that regular repayments promote self-discipline on the part of the poor 
borrowers. This idea of self-control, good behaviour makes borrowers liable for 
controlling irregular income streams, something which has been possible through 
receiving microcredit/loans. On this evidence, Lavinas (2013) contends that poverty 
is still viewed as a consequence of laziness and passivity, moulding it as a choice. 
Thus, the over-indebtedness, power relations and concerns of well-being, status and 
dignity are all ignored.    
The general concept of financial inclusion is that the poor lack access to microcredit 
due to the substantial collateral required by the formal financial system. This idea 
views poverty as due to the condition of financial exclusion encountered by poor 
people (Yunus, 1999). Therefore, by using social bonds as the preferred form of 
collateral, as in the case of group loans and solidarity lending, microfinance aims to 
provide the right to an economic initiative to the poor, in order to empower them to 
self-improve their life condition (Novak, 2005). Reed (2015) argues that there has 
been a substantial growth of Microfinance Industry (MFI) and its clients over the last 
30 years. The vast majority of these are in the periphery regions – Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. It is essential to recognise that the pioneering microfinance institutions 
have gone through an extensive transformation. The initial MFI were either small or 
medium-sized organisations managed by NGOs, which depended on public subsidies 
to cover operating costs (Robinson, 2001). Contemporary MFIs are managed and 
operated by large financial institutions governed by the neoliberal market-based notion 
of financial self-sufficiency. These institutions demand exorbitant interests from poor 
borrowers in order to cover their high operating costs and also to reward investors for 
the capital collected from the market. The transition from the public subsidised/state-
driven model to a market-oriented one has been enthusiastically supported by key 
45 
 
players such as the World Bank and the IMF through the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP), an organisation aimed to promote the best practices in the 
financial inclusion industry.    
Rob Aitken (2103) remarks that microfinance, microcredit and financial inclusion are 
vehicles of extracting further financial profit from the poor and the unbanked. He 
posits three ways in which microfinance and financial inclusion paradigm of poverty 
alleviation have been financialised: 
‘Practices of valuation, in which microcredit is made legible in the metric 
associated with financial markets; techniques of intermediation which 
facilitate flows of global capital into micro-credit networks; and processes of 
securitisation which have provided a vehicle through which global investors 
can access micro-credit receivables as investable objects’ (Aitken, 2013: 474).  
Aitken is of the view that delivering Microfinance (MF) through commercialised ways 
has attracted investor interest in the sector. This interest has resulted in the growth of 
rating agencies in the MFI with the main aim of providing investors with financial 
information relating to the financial performance, quality of loan portfolio, risk 
exposure and return on investment. The overall purpose has been to offer relevant 
information to promote transparency of MFI to facilitate investors’ continuous interest 
to ensure regular capital flows into the sector. Bateman (2010) argues that financial 
analysts, investors, fund managers and consultants have profited from this incentive-
driven arrangement with rising incomes. Since microfinance and financial inclusion 
advocate individual self-reliance - a feature of neoliberalism, it endorses slashing of 
state social security for individual security and effect facilitate the withdrawal of state 
public services. Bateman concludes that commercialised microcredit/loans are an anti-
poverty variant of capitalism. The emergence of microfinance investment vehicle 
dominated by global capital oligopolies – an intermediary operating between private 
investors and MFIs have increased the total assets of microfinance investment vehicle 
from $2.3 billion in 2005 to $13.5 billion in 2016 (Symbiotics, 2017). The growth of 
microfinance investment vehicles demonstrates that there is sufficient reward to keep 
private investors in MFI.     
Central to financialisation is the securitisation of consumer credit- a new technique 
adopted by financial market. This model involves the pooling of credit receivable into 
financial engineering/securities which can be traded in the financial market. The price 
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of this securitised credit is derived from the income streams generated from the interest 
payments. This financial engineering/securitisation distincts the risk of credit from its 
owners onto investors. It converts consumer credit market into the sphere of 
generating/yielding tradeable financial products based on the cycle of regular monthly 
payments. MFI has also embraced the securitisation similar to the subprime mortgage 
market. Consequently, consumers’ microcredits and loans are converted with all the 
risks attached to special purpose vehicle and selling their related cash flows to an 
investor. It is therefore not difficult to conclude that, the purpose of MFI is to generate 
a tradeable financial product that will earn regular monthly repayment to the capitalist. 
This activity generates further income to fund additional microloans. This facilitates 
investors to borrow short-term from the money market to fund microcredits and loans.  
Securitisation has been a critical feature in contemporary financial market but usually 
applied to middle-class financial products in the form of mortgages and loans of high 
value to middle and upper classes of society (Dymski and Veitch, 1996). Nevertheless, 
in a finance-led accumulation regime, financial institutions have exploited other 
markets to extract financial products. This has been possible due to the enormous 
database constructed by specialised credit-ratings agencies with new forms of credit-
scoring algorithms that invent new forms of risks and new geographies apparent.  
Although the retail financial market has always been about generating new financial 
products, the shift in the last four decades has been significant. Previously banks assets, 
in the form of loans and mortgages were matched by their liabilities such as deposit 
and savings. However, in a financialised capitalism, financial products have been 
drawn on not for the proceeds that can be earned from the interest rates spread on 
savings and credit/loans, but rather the raw materials for bonds and other securities 
that can be invented from the regular income payments that such assets can provide 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2014).     
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) of Compartamos, a leading MFI in Mexico accused 
of charging high-interest rates raised $467 million in the Mexico stock market in 2007, 
providing healthy returns on investment for investors. An Indian MFI, SKS also raised 
$1.5 billion in the Bombay Stock Exchange in 2010, an amount which is over forty 
time its entire year earnings (Reille, 2010; Feasley, 2011; Roodman, 2011). These 
examples illustrate that the interest of the poor borrower is irrelevant, and the real 
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mission of financialised MFI is to serve the interest of profit maximising private 
investors. It has been argued that microfinance and financial inclusion of the poor will 
offer a win-win solution for all. Thus, the poor who are financially excluded would be 
assisted to emerge from a condition of social exclusion, while at the same time 
microfinance companies make profits for their investors. However, the profit motive 
of the industry has resulted in high interest in microcredit to the most vulnerable 
people in society. This has drawn attention to the level of interest rates considered 
appropriate to satisfy the social mission that microcredit and financial inclusion 
companies claim to offer and what has been recognised as a profit maximising 
objective of these industries. Bateman (2010) argues that the high-interest rates 
charged have been justified on the grounds of financial self-sufficiency and continuous 
expansion to offer more microloans to increase the number of beneficiaries. This 
proposition shows that the financial inclusion industries are using poor individuals at 
a point in time to kindly accept to help other poor households some other time in the 
future. That is, in order to get out of poverty, poor households should accept high 
market interest rates to help themselves and others in similar condition. This is not the 
equitable vision of banking the unbanked. Bateman concludes that financial inclusion 
firms have failed to deal with their moral and ethical missions. 
The exorbitant interest rates, however, are just one of the contradictions that have 
accompanied the neoliberal financial inclusion paradigm of poverty alleviation. 
Cutthroat competition amongst firms in the industry have resulted in predatory lending 
in a rising saturated market. This has pushed many poor borrowers into a condition of 
over-indebtedness and suicide as reported in India and Nicaragua (Priyadarshee and 
Ghalib, 2011; Mader, 2015). The authors argue that microcredit is being used for 
consumption purposes in most cases and explain why multiple borrowing has become 
a feature in the industry – credit from one financing firm could be the only way to 
meet the repayment obligation from the previous loans. Consequently, micro 
borrowers are at risk to face a situation in which loan repayments have to be made at 
the expense of food, education and health expenditures. Failure to repay microloans is 
likely to result in exposing insolvent borrowers, harassment and further social 
exclusion (Guerin et al., 2014). 
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The World Bank argues that individualising the process of poverty alleviation means 
freeing the poor people of reliance/habituation on an estranging system of social 
protection and therefore empowering the poor for their destiny. This neoliberal idea 
manifests itself to be generous; however, it is severely disputed by the social 
relationships of the market, where it is the survival of the fittest. The privatised state 
enterprises make access to social amenities unavailable for the poor, and by 
transferring social policies, provision of which is a challenge in the periphery countries 
to the realms of the market in the form of contracts contradict any effort to alleviate 
poverty. Financial inclusion has been generally supported as an effective poverty 
alleviation tool, which is also fostering to democratise the financial sector. However, 
rising over-indebtedness has increased the level of suicides and non-performing loans 
in poor communities, undermining the trust in the whole microfinance and financial 
inclusion system as a way of alleviating the misery of poverty. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The post-war capitalism was in contrast to the pre-war era. The rise of neoliberal 
capitalism is not an accident but a well-planned and orchestrated approach. The 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the cross-border integration and production 
processes facilitated this. The global integration of production and financial systems 
was facilitated by technological changes in transport, communication and data 
processing. The dominant neoliberal idea of individual freedom and liberty assumes 
that responsibilities for successes and failures rest on the individual but not the state. 
It also limits state intervention and advocates the importance of the rule of law.  
Political economists and other disciplines have captured the exponential rise of finance 
in the concept of financialisation. The literature on financialisation offers both 
contradictory and complementary between accounts drawn from diverse disciplines. 
Four strands that stand out in the literature are the stagnation in production; French 
regulation theory of financialisation, post-Keynesianism and financialisation, and the 
trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance. All these strands deliberately 
addressed issues on the global as opposed to national accumulation. However, they 
failed to critically examine the changing behaviour/conduct of the agents of 
capitalism- bank, industrial enterprises and households both within countries and 
across borders. Like post-Keynesians, Marxist recognise the connection between 
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stagnating production on the one hand and the ascendency of finance on the other in 
the era of financialisation. However, they differ on the root cause of this financial 
expansion. Post-Keynesians argue that the rise of finance is due to inappropriate 
economic policy, while Marxists believe the rise of finance is due to the declining 
productive sector. 
The brief literature on financialisation provides very little theoretical insight into the 
emergence of the phenomenon across the world market; however, it offers essential 
case studies on the transformation of various institutional settings. 
Increasing financial flows remain the main feature of financialisation. However, it 
should not be assumed that financialisation in SSA will be homogeneous. The study 
of financial systems and the dominance of finance must acknowledge the global 
hierarchical foundations of this process. The restrictions imposed by international 
imperialism is mediated by domestic economic restructuring with rooted class 
implication and interactive transformations between economic agents. The 
relationship between the global financial systems and its international accumulation 
processes and the specific country's trajectories of integration should be incorporated 
into the research of financialisation in the periphery. For instance, SSA capitalists' 
access to the global pool of liquidity has resulted in mixed outcomes because of the 
floating exchange rate systems. SSA governments have also adopted contractionary 
monetary policies aimed to attract capital inflows, with sterilisation efforts driving the 
growth of domestic bond markets. Thus, a distinctive aspect of financialisation as it 
unfolds in the periphery. 
The next chapter examines the long-standing debate on financial development and 
economic growth. It brings together the rise of finance and the financialisation of 
everyday life and unpacks the financial profit conundrum. The chapter distinguishes 
between fictitious accumulation and real commodity accumulation. 
 
50 
 
Part Two 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Ghanaian Economy 
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 : Finance-Growth-Nexus: theoretical and 
empirical literature 
3.1 Introduction   
Heterodox currents of economic thought have mostly addressed financialisation as a 
particular configuration of the core. The previous chapter presented the rise of 
neoliberalism and the emergence of financialisation. The chapter discussed the shift 
from the Keynesian-Fordist mass-production mass consumption economic principles 
and management to the late 1970s neoliberal era and the contradictions of the 
neoliberal capitalism.  
This chapter examines the long-standing debate of finance-growth nexus. It starts with 
the rise of finance and the financialisation of everything by examining the 
collateralisation of everything that could be collateralised. The financial profit 
conundrum is explained by examining Marx's profit upon alienation, in particular 
financial profit extracted from individuals and profit derived from trading financial 
assets. The chapter further provides a clear distinction between real commodity 
accumulation and fictitious accumulation, and the balance of power between them. 
The contemporary heterodox perspective on the finance-growth debate is also 
examined in this chapter by providing supply-leading hypothesis relative to demand 
following theory. 
3.2 The rise of finance and the financialisation of everything 
Contemporary financialisation epitomises the second bout of financial dominance in 
the history of the core countries, the first covering the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century lasting until the interwar years. During that 
period, the growth of large monopolistic corporations as the dominant units of 
production emerged, most of the time organised as cartels operating in exclusive 
trading zones. Likewise, capital export and international financial markets grew 
strongly, typically associated with giant monopolistic banks that dominate 
international finance (Orhangazi, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2013). 
Contemporary financialisation has clear resemblances or comparisons but also 
distinctive features with the previous bout of financial dominance. The growth of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) dominate the international economic activity- (a 
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feature of globalisation); international banks play a prominent role in global finance; 
capital exports have grown significantly. However, there are also noteworthy 
differences between these periods. The ascendance of finance- financialisation has not 
resulted in exclusive trading zones associated with territorial empires as it did in the 
first stint. Besides, banks are not dominant over large industrial enterprises, at least in 
the core. However, there has been significant interpenetration and interconnectedness 
between the realm of finance and the sphere of production, while the financial relations 
have flourished in the economic life of workers and households in general. Panitch 
and Gindin (2004) posit that globalisation and the ascendency of global finance have 
been driven by the US state, capital, and imperialism in the modern era, and has 
necessitated the restructuring of other states according to the dictates of globalisation 
and ascendant finance (a debatable exception could be China and Russia).     
The first bout of financial dominance in the international economy led to a passionate 
debate among Marxist theorists. An essential contribution to this debate is the work of 
Hilferding (1910). The conclusions drawn from his work do not apply directly to the 
contemporary conditions of financialised capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2013). Nevertheless, 
the theoretical concepts he sets out, the issues he raised, and the links he drew between 
economic, social and political phenomena are vital for the examination of 
contemporary financialisation. Hilferding (1910) argues that as production becomes 
monopolised, large firms will increasingly depend on bank credit for real productive 
investment. 
Consequently, the relationship between financial institutions and industrial capitalists 
will lead to finance capital. Finance capital is therefore hypothetically resting on close 
links between the banking and industrial sectors through interconnecting appointments, 
information sharing, and making mutually beneficial decisions. It is essential to 
recognise that Hilferding's analysis ignores the supposed opposition between what 
Lapavitsas (2013) calls the ‘active' industrialist and ‘idle' financier. Consequently, the 
power of rentiers imposing their interests in industrial capital and reducing investment 
rate and growth was largely ignored. Somewhat finance capital was perceived as an 
amalgam of banking and industrial capital, and therefore real economic sector took an 
interest in the operations and profitability of the financial sector and vice versa. 
A new form of profit emerged as finance capital developed. Hilferding discerned 
profits from the stock market discounted at the rate of interest; however, industrial 
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capital earns the profit. Given that, the rate of profit should normally be higher than 
the rate of interest, the purchase price of shares exceeds the capital invested, if future 
returns are translated into net present value, this conforms to Marx's analysis of finance. 
The difference between the two (profit and interest) is ‘founder's profit,' which is 
extracted and given as a lump sum to those money manager capitalists who manage 
the shares on the stock market.  Part of this founder's profit also accrues to banks for 
their investment banking activities.  
 The concept of the founder's profit remains important in examining contemporary 
financial profit, including capital gains (Krippner, 2011; Orhangazi, 2011; Lapavitsas, 
2013). Hilferding saw shareholders in the same way as moneylenders and that the 
expected return on shares should be the same as the rate of interest (in addition to a 
risk premium). 
The concept of Finance Capital was used by Lenin (1917) to build the theoretical core 
of his analysis of imperialism. He stresses the importance of the tendency towards 
monopoly for both industrial and banking capital, although Hilferding was aware of 
monopolisation. Lenin posits rentier37 as a vital social group within the capitalist class 
in the era of imperialism. He stresses the significance of the re-division of the world 
by countries dominated by finance capital, therefore leading to imperialist rivalries 
and wars. 
It is worth noting that neither Hilferding nor Lenin tried to explain the ascendancy of 
finance as a result of capital escaping to the sphere of circulation looking for 
speculative financial profit. Lapavitsas (2013) argues that these authors and other 
leading Marxists at the time treated crises as a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon that could not be associated with a simple theory of the rate of profit to 
fall. He argues that classical Marxists are alien to the concept that normal state of 
capitalist production is to malfunction due to a continuously excessive organic 
composition of capital, or even due to falling ‘surplus’ absorption. Again, these 
authors would have been surprised at the notion that the rise of finance epitomises the 
‘autumn' of capitalist hegemonic power, as suggested by Arrighi (2007). Lenin 
however, saw imperialism as parasitic and decaying, but this he referred to the 
 
 
37 Lenin borrowed the notion of ‘rentier’ from Hobson. 
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capitalist mode of production as a whole, rather than to the sphere of production in 
countries where finance capital was robust. 
The theoretical analysis of Hilferding’s Finance Capital demonstrates an epochal 
transformation of capitalism that transpired in the nineteenth century until the interwar 
years of the twentieth century, related to the significant rise of finance during the same 
period. However, if this epochal transformation of capitalism has taken place, then as 
argued by Lapavitsas (2013) its roots are likely to be found in the forces of 
production/industrial enterprises and labour process/households. However, Hilferding 
has not discussed this thoroughly and there is no relevant empirical evidence provided 
in Finance Capital. This weakens the overall analysis of finance capital. Hilferding's 
analysis does not critically capture the complexity and range of the contemporary 
relations between industrial enterprises and bank capital. In the era of contemporary 
financialisation, banks do not hold the dominant position in bank-industry relations. 
As argued by Harvey (2005), Toporowski (2009), Orhangazi (2011), Lapavitsas (2013) 
and Storm (2018), banks compete with pension funds, insurance firms, and other 
financial institutions in providing external funds to industrial enterprises. Similarly, 
large industrial enterprises engage in financial activities in the open markets on their 
own account by issuing shares and bonds. Furthermore, they can engage in trade and 
consumer credit, as well as transacting forward, futures and derivatives markets on 
their account without the need for banking services. For instance, Mobile Money 
Operators in Ghana can issue shares to the public/customers to raise capital for their 
operations38.   
The ascendancy of finance in the mid-1970s was empowered by the nexus of 
supportive neoliberal thought, the global stagflation during the period, and the 
improvement in information technology tools. The improvement in financial 
technology eased the cost of financial engineering with the help of complex 
mathematical tools for pricing financial assets and supported by the 24/7 global 
financial trading with speed (Epstein, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014; Davis and Kim, 
2015). What makes the current ascendency of finance different is how financial 
intermediation has shifted from banks and other financial institutions to financial 
 
 
38 See chapter seven for detailed analysis of Mobile Money.  
55 
 
markets. A process Storm (2018) calls a move from the visible hand of relationship 
banking to the axiomatic invisible hand of apparently self-correcting, self-regulating 
efficient financial markets. 
For example, households’ mortgage debts have been financially engineered into 
securities and traded in international financial markets, while pension and savings 
invested in mutual funds and stock markets (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2011). Besides, 
the un-banked and underserved on the other hand have been entangled into the realms 
of global financial market through their daily dependence on microloans, credit and 
mobile money like banking (see chapter seven for detailed analysis of mobile money 
services) in the name of financial inclusion. The development of enforced 
indebtedness proposed by Steindl (1989) is worrying for a financial crisis. Thus, the 
life of households everywhere revolves around finance. Steindl remarks that 
households organise their daily lives around investor logic, active individual risk 
management, and involvement in international financial markets. Storm (2018) argues 
that conglomerate corporate bodies, which previously provided secure employment 
and stable retirement benefits, have been broken up into disaggregated international 
commodity chain structures to comply with global financial markets principles of 
shareholder value maximisation (SVO). (Lazonick, 2014) contends that contemporary 
decision-making powers have shifted away from corporate boardrooms to global 
financial markets. Consequently, falling real capital formation as investors transfer 
their funds to a more lucrative global financial markets. The excess funds in the 
financial markets are used mainly to invest in short-term financial instruments, which 
yield high returns that precipitated the systemic meltdown of the recent global 
financial system in 2007/08 (Storm, 2018). Thus, in pursuit of high return investments 
using the liquidity to generate more money from money- M→M1 (in the money circuit 
of capital). 
Financial markets are deeply penetrating social space by financialising everything and 
opening new enclosures/fields; for instance, insurance firms issuing healthcare bonds 
where the payoff comes from the savings made from the healthcare intervention for 
the insurer. Similarly, the International Red Cross collaboration with a German 
insurance firm to issue bonds to fund rehabilitation services in conflict zones (van der 
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Zwan, 2014; Storm, 2018). The roles of financial actors 39  have occupied bigger 
geographical scales in markets of items significant to human survival and development. 
The global markets for food, primary commodities, healthcare, education, and energy 
have all been financialised. These financial actors and financial institutions have 
converted nature into an object of accumulation strategy and have created various 
financial products aimed at the environmental crisis in the form of carbon trading 
markets, climate-sensitive derivatives, biodiversity asset bonds and disaster bonds. 
Keucheyan (2017) calls it the ‘assurantialisation’40 of climate risk. He explains the 
deliberate privatisation of risk, which has removed government responsibility and 
protection, which was previously given to farmers against any personal misfortune to 
market-based individualised insurance for farmers, workers and households. Thus, in 
a contemporary financialised economy, trading in commodities and food markets has 
nothing to do with the current and future consumption needs of households/consumers 
but the directives of financial market's alternative collateral, store of value, and assets 
role in the international economy (Clapp and Isakson, 2018). 
Consequently, the value gained/derived from futures contract of these commodities 
neither support its capacity to meet consumers’ demand for food nor smoothen output 
prices for farmers, but rather it uses as collateralised securities to endorse speculative 
shadow banking transactions. The consequences are higher food and commodity 
prices and increased price of farmlands. With big financial investors into agricultural 
commodities trading, farmers, agrifood firms and food retailers now seek gains in the 
financial markets; they have prioritised the interests of their shareholders as they 
branch into more financial activities. As a result, wages have been reduced, and 
external costs have been ignored by shifting risks to workers/consumers. With reduced 
or no government support, farmers must now manage their risks (price and weather) 
by taking out insurance- commodity exchange as hedging (Clapp and Isakson, 2018). 
These developments underpin rising inequalities in power and wealth within the food 
industry and produce further unpredictable food markets. As a result, weaken the 
resilience and sustainability of the industry, and have impeded collective action to 
 
 
39 Financial actors here refer to financial intermediaries such as banks, bond investors, pension fund, 
insurers and speculative hedge funds.  
40 The insurance of nature 
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tackle these challenges (Clapp and Isakson, 2018). Storm (2015) remarks that in the 
era of financialisation, anything that can be collateralised will be collateralised.  
Access to affordable financial products is being reconceptualised as the rights and 
responsibility of every citizen. Thus, the displacement of financial institutions by 
financial markets has had an inescapable impact on the way households; industrial 
enterprises, as well as governments, make decisions and choices. 
Governments around the world have adopted finance-friendly policies at the expense 
of social welfare to welcome cross border capital flows. Some of the policies include 
reducing capital controls, promoting liquid domestic stock markets, given 
independence of the central banks, decreasing and in some cases abolishing the 
taxation of wealth and capital gain (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002; Storm, 2015, 
2018; Bortz and Kaltenbrunner 2018). To compound the problems of the poor, the 
international institutions, notably the World Bank and the IMF narrowed the definition 
of poverty to mean lack of access to quality and affordable finance41. Consequently, 
the neoliberal economic policy comes to produce more financial relations- a new 
institution to manage the poor, the unbanked and the underserved in the society (Mader, 
2015). The hegemony of finance has shifted the focus of governments, industrial 
enterprises and households away from the real economic sector production towards 
returns/income earned through financial instruments. A process Davis (2009), Van der 
Zwan (2014), Kiely (2018) and Storm (2018) describe as the transformation from an 
industrial to a post-industrial society and the financialisation of everyday life. This has 
an important implication on the direction of government policy towards poverty 
alleviation in a country such as Ghana. Rising financial profits at the expense of 
industrial profits have been the cornerstone of contemporary financialisation. The 
imbalance of power relation between holders of capital and households resulting in 
exploitation of the latter is examined below. The next section examines the financial 
profit conundrum.       
 
 
41  See chapter six for the theoretical and empirical analyses of the Issue of poverty- definition, 
measurement and debates.   
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3.3 The financial profit conundrum- profit in Marxist economics 
One of the critical features of financialisation is the rising financial profit, empirical 
evidence for which is provided in chapter four. Many theoretical approaches to 
contemporary financialisation have classified increasing financial profit as a sign of 
limited profitability in the sphere of production and a resultant escape of capital in the 
sphere of finance (Arrighi, 2007; Krippner, 2005, 2011; Lazonick, 2012; Orhangazi, 
2012). Arrighi's historical systemic cycle of accumulation posits that financial 
expansion is the ‘autumn’ in the cyclical trajectory of hegemonic prowess in 
production and trade. That is as finance grows, capital migrates from production and 
trade to financial speculation, financial intermediation, and profit gradually and 
progressively come from financial deals.  
The concept of profit can be contended to be one of the main innovations in the field 
of political economy by Marx (1867), although his notion has not been generally 
accepted. In his view, profit is the money-form of surplus value created in production. 
Wage workers earn the equivalent of the value of labour-power as money wages but 
usually indulged in working for longer than the time-equivalent of the value received, 
thus creating extra, or surplus value. This labour-process is exploitation in production 
and constitutes the defining feature of capitalism- the difference between ‘necessary 
labour time and surplus labour-time'42. Thus, the surplus-value is determined by the 
extra portion of the working day that the labour works. The rate of surplus-value is, 
therefore, an expression of exploitation of labour by the capitalist in the production 
process. 
For Marxist Political Economy, profit is basically treated as a flow of surplus-value 
and of net output- newly created in the sphere of production. Surplus value realises a 
monetary form in the sphere of circulation through the sale of the finished product and 
ensues as the exclusive property of the capitalist who owns the means of production. 
Different forms of return emerge as the total flow of surplus-value is unevenly 
distributed among sectors under various heads in the sphere of circulation- rent for 
 
 
42 ‘Necessary labour-time' is the portion of the labour-process which produces the value of the labour 
means of subsistence. Surplus-labour time is the labour-process that is no longer necessary labour 
because it creates no value for himself but creates a surplus for the capitalist (Marx, 2004 [1867]). 
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property owners, profits for entrepreneurs actively engaged in the production and trade, 
and interest for owners of money capital available for lending. Although Marx's theory 
of surplus-value diverged significantly from Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy 
of Taxation, there are some similarities in their investigation of profit. Ricardo ([1817] 
1951) posits that profit is a newly created flow of value (embodied labour) that 
accumulates per period. However, profit is not a self-standing part of 
production/output emerging due to a normal profit-generating process. Instead, profit 
is the left-over net output that accrues to capitalists once labourers have claimed their 
share corresponding to wages. Thus, profit or the residual tends to fall as wages, and 
other costs rise. 
Similarly, Marx treated profit as part of net output accruing to capitalists. However, 
Ricardo's notion of profit as residual contrasts with Marx's theory of exploitation to 
explain the emergence of profit as a result of a typical capitalist process. Although 
Marx treated profit as part of the flow of net output accruing to capitalists, he rejects 
Ricardo's view that profit is a residual and proposed his theory of exploitation to 
explain the emergence of profit as a consequence of a feature of the capitalist process.   
Essential for this thesis is Marx's theory of profit, which has influenced other strains 
of classical political economy, which identified types of profits independent from the 
flow of production.  This strain of Marx's theory is vital to examining financial profit. 
The central notion in this regard is ‘profit upon alienation,' initiated by Steuart ([1767] 
1995). He posits that ‘real value' and ‘profit upon alienation’ are inherent in the price 
of a commodity. The necessary labour needed for production, the cost of materials and 
of subsistence of workers form the real value; while the profit upon alienation is 
derived from the residual/surplus of price above the cost of real value. The profit upon 
alienation is what forms the profit accrued to the industrial capitalist. Steuart further 
distinguishes between ‘positive profit' and ‘relative profit'. Positive profit is 
determined by the overall increase in value and output, which expands the ‘public 
good'. This is qualitatively different from relative profit, which is extracted from trade 
and unrelated to the expansion of output. The distinction is significant because, on the 
one hand, profit could come from the expansion of productive capacity- an addition to 
earlier output. On the other, profit could come from purely a zero-sum trading game 
relative to output- a gain by one party will lead a loss by another party in the sphere 
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of circulation (Lapavitsas and Levina, 2010; Lapavitsas, 2013). The latter is what 
Steuart refers to as ‘profit upon alienation’, which constitutes ‘relative profit’.  
The analysis of ‘profit upon alienation’ has many strengths relevant to this thesis. 
However, since it classifies the overall capitalist profit with ‘profit upon alienation', it 
considers capitalist profit as it emerges from a zero-sum game in exchange. In contrast, 
Marx ([1867] 2004) argues that capitalist profit is already enclosed in ‘real value', not 
least as part of normal labour required for production. Nevertheless, Marx points out 
that one party’s gain in circulation could come as a loss of another party. There is a 
distinctive feature of this form of profit from the flow of surplus value created in 
production through the exploitation of labours. Marx adopted the concept of ‘profit 
upon alienation' in his examination of financial transactions relating to the personal 
income of households. He posits that financial dealings extracting profit from 
household income is exploitative and not related to surplus-value. That is, there is 
qualitatively a distinction between exploitation occurring in financial transactions and 
exploitation occurring in the sphere of production. The financial exploitation is 
derived from a direct extraction of rent from households’ income to the rentier. This 
exemplifies the World Bank and IMF financial inclusion policy in Ghana and other 
periphery countries. Lapavitsas (2013) argues that the social factors that account for 
exploitation are related in the sphere of circulation, reflecting, in particular, the 
imbalance position of power between households/workers and capitalists in the 
financial transaction, as discussed in chapter seven.  
The exploitation in production as outlined by Marx amounts to creating a new flow of 
value out of unpaid labour, which accrues as the exclusive property of the capitalist 
who owns the factors of production and the finished products. The social factors 
underpinning this exploitation as outlined by Lapavitsas and Levina (2010) and 
Lapavitsas (2013) are the absence of property rights by households/workers over the 
means of production, as well as the lack of power of households/workers over the 
production process. In short, capitalist profits originate from a new flow of value 
created in production through the exploitation of labours. However, profit upon 
alienation emerged from zero-sum relations relating to the current stock of money 
originating through financial dealings. This concept is adopted in this thesis to analyse 
financial profit, and in particular financial profit for rentiers advancing money to 
households, governments and profit extracted from financial assets. Financial profit 
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contains elements of surplus value but broader in construction to include other forms 
of monetary increments. For Lapavitsas and Levina (2010), Orhangazi ( 2011), 
Lapavitsas (2013) and Storm (2018) financial profit is similar to the primordial type 
of profit capturing purely the excess of money returned over money advanced- M→M1 
in the money circuit of capital. 
The notion of ‘profit upon alienation' is significant to the analysis of financial profit 
earned from a mortgage, consumption loans (through mobile money services in Ghana) 
to households, and from handling pension and other funds. It is important to note that 
these forms of financial profit could be accrued to the lenders of financial assets, or 
financial institutions as fees, commission and proprietary profits. Lapavitsas (2013) 
argues that the social underpinnings of financial expropriation are partly with the non-
capitalist character of personal income. Workers and other households go into a 
financial transaction in order to obtain use-values, whether directly in the form of wage 
goods or in the future through a pension. In contrast, financial institutions enter 
financial transactions in order to make profits. There are systematic differences in 
information, organisation and social power between the two parties, which permit 
financial institutions to exploit the holders of personal income. Indeed, it is also 
possible for individual households/workers to enter a financial transaction from the 
perspective of making a profit, but this does not eliminate the systematic difference 
between individuals and financial institutions as counterparties to transactions. The 
two-way relationship between real commodity accumulation and financial 
accumulation and the change in the balance between them is examined below. 
3.4 Real commodity accumulation and fictitious accumulation 
A contemporary financial system (financial services and monetary services) provides 
a variety of purposes in capitalist accumulation. Monetary services offered by the 
financial systems include credit creation, savings, transfer of money across the 
economy, enabling foreign exchange transactions, and other monetary services. 
Financial services, however, include mainly the mobilisation of loanable funds in the 
economy and its subsequent advance through loans/credits. Besides, financial services 
include collecting spare money funds across society as well as trading loanable capital 
in the open markets (Lapavitsas, 2013:201). The monetary services of the financial 
system are often ignored or overlooked in the debate on financialisation despite its 
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vital importance to financialised capitalism. Lapavitsas posits that monetary and 
financial services are closely intertwined through the creation of credit by financial 
institutions.   
The importance of distinguishing between real and financial/fictitious accumulation 
originates with Marx43 who argued that ‘money' capital available for lending takes a 
separate form of accumulation compared to capital employed in production. From this 
viewpoint, financialisation could be seen as a change in the balance between real and 
financial/fictitious accumulation, and specifically, as Lapavitsas puts it, 
financialisation represents the asymmetric expansion of fictitious compared to real 
commodity accumulation since the neoliberal era. 
Real commodity accumulation comprises industrial, agricultural and merchant's 
capital, and this occurs in both production and circulation. The actual form it takes 
includes the addition and improvement to the means of production, the expansion of 
real value, the growth of the labour force, and the development of the means of 
communication, amongst others. Moreover, it further relates to the sphere of 
distribution, since it leads to the division of output between wages and profit. The key 
aspect of real commodity accumulation is the production and expansion of surplus-
value, which yields positive profit from the sale of the product, which later facilitates 
real investment. The pointers of real commodity accumulation, thus, include 
expansion of output- value and use-value, an increase of the workforce and 
enlargement of real capital investment. 
Fictitious accumulation, on the other hand, originates in the sphere of circulation and 
remote from the real production; but could also be seen in the scope of distribution 
primarily through the creation of financial profit as discussed above. 
Financial/fictitious accumulation mainly takes the form usually undertaken by 
financial markets/institutions in the form of mobilising, trading, and advancing 
loanable capital. One key feature that sets real accumulation apart from financial 
accumulation is that the latter does not offer a quantifiable final product- value and 
use-value (Orhangazi, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2013). Just like the real commodity 
accumulation, financial/fictitious accumulation provides jobs needed to undertake the 
 
 
43 See Marx’s Capital Vol.3, pp. 599-607. 
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various sophisticated financial products and transactions. However, the relationship 
between the expenditure of the workforce and the degree of fictitious accumulation is 
somewhat incongruence (Krippner, 2011; Orhangazi, 2011; Storm, 2018). Likewise, 
the huge capital investment in establishing financial intermediaries do not match the 
degree of fictitious accumulation. This is because it mainly deals with mobilising, 
trading and advancing loanable capital.  The critical aspect of financial accumulation 
is heaping up claims on others- mobilising financial assets which have their own 
(fictitious) prices (Orhangazi, 2011; Storm, 2018). 
Another distinctive feature is that whereas real accumulation relates to stocks, 
financial accumulation is mainly a flow concept. That is, financial accumulation 
involves the flow of mobilising and advancing of loanable capital, and in contrast, real 
commodity accumulation relates to the expansion of industrial, agricultural and 
merchant's capital- the stock concept. 
The balance between these two is shaped by the characteristic difference between the 
forms of accumulation. The operation of the financial systems varies across countries, 
regions, and even cultural framework within which industrial, agricultural and 
merchant's capital interact with loanable capital. Therefore, the connection between 
real and financial accumulation has historical and geographical dependent characters 
(Orhangazi, 2011). Real accumulation requires a complex financial system, and 
therefore necessarily requires the development of financial accumulation; however, 
the outlook and the conduct of financial systems vary according to specific and 
historical factors (Orghanzi, 2007, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2013). A given state of real 
accumulation in terms of growth rates, employment, and profitability, could 
correspond to significantly varying states of financial accumulation. Since historical, 
institutional, political, and cultural factors play a pivotal role in the relationship 
between real and fictitious accumulation, there can be no perfectly optimal balance 
between them. Orhangazi (2007, 2011) outlines two main channels in which 
financial/fictitious accumulation could impede real accumulation. Firstly, he argues 
that diverting capital into financial assets crowd-out real sector accumulation. Thus, if 
firms put more money into financial assets, there will be less available for real 
investment. Given the incentive to earn higher returns in financial assets, more capital 
flows into financial assets at the expense of the real economic sector. This, however, 
assumes external funds are limited, and any extra capital come at a higher cost. 
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Secondly, he remarks that the pressure on management to generate short-term profit 
shifts investment to the financial sector due to the lucrative quick returns as opposed 
to real investments. However, it could be argued that earnings from financial 
investment, albeit rapid returns in the short-run, could be used to fund real investments 
in the medium to long-run. 
Another way to assess how financialisation hampers real investment is through 
pressure on industrial enterprises to increase payments to financial markets in the form 
of dividends and stock buybacks by firms (Orhangazi, 2007). Tobin (1965) argues that 
there is an inverse relationship between real accumulation and fictitious accumulation. 
He posits that real and financial investment are substitutes. Thus, if financial assets 
provide better returns, it will attract more capital to the detriment of real sector 
investment. He concludes that investment in financial assets could not compensate for 
the detriment in the real sector at the macroeconomic level by merely reallocating 
funds.      
Equally, Crotty (2005) presents that in the era of neoliberal capitalism, industrial 
enterprises have expanded their financial investments by acquiring financial 
subsidiaries or expanding existing ones to accrue financial profits. He argues that 
industrial enterprises diversifying into financial markets was a response to the falling 
rate of profit in the real economic sector in the last four decades. Stockhammer (2004) 
remarks that contemporary transformation in corporate governance as a result of rising 
financial profit has resulted in different priorities and incentives of firms' management. 
Management adopts the preferences of financial markets due to rising financial profit. 
The consequences of managerial preferences for short-term financial profit, as 
opposed to long-term growth, are the declining real sector investment and falling 
productivity.  He concludes that the transformation since the 1980s can be 
conceptualised as a displacement of the earlier regulated capitalist objectives of long–
term growth through real capital accumulation for a short-term investment in financial 
assets. This process of managerial objectives of long-term growth prevailed until the 
late 1970s when the neoliberal ideology of institutional investors interested in short-
term growth in share/stock prices emerged. 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000) describe the approach as a shift from a ‘retain and 
invest' strategy to a ‘downsize and distribute' approach. They contend that 
management prioritise allocating firms' revenue in a way that will increase the firms' 
65 
 
share prices as well as the valuation of stock options. These institutional changes have 
given priority to ‘shareholders value' together with the increase of institutional 
investors, the alignment of the interests of managers with those of shareholders 
through the use of stock options, and the threat of takeover in the active markets for 
corporate control. Duménil and Lévy (2004) note that real capital accumulation 
processes follow the rate of retained profits in the economy. Thus, increased financial 
pay-outs in the form of interest and dividend payments reduce retained profits and so 
should reduce the rate of accumulation44. Although it could be argued that in efficient 
financial markets firms could raise capital to fund profitable investment opportunities; 
it is clear from the above that industrial enterprises are in a position in which, managers 
first transfer a considerable part of their earnings to the financial markets and then 
compete with all other borrowers to re-acquire their funds back. A process Froud et al. 
(2000) describe as ‘coupon pool capitalism.' This process of discharging the earnings 
to the financial markets and then compete with everyone else to re-acquire these funds 
increases the degree of uncertainty and reduces the planning horizon for investment 
funding. Thereby, unlike the earlier period of ‘retain and invest', managers now could 
not be sure of the amount of these funds they will get back and at what cost. They 
conclude that the pressure to offer rising short-term returns to shareholders, impedes 
investments that have more extended periods of gestation by creating uncertainty 
about the ability of the firm to finance future projects. 
In summing the above, Gowan (1999) remarks that global financial markets assert 
mitigation charges upon the real economic sector and that the contemporary financial 
system is not a source of finance for productive projects. In his view, it is erroneous 
to assume that international financial markets are financing the development of the 
real economic sector. 
 
 
44 Duménil and Lévy (2004) observed huge data from France and the US, which were consistent with 
a slower pace of capital accumulation on the one hand and rising interest and dividend payments on the 
other.   
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3.5 Contemporary heterodox perspectives on finance-led growth 
debate  
The 2007/08 financial crisis reignited the debate of the relevance of deepening the 
financial system45. There is a sharp disagreement among economists concerning the 
impact of the financial sector on economic growth and development. The dominant 
hypotheses are the demand-leading hypothesis and supply-leading hypothesis. 
According to heterodox economics, financial crises and more recently 2007/2008 
global financial crisis is a result of deregulation and liberalisation policies in the 1980s, 
which contributed widely to the instability in the global financial and economic 
systems. The internationalisation/globalisation of the financial systems allows the 
crisis to spread across borders.  
The disastrous consequences of recurring financial crises facilitated heterodox 
assessments to gain extensive attention in academic discourse and several policy 
institutions. The growth of global capital flows as a result of the neoliberal policies -
liberalisation and deregulation has been described as the new phase of contemporary 
capitalism- financialisation, a phenomenon whose effects are described by many 
scholars as damaging to real capital accumulation and sustainable economic 
development (Orhangazi, 2011; Stockhammer, 2012; Lapavitsas, 2013). Foster and 
Magdoff (2009) argue that this is a gravitational shift of the economy from real 
production to financial/fictitious engineering. 
Banks, financial markets and economic growth: the dilemma 
Among the notable contributions to finance-growth nexus studies are Bagehot (1873), 
Schumpeter (1912), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) who offer 
prudent arguments in favour of deregulation and liberalisation of the financial sector 
to induce economic growth. However, the studies of Joan Robinson (1952), Robert 
Lukas (1988), Merton Miller (1998), Plihon and Miotti (2001), Jeanneney and Kpodar 
(2004), and Laizoz (2006) reject finance as an ‘over-stressed' deciding factor of 
 
 
45 Financial deepening is a term used by economists to refer to the increasing provision of financial 
products. It can refer to both a wider choice of services and better access for different socioeconomic 
groups. Financial deepening can affect both individuals' and societies' economic situations. It is used in 
this thesis to represent the development of the financial sector. 
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economic growth and posit that where enterprise leads, finance follows. Thus, finance 
in their view is not a critical determining factor of economic growth, but instead, 
economic growth drives financial development; hence, finance merely responds to 
growth needs. On the one hand, Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gurley and Shaw 
(1955), Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) dismiss the view that the 
relationship between financial sector development and economic growth can be 
ignored without significantly restricting the understanding of economic growth. This 
is important for policymaking, because if finance merely acts to changes in demand 
of the real economic sector, then it will lessen the intensity of studies on the causes 
and development of financial sectors. In contrast, if there were convincing evidence 
of a long-run positive impact of financial development on sustainable economic 
development, then this will call for an urgent need for intensifying research on the 
political, legal, regulatory, and policy determinants of financial systems. 
As noted by Bagehot (1873) in his reference to the British industrialisation46, finance 
promotes capital accumulation and reduces risks that are inherent in particular 
investment projects. Bagehot suggested that British investors and managers had 
sufficient knowledge concerning businesses together with market and economic 
environments in the country. As a result, by improving information on firms, managers, 
and market conditions, financial intermediaries can drive economic growth. Financial 
intermediaries produce better information, improve resources allocation, and foster 
growth. Thus, besides identifying a market niche, an entrepreneur requires finance 
provided by financial systems. Financial intermediaries as King and Levine (1993) 
and Morales (2003) remark that it may also boost the rate of technological innovation 
by identifying those entrepreneurs with the most excellent chances of successfully 
initiating new goods and production process. This supports the central view of 
Schumpeter's (1912:74) argument about finance in the process of economic 
development: ‘the banker, therefore, is not so much a middle man…. he authorises 
people in the name of society….to innovate'. Thus, in the view of Schumpeter, the 
supply of credit by banks was a crucial determinant for growth in the industrialisation 
 
 
46 The industrial revolution in England characterises the transformation from labour intensive (manual 
production) to capital intensive (machine production) that changed the social structure of the British 
economy.   
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eras by providing capital for technological innovation and productive ventures. 
Therefore, financial systems re-allocate resources to the best productive projects by 
advancing credit to entrepreneurs to produce goods and services47. In contemporary 
capitalism, Schumpeter's view could be achieved by public financial systems as 
opposed to private financial systems seeking the short-term return from the financial 
market. 
However, the assumption that capital somehow will be inexplicably flowing towards 
productive ventures is less convincing because banks require the multifaceted task of 
mitigating information as well as transaction costs. Besides, what Schumpeter failed 
to mention in the bank-firm relationship is the absolute power of the bank managers, 
which could severely weaken the corporate governance of firms. This is because it 
will be relatively easy for the bank insiders to exploit their creditors and may not be 
immune to corruptible influences. 
Keynes ([1936] 2004) however, attached partial importance to the role of finance on 
the principle of an efficient and perfect money market. That is equalling the money 
market equilibrium to the macroeconomic equilibrium. He posits the importance of 
financial intermediaries in mobilising savings that could be channelled to investment 
projects to facilitate capital accumulation, employment and economic growth. 
Consequently, disequilibrium in the financial sector could impact on the real economic 
sector in multiple ways. 
The deepening of financial systems can accelerate economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2004). Thus, a well-developed financial sector with varying financial 
services ahead of time of their demand will accelerate economic growth by 
reallocating scarce resources to the competing needs. Hence, financial sector 
deepening as a crucial determinant of economic growth cannot be overlooked 
(Goldsmith 1969; Hicks, 1969). When a significant portion of domestic income is 
reinjected into the economy, it creates domestic capital accumulation, which enhances 
economic growth. Financial intermediations that connect savers with borrowers and 
other financial services stimulate growth rates as well as improving the performance 
 
 
47  See Lapavitsas (2013), and Marx capital vol. 3 for a critique of borrower, lender and monied 
capitalism.   
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of the economy. The establishment of financial institutions facilitates new financial 
instruments and a variety of financial assets that are critical in the production process. 
The core argument here is that financial sector deepening impacts positively on 
economic growth and development through efficient use of capital stock. As 
Galodsmith (1969) posits, there is no doubt that the impact of financial sector 
development on economic growth results in an alternative circulation of capital 
expenditure within the economy, whether the outcome is positive or otherwise.  
The hypotheses of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) extended Goldsmith (1969) 
finance-led theory by adding that financial sector development does not suggest 
singularly higher productivity of capital, but higher savings rates that promote savings 
mobilisation which could reallocate for investment in the real economic sector. 
Contrasting Goldsmith’s (1969) view that financial sector development and growth 
are mutually thought as endogenous, McKinnon and Shaw’s central point which is an 
extension of Hayek's thesis (of omniscient markets), is the impact of economic policies 
that impede the development of the financial sector. They argue that financial 
repression damages economic growth and develop a theoretical model with debt 
intermediation. Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) argue that 
development in the financial sector impacts positively on economic growth. They 
suggest that inefficient financial systems and weak capital markets deter global 
investors because underdeveloped financial markets lack liquidity and suffer from 
high transaction costs. Thereby, the local economy becomes unattractive, and 
investment activities remain underdeveloped. These authors advocate financial 
liberalisation programme and the adoption of structural reforms in the banking and 
financial sector to attract foreign investors to boost the domestic economy. They argue 
that financial market financing is effective than financing through debt because it is 
less expensive and more flexible and secure for lenders, and above all, it allows 
optimal allocation of scarce resources which lead to the acceleration of growth rate.  
They conclude that financial intermediaries could increase the real returns to savers 
and likewise decrease the real cost to investors by way of accommodating liquidity 
preferences, reducing risks as a result of diversification, enhancing operational 
efficiency and cutting information costs. 
The work of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) contends that 
liberalisation of interest rates promotes banking competition that will stimulate capital 
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investment and economic growth. The development of the banking sector through 
liberalisation of interest rates will spur the accumulation of savings. Higher interest 
rates will encourage savers; this saving accumulation will serve as a source of 
investments financing. The investment adds to the capital stock and creates 
employment and increases productivity that leads to economic growth. According to 
this tradition, there is a strong positive relationship between developments in the 
financial and banking systems and economic growth. 
The supporters of the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) hypotheses argue that state restrictions 
on banking system policies over time slow down financial developments and damage 
economic growth. The imposition of governmental restrictions obstructs the dynamics, 
the efficiency, and competitiveness of the financial system. Consequently, households’ 
incentive to save will decrease as the real interest rate falls, which in turn will reduce 
savings mobilisation and therefore decrease the amount available for investment. This 
process will limit capital investment, which will reduce productivity and economic 
growth. Accordingly, it is expected that financial liberalisation will include interest 
rate reforms that will promote savings which will facilitate the rate of real capital 
formation, increase productivity and economic growth in the periphery countries. 
The Neo-Structuralist School48 on the other hand, have argued that there is an inverse 
relationship between financial market deepening and long-term economic growth rates. 
Advocates of this tradition focus on the consequences of the implementation of the 
liberalisation programme on real economic activities and recommend financial 
repression. Laizoz (2006) points out that liberalisation of financial markets may 
impede growth if curb markets (trading shares outside the official stock market) 
become dominant over the official channel of financing investments. The work of 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2004) on the impact of financial sector deepening on financial 
instability, found that, the expansion of the banking industry and financial sector 
deepening through financial liberalisation and deregulation, led in vast majority of 
cases to financial instability and financial crises followed by slowdown and recession 
 
 
48 Neo-structuralism is a contemporary version of a structuralist current of thinking, which argue that 
underdevelopment is not a cause of exogenous factors or bad policy, but an intrinsic feature ingrained 
in social and economic structures. Advocates oppose neoliberal mantra of stabilisation, privatisation 
and liberalisation.    
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in domestic economies 49 . Plihon and Miotti (2001) assert that the financial 
liberalisation policies adopted by (or in many cases forced on) many periphery 
countries to develop their banking sectors and strengthen the financial market 
structures, were closely followed by an accentuation of the banking crisis and the 
precipitation of new risky behaviours. Thereby, trade and financial liberalisation of 
the capital account could be viewed as a catalyst for the recent financial instability. 
Therefore, development in the financial sector has adverse effects on long-run 
economic growth. 
The proponents of this tradition argue that finance is demand-following and posit that 
a growing economy culminates in demand for credit and financial products which will 
facilitate financial institutions to respond spontaneously to the rising demand for these 
financial products/services. Robinson (1952:86) argues that ‘where enterprise leads, 
finance follows.’ Thus, financial sector development is not a critical determinant for 
long-run economic growth. In his view, the financial sector deepening is ‘demand 
following' and not a cause of economic growth. Ang (2008) asserts that when an 
economy is growing, the demand for financial products stimulates the development of 
the financial system by establishing new financial providers, financial actors and 
financial services in the domestic economy. Thus, financial sector deepening per se 
does not cause economic growth but instead follows the growing demand emerging 
from the real economic sector. Others such as Lucas (1988)) and Singh (1997) contend 
that financial sector deepening may obstruct economic growth and sustainable 
development. 
In support of demand-following tradition, Lucas (1988) questions the role of the 
financial sector deepening in sustainable development. He dismisses financial 
deepening as an ‘overstated determining factor in the growth debate. He argues that 
total factor productivity is determined exogenously, suggesting a somewhat weak 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. This, in his view, 
is the consequence of diminishing returns to capital, suggesting that financial variables 
may influence the level of income but not the growth of income in an economy. 
 
 
49 See David Harvey (2005) for an account of Chile’s economy before and after the liberalisation of the 
financial market. 
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3.6 Economic functions of financial intermediaries 
Financial systems have influenced the allocation of resources throughout the history 
of capitalism. The emergence of banks that enhance the acquisition of information 
about firms and managers undoubtedly alter the allocation of credit. Besides, financial 
contracts that make investors more confident about returns on their investment affect 
how people allocate their savings. Likewise, money and capital markets development 
promote liquidity of the financial system that encourages the mobilisation of savings 
and facilitates resources to flow towards its most efficient use (Merton and Bodie, 
1995). 
A practical approach in understanding how financial systems impact on savings and 
investment decisions and hence, economic growth, has been the work of Levine (1997, 
1999, and 2005). She presents ways through which financial systems promote 
economic growth. These include the mobilisation of savings, efficient allocation of 
capital, supervision of managers, simplifying risks trading and enforcing contracts in 
the trading of goods and services. Although there are alternative ways of classifying 
these functions 50 , Levine suggests that financial development provides quality 
financial services and therefore reduces the impacts of asymmetric information and 
transaction costs. As a result, financial development involves improvements to i) 
production of ex-ante information about investments, ii) monitoring of investments 
and implementation of corporate governance, iii) trading, diversification, and 
management of risks, iv) mobilisation and pooling of savings, and v) exchange of 
goods and services (Levine, 2005:870). Each of these financial functions may 
stimulate savings and investment decisions and hence, economic growth. Thus, 
decreasing the cost of financial intermediation facilitates investment due to the lower 
cost of borrowing; as a result, stimulating economic growth. Likewise, mobilising 
savings comprise the ability to overcome the transaction costs of accumulating from 
individuals as well as information asymmetries. This suggests that banks play an 
essential role in channelling resources from surplus unit-lenders to deficit unit-
borrowers for investments projects. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) remark that the 
 
 
50 See for instance, Merton and Bodie (1995, 2004) for alternative ways of categorising the functions 
provided by the financial system. 
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process climaxes in capital accumulation, productivity gains and therefore, economic 
growth. Thus, by mobilising savings from households, financial intermediaries 
provide reasonable returns to savers and advancing credit to a largely diversified range 
of ventures facilitating the capital accumulation process and economic growth.   
However, the adverse effect of the illiquid stock market on growth rates in the 
periphery countries is more significant than banks (Singh, 1991; Levine, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004; Masoud and Hardaker 2012). Singh (1991) for 
instance, argues that the instability of the stock market, deterrence of risk-averse 
savers, the growth of short-term speculative investors looking for quick returns 
relative to long-term growth are the major drawbacks in the periphery and has 
considerable influence on the performance of the economy. Moreover, the critical 
drawback of Harrod-Domar Growth model51 in the periphery is its limited application. 
There is a high marginal propensity to consume in many periphery countries, and 
therefore, any extra income earned would be spent rather than saved, which would 
result in domestic savings gap. Besides, the lack of sound financial systems and the 
high cost of capital (see chapter five) also limits the viability of such a model. 
Increased household savings may not necessarily mean the availability of capital for 
real sector investment. Weaknesses and deficiencies in human capital in many 
periphery countries limit the capital-output ratio of the model.  
 Empirical evidence on finance and growth 
Studies on the interaction of finance and growth assess the impact of the operations of 
the financial systems on economic growth. That is, whether the impact is economically 
significant and whether specific components of the financial system (such as banks, 
and stock markets) play any significant role in fostering growth at different phases of 
economic development. The discussion starts with cross-country studies of finance-
growth nexus. The second part examines econometric approaches to finance and 
 
 
51 Harrod-Domar Growth Model argues that the level of national savings and the productivity of capital 
investment (input-output ratio) are the significant determinants of economic growth. The model stresses 
the cyclical relationship between domestic savings, investment, capital stock and economic growth.   
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growth based on cross-country case studies and recent econometric studies in the 
context of Ghana52.  
Cross-country studies of the finance-growth nexus 
The pioneering cross-country work on finance-growth nexus was led by Goldsmith 
who posits that ‘one of the most critical problems in the field of finance, if not the 
single most important one….is the effect that financial structure and development have 
on economic growth’ (1969:390). Thus, he sought to examine whether finance exerts 
a causal effect on growth and whether the combination of markets and intermediaries 
operating in an economy influences economic growth. Goldsmith (1969) based his 
work on data compiled from 35 countries between 1860 and 1963 on the value of 
financial intermediation assets as a share of economic growth. He presumed, albeit 
with ample qualifications, that the depth of the financial sector is positively related to 
the quality of financial activities offered by the financial systems. His cross-country 
studies pointed to the fact that over time, the size of the financial sector relative to the 
economic output increases as economies develop and peaks at about three times of a 
country’s GDP. His result shows a positive relationship between the development in 
the financial system and the level of economic activity, but he failed to deliberate on 
the direction of the causality. As Levine (2005) pointed out, Goldsmith did not take a 
stand on whether financial development causes growth. Besides, he was unable to 
provide much cross-country evidence of the connection between economic growth and 
the structure of the financial system due to lack of data on securities market 
development for a wide range of countries. 
Thus, Goldsmith’s (1969) work raises several key issues, all of which he presciently 
stresses, that subsequent studies have tried to resolve. These include the fact that the 
investigation involves only 35 countries. Also, the investigation does not 
systematically control for other factors that could influence economic growth. 
Furthermore, the study did not investigate whether financial development is connected 
with productivity growth and capital accumulation, which they stress. Last but not 
least, the examination did not shed light on whether financial markets, non-bank 
 
 
52 See chapter nine for econometric analysis of finance-growth-poverty nexus in Ghana. 
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financial intermediaries, or the combination of markets and intermediaries matter for 
economic growth. 
Building on the pioneering work of Goldsmith (1969) and addressing some of the 
limitations of his work, King and Levine (1993) examined 77 countries over 29 years. 
To rectify the problems identified in Goldsmith’s (1969) work, they systematically 
control other factors influencing long-run growth. The findings show that financial 
development measured by private credit relative to GDP (PRIVY), the size of the 
financial system (DEPT) and how central and commercial banks allocate credit to the 
household (BANK) has a positive and significant effect on growth indicators- real 
GDP per capita, capital stock and productivity growth. They concluded that the initial 
level of financial development and growth is significantly large. However, this 
example does not explain the causes of financial development. They only posit the 
possibility of a significant long-term impact of financial development on growth. 
Although they addressed some of the limitations of previous studies, cross-country 
regression cannot eliminate them all. Thus, though King and Levine (1993) 
demonstrated that finance has a positive impact on economic growth, they failed to 
address the issue of causality. The authors also centred their investigations simply on 
banks and did not consider other aspects of the financial market.  
The work of Levine and Zervos (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996, 2004) 
examined the performance of stock markets on economic growth. They considered 
about 50 economies and found a positive relationship between stock market 
development and long-term growth rates. However, due to the speculative and illiquid 
nature of stock markets in SSA and other periphery countries, such fundamental 
conjecture from cross-section techniques could be precarious (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997).  
A study by the McKinsey Global Institute (1999) on the effect of financial sector 
performance on growth rates, reported that the performance of the financial sector 
positively influences capital productivity. The report studied the productivity of 
capital in three core countries from 1974 to 1993. The findings indicate a higher per 
capita wealth in the US ($26,500) than in Germany ($21,900) and Japan ($20,900) 
using 1993 US Prices. They argued that there is a positive relationship between the 
productivity of capital and wealth accumulation. Accordingly, the financial market in 
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the US performs better in facilitating profitable projects, and in return, reward savers 
better than those in Germany and Japan.  
Contemporary literature on econometric models for Ghana  
Empirical research on finance-growth nexus is limited in Ghana, except for the 
inconsistent/conflicting studies by Quartey and Prah (2008), Adu, Marbuah and Tei 
Mensah (2013) and Adusei (2013). Quartey and Prah (2008) found some evidence of 
finance-led growth when examining the ratio of broad money to GDP. However, the 
evidence presented using private credit (as a proxy for financial deepening) relative to 
GDP demonstrates no relationship between financial sector development and 
economic growth. That is neither supply-leading response nor growth-led finance 
(demand-following). Esso (2010) also examined the relationship of financial system 
deepening and growth rates in six West African countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and found that economic growth leads 
financial development in only Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.  
More recently, Adu, Marbuah and Tei Mensah (2013) reported that the impact of 
financial sector development on economic growth depends on the choice of financial 
indicators used as a proxy. They examined the long-run impact of financial sector 
deepening on economic growth in Ghana. The model findings show an adverse effect 
of broad money growth on economic growth; however, they found a positive impact 
of private sector credit on economic growth.  Their findings, therefore, suggest the 
choice of financial sector proxy is a critical factor in the finance-growth nexus. Adusei 
(2013) conducted annual time-series (from 1971 to 2010) using private credit and 
broad money as financial development proxies. His findings show that development 
in the financial system in Ghana impede economic growth.  
The World Bank, IMF and other orthodox economists have contended that 
development in the financial systems drives economic growth. However, the evidence 
is mixed, and the argument on whether financial development is the cause or the effect 
of the growth process is still not settled. Another debate is the issue of a correct 
measure or appropriate indicator of financial development. This thesis aims to employ 
time series econometric techniques to try to address these concerns in the literature 
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3.7 Dynamics of financial development, income distribution, 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Ghana  
The interplay between the ascendency of finance, economic growth, and poverty 
alleviation has captured the attention of both policymakers and researchers since the 
divergences between theory, and the result of practical policy application with regard 
to the relationship of these factors have been rather conspicuous. Theoretically, the 
financial sector has a strong relationship with the real economy through the provision 
of financial resources to the factors of production, stimulating the production of real 
output, increasing employment opportunities and reducing poverty levels. 
Paradoxically, in many cases, countries experiencing fast financial development have 
demonstrated greater income inequality, implying that the effort to reduce poverty 
levels may not have been realised despite rapid development in the financial sector.  
Using data from Indonesia Central Statistics Agency, Dewi et al. (2018) argue that a 
1-percentage increase in economic growth was tagged to reduce the poverty level by 
0.116% over the period 2010-2015; however, in reality, it only reduced the poverty 
levels by just 0.059%. 
Understanding the relationship between financial development and poverty reduction 
is of particular significance for Ghana. Over the last few decades, the financial sector, 
albeit liberalisation and deregulation policies, has become the engine of growth for the 
real economic sector through the accumulation of capital and technological 
advancement. The contribution of the financial sector to economic development, as 
measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP increased from 20.5% in 2004 to 33.3% 
in 2018, Private credit relative to GDP also increased from just under 7% in 2004 to 
17.7% in 2016. Ghana achieved nationwide poverty reduction target set by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. Poverty rates in Ghana halved to 
24.2% in 2013, two years before the target date of 2015. Since then, poverty alleviation 
has stalled; between 2013 and 2017, poverty rates reduced by just 0.8% to the new 
rate of 23.4% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2018). 
Furthermore, there are wide regional variations with the rural-urban divide. With its 
substantial growth in the population currently estimated at 29 million (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2018), it is estimated that nearly seven million (6.786) Ghanaians 
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are living below the poverty line. This absolute figure is not different from the 1990 
levels.   
As Ghana aspires to achieve a higher middle-income status sooner than later, it is 
evident that a concerted effort to reduce poverty in Ghana is urgently needed. Since 
the various economic development programmes undertaken to eradicate poverty will 
likely be effective with the assistance of resource mobilisation, substantial 
developments in the financial sector are expected to attract these resources. Many 
multi-lateral agencies, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and Africa Development Bank (AfDB) have long been accelerating the development 
agenda of the financial sector in Ghana to attract external resources as part of broader 
efforts to eradicate poverty. On the domestic level, the Bank of Ghana has consistently 
made concerted effects to provide a stable and enabling environment for financial 
sector growth. 
Previous research on the impact of financial development on poverty reduction 
documented conflicting and debatable findings across countries, data and 
methodologies. For instance, Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2009), Inoue and Hamori 
(2012), Khan et al. (2012) and Chemli (2014) reported causality running from 
financial sector development to poverty reduction. However, the work of Ho and 
Odhiambo (2011) and Uddin et al. (2014) presented a bidirectional causality between 
development in the financial system and poverty. Although majority of studies 
reported a positive relationship from the development in financial systems on poverty 
reduction (Beck et al. 2007; Dhrifi, 2014; Shahbazet al. 2015), others suggest that 
financial sector development apparently causing poverty levels to increase. 
In the context of SSA countries, minimal empirical research has been made to 
investigate the interaction between financial systems development and poverty 
reduction. The few empirical research includes Odhiambo (2009) for South Africa, 
Odhiambo (2010) for Kenya, and Odhiambo (2009a) for Zambia presented a positive 
impact of financial sector development on poverty reduction. However, Aye (2013) 
provided evidence from Nigeria, showing causality from poverty to financial 
development. Dauda and Makinde (2014) maintain that that, there are no significant 
effects of the financial system deepening on poverty levels in Nigeria. Keho (2017) 
investigated six SSA countries and found that development in the financial system 
causes poverty alleviation but not directly. He found that in Cameroon and Gabon, 
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financial development causes economic growth, which creates job opportunities and 
higher wages, hence poverty reduction. However, his findings from Nigeria and South 
Africa show that poverty alleviation causes financial sector deepening. Therefore, it is 
difficult to conclude from Keho's findings that there is a direct causal link running 
from financial sector deepening to poverty reduction. The author concludes that there 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that the development in financial system causes 
poverty reduction in many periphery countries. That is, an expansion of private credit 
relative to GDP does not necessarily lead to improved well-being for the poorest 
households. 
While most of these studies were conducted in Asia, Latin America and SSA, none 
has focused on the Ghanaian case. Furthermore, these studies examined causality 
between the financial sector and poverty alleviation, but no interest was given to the 
relative strengths of the financial sector in reducing poverty and the degree to which 
changes in financial development cause poverty levels. The purpose of this thesis is to 
try and fill this vacuum by providing a more recent empirical evidence on the 
contribution of financial sector development on poverty reduction, particularly in the 
Ghanaian context, using the more recent Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS7). 
Given that poverty reduction has been a critical issue in Ghana, to the best of our 
knowledge this thesis is among the first attempts to provide empirical evidence on the 
financial sector-poverty reduction nexus in Ghana using the more recent national 
poverty data published in 2018. It also tries to fill in an existing gap in the literature 
by investigating the causality between the financial sector development and poverty 
reduction, assessing the relative strengths of the dominance of financial institutions, 
financial actors and financial motives in the war against eradicating poverty. 
By further exploring the issues concerning the financial sector and poverty reduction 
expansively, the findings of this study are expected to provide significant inputs for 
the relevant authority to formulate policies to ensure a meaningful contribution from 
the financial sector that could ultimately help to alleviate poverty. The study also 
makes a methodological contribution to the literature in terms of using vigorous 
investigation techniques- dynamic Granger causality test based on error correction 
mechanism in arriving at robust and possibly conclusive empirical evidence for the 
financial development-poverty reduction nexus. 
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3.8 Conclusion  
The rise of finance and the financialisation of everything examined the consequences 
of the shift in financial intermediation from banks and other financial institutions to 
financial markets. The consequences of this shift are the rising profit of financial assets 
and the collateralisation of everything that can be collateralised. As financial profit 
grows, capital then migrates from the real economic sector to financial speculation. 
The concept of profit upon alienation provides the reasons why so much financial 
profit is accrued from mortgage, consumption loans, and from handling pension and 
other funds to the rentier money lender. 
The distinction between fictitious accumulation and real commodity accumulation 
provided the balance of power between them. While real accumulation is a stock 
concept, financial accumulation is a flow concept. There is no perfect optimal balance 
between financial and real accumulation due to historical, political, institutional as 
well as the cultural relationship in each geographical setting. However, increasing 
financial investment crowds-out real accumulation. Thus, as firms' increased 
investment into financial assets, there will be less for real accumulation. Consequently, 
rising financial profit will attract financial/fictitious accumulation at the expense of 
real accumulation. The pressure on firm managers to increase profit in the short-run 
can shift investment into financial assets that yield quick returns.    
The contemporary heterodox perspective on finance-growth debate provides supply-
leading hypothesis relative to demand leading theory arguments. Supply-leading 
hypothesis, on the one hand, provides prudent arguments in favour of deregulations 
and liberalisation of the financial system to stimulate economic growth and argue that 
development of the financial systems cannot be overlooked in addressing economic 
growth debate. Consequently, well developed financial systems together with 
financial products ahead of their demand, will induce the real economic sector by 
connecting lenders with borrowers. Thus, financial sector development impacts 
positively on economic growth rates. However, demand following hypothesis presents 
inverse relationships between development in the financial systems and economic 
growth. Advocates of this tradition argue that financial systems respond spontaneously 
to the increase in demand for financial products, and hence, finance is demand 
following. 
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Cross-section studies of finance-growth nexus pioneered by Goldsmith (1969) argued 
that financial development fosters economic growth. However, the evidence presented 
in the context of Ghana provided mixed outcomes. The reported growth effects of 
financial system development depend on the choice of financial proxies employed. 
The interplay between the ascendency of finance, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation has attracted the attention of policymakers and researchers. Theoretically, 
development in the financial system induces economic growth, job creation, and 
reduces poverty levels. However, rising economic growth in Ghana has resulted in 
income inequality with a marginal reduction in extreme poverty. 
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 : The case of Ghana 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter examined the shift in financial intermediation from banks and 
other financial institutions to the financial markets, and presented the lack of 
consensus on the long-standing debate of finance-growth-poverty nexus. Chapter four 
is a case study of Ghana and presents the country's profile since independence in 1957 
to 2017. The chapter also discusses the evolution of the financial sector and 
investigates the effects of banking reforms on the economy. Section 4.1 presents recent 
economic performance, including some key economic indicators since 2000. Section 
4.2 is divided into two parts and examines the political economy of Ghana from 1957 
to 1982, the trajectory of state-led accumulation to neoliberalism. Part two covers the 
political and economic developments from 1983-2017. This part explains the reason 
why Ghana adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the transition 
into multi-party democracy in 1992. The consequences of neoliberalism are 
investigated in section 4.3. The various waves of financial sector reforms pre and post-
adjustments periods are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the distinctive 
features and the commonality of financialisation in the core and the periphery. This 
section analyses why the Ghanaian economy is under-financed yet financialising.  
Section 4.5 concludes with the empirical study of net capital flow from Ghana to the 
core countries, notably the US. 
4.2 Country profile and overview of recent economic performance 
Ghana is one of the most relatively stable and peaceful countries within the sub-
Saharan African sub-region and was the first country within the sub-region to gain 
independence in 1957 and to experience Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
together with Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983. Recently, the country 
has made significant progress in its political and economic developments compared to 
the challenging years of political instability and economic policy inconsistencies that 
branded its initial years after independence. With Gross Domestic Product (PPP) of 
$ 132.5 billion in 2015, Ghana’s economy ranks second largest after Nigeria in the 
West Africa sub-region and twelfth largest economy in Africa (African Economic 
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Outlook, 2017)53. Ghana has consistently achieved year-on-year economic growth, 
with an average yearly GDP growth rate of 8% during 2009-2014; compared with the 
SSA average growth rate of 5% over the same period. Consistent economic growth 
coupled with the recent discovery of oil in 2007 and subsequent production in large 
quantities raised Ghana's GDP per capita (current prices) to $ 1,648 in 2017. In 2015, 
Ghana's GDP per capita reached $ 1,480 and was therefore classified as a low-middle 
income country as per the World Bank's country classifications (World Bank, 2016; 
IMF World Economic Outlook, 2016; Bank of Ghana, 2017). 
The economy of Ghana has historically depended on two major sectors- the 
agricultural sector (mainly cocoa production)54, and the mining sector (mainly gold). 
However, other minerals such as diamond, bauxite and manganese are also produced 
in commercial quantities. The service sector has in recent years surpassed the primary 
industry, thanks to the rise of financial services, information and communication sub-
sectors. The country is therefore in an enviable position of few commodity-dependent 
economies that are blessed with all the three significant commodities of interest to 
Africa trade- agriculture, minerals, and oil. Therefore, there is a high expectation for 
accelerated growth and development and structural transformation of the country. 
Table 4.1 highlights selected key economic indicators from 2000-2017. 
Table 4. 1 Selected key Economic indicators, 2000-2017 
 
 
53 Based on GDP at PPP as at 2015, the 12 largest economies are Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Algeria, 
Morocco, Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Ghana. 
54 Ghana is currently the world's second-largest producer of cocoa. It held the first position for many 
decades before the 1980s bushfires that destroyed the crop.  
Economic 
Indicators 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017 
Real GDP 
Growth (%) 3.7 4.5 5.6 6.2 7.3 4 8 9.3 4 3.7 8.5 
Inflation 
(year-end) 40.5 15.2 11.8 10.5 18.1 15.9 8.6 8.8 17 17 11.8 
Monetary 
Policy Rate 
(%) n/a 24.5 18.5 12.5 17 18 13.5 15 21 25 20 
91-day 
Treasury Bill 
(%) 42 26.6 17.1 10.2 24.7 23.7 12.3 22.9 25.8 16.8 13 
Fiscal Balance 
(% of GDP) -9.7 -6.7 -3.7 
-
7.55 
-
11.48 -5.6 -6.8 
-
11.5 
-
10.2 -7.9 -6 
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Source: Author’s estimates, figures from Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and Federal Reserve 
Table 4.1 shows positive real GDP growth rates ranging from a low of 3.7% in 2000 
to a high of 8.5% in 2017. This was achieved thanks to substantial growth in financial 
services, and information and communication as well as mining production, which 
was helped by the relatively stable prices of its key export commodities (gold and 
cocoa) during the period. The decline in economic growth in 2009 is due to the global 
economic crisis, and subsequent fall in cocoa price, fall in remittances, tourism, and 
other capital flows, together with the increase in global oil prices. Other internal 
problems such as severe energy challenges and deterioration of fiscal deficits also 
compounded its external balance of payment deficits to limit economic growth in 2009.  
 Figure 4. 1 Real GDP growth rate (%) 2000-2018  
 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from Ghana Statistical Service (2018). 
The strong economic growth in 2011 was supported by the oil sector when Ghana 
started full oil production in commercial quantities (figure 4.1).  
Historically, the agricultural sector has been the main contributor to Ghana's GDP. 
However, in recent times, the service sector has overtaken the agricultural sector's 
dominant contributions to the GDP.  Between 2010-2016, the service sector accounted 
for over 50% of the total GDP, while the contributions of the agricultural sector 
declined every year from almost 40% in 2002 to just 19.5% in 2016. The growth of 
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the industrial sector declined between 2006 and 2011 before rising in 2012 due to the 
production of oil in commercial quantities. The recent growth in the service sector has 
been engineered by the strong growth in the financial services, and information and 
communication sub-sectors, as shown in figure 4.2 below.  
Figure 4. 2 GDP Composition by Sector 2002-2016 
Source: Author’s estimates, data from Ghana Statistical Service (2018) 
The macroeconomic policy objectives for the country are set to achieve a stable 
macroeconomic performance together with the fiscal discipline to facilitate private 
sector development to accelerate the economic growth agenda. However, there have 
been some challenges in achieving these stability objectives. The intermittent high 
inflation accompanied by high-interest rates and the continuous depreciation of the 
cedi usually trouble the economy. The instability often happens during the political 
election period, which occurs every four years. This could be seen in 2000, 2004, 2008, 
2012, and 2016, mainly because of excessive budget deficits from expenditure 
overruns by the incumbent government to hold on to power. Table 4.1 illustrates fiscal 
deficits throughout the period with large deficits notably in 2000 (9.7%), 2008 
(11.48%), 2012 (11.5%) and 2016 (7.9%) election years. Fiscal deficit financing has 
crowded out private sector investment. Besides, the occasional deterioration in the 
country's terms of trade and capital movements have created a large balance of 
payment deficits as seen in particular in 2000, 2008 and 2014. These twin deficits 
(budget and balance of payment deficits) adversely affect the macroeconomic stability 
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coupled with high inflation and high-interest rates, and weaken domestic currency, as 
well as affect the economic development of the country.  
The historical high inflation rate was brought under control from 2000-2007, except 
for a brief rise in 2003 due to fuel price hikes, and remained relatively stable after that 
between 10-15%. A combination of policies accounted for this relatively stable 
inflation. The automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism, as well as prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies coupled with a relatively stable exchange rate of the cedi were 
due to savings made because of the external debt cancellation under HIPC initiative55.  
Monetary policy rates have moved in tandem with inflation rates and therefore 
witnessed a fall during 2000-2007, after which it was raised to reduce inflationary 
pressures that occurred during 2008-2009. The two election years- 2008 and 2012 
resulted in high fiscal deficits; consequently, interest rates on government securities 
increased as the government borrowed to finance the deficits.    
The review signifies that Ghana's recent macroeconomic performance has been 
relatively stable compared to the historical years. However, the occasional 
deterioration in the twin deficits coupled with high inflation and rising interest rates 
obstruct private sector development. Nevertheless, continuous political stability, 
increasing economic growth and sound economic policies have played a significant 
role in stabilising the current economic performance. 
4.3 The political economy of Ghana: from state-led accumulation 
to neoliberalism 
The political and economic arrangements of Ghana are classified under two distinct 
periods. The period after independence from the British rule, to the end of 1982- where 
the state-led accumulation provided social welfare to the citizens. The neoliberal 
accumulation ushered in April 1983 and dismantled government intervention by 
glorifying and justifying individual freedom and market-led economic arrangements.  
 
 
55 Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), an initiative signed by the government of Ghana under the 
auspices of the IMF/World Bank, which resulted in debt cancellation. 
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4.3.1 Political and economic developments from independence (1957) to 1982 
Before proceeding to examine the process of Ghana's stabilisation and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), it is essential to assess in detail the structure of the 
country's economic and political decay. That is the confluence of factors that 
precipitated the catastrophic state of affairs within which the recovery effort was 
launched. This section will argue that the state apparatus is to be blamed for most of 
the crisis that prompted the excruciating process of SAP in Ghana.   
The economic crisis that swamped Ghana since independence can be argued to involve 
the intensification of three interrelated problems that had their roots in the policies 
pursued after independence- in an attempt at building an integrated and self-reliant 
national economy. 
Firstly, there was a structural crisis within the economy epitomised by an asymmetry 
between high domestic demands on the one hand, and sharply declining industrial and 
agricultural production on the other. Secondly, there was a fiscal crisis, exemplified 
by swelling external and domestic debt, massive budget deficit, and apparently 
uncontrollable expansion in government spending. Furthermore, there were deep-
seated patterns of state instability, debilitation and increasing delegitimation, proven 
by frequent regime changes accompanied by frequent policy changes and revisions, 
increasing loss of policy control and effectiveness, and of popular confidence and 
support (Hutchful, 1989; Killick, 2000). 
This thesis argues that these three components, which reciprocally reinforced each 
other to deepen the crisis, also functioned to create a context in which a decrease of 
state control over the country’s political economy steadily originated - as 
demonstrated in a rapid expansion economic activity outside the reaches of state 
control during the 1970s.    
Ghana's prospects for development were bright when it gained independence from the 
British in March 1957. The abundant natural resources aided the first president, Dr 
Kwame Nkrumah, to embark on a state-led strategy, focusing on import substitutions. 
Other Latin American countries had successfully started state-led development 
strategies during the period (see Hutchful, 1989, 2002).    
Politicians are characterised by their distinct ideologies, and President Kwame 
Nkrumah was no exception. Atta-Boakye (2006) argues that he used his political 
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ideology as a weapon and transformed the political landscape of Ghana into 
ideological concepts.  Nkrumah established an institute to teach his doctrines of 
socialism, communism, and 'Nkrumaism'- his ideologies became the blueprint in all 
public places- educational institutions, market places, and workplaces. He argued that 
capitalism is too complicated for a newly independent country like Ghana, hence the 
need for a socialist society56.  
Nkrumah established several State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) ranging from food, 
timber, Sanyo manufacturing to Cocoa Marketing Board. The government 7-year 
development plans emphasised industrialisation through domestic production of 
import substitutes. The state provided the necessary welfare services from healthcare 
to public housing. Socialism became the engine of Ghana's economic development. 
As Killick (2000) and Hutchful (2002) observe, this socialist-oriented policy was 
based on the hope of a continuous increase in the price of cocoa and other minerals 
that Ghana was blessed with. The state-led approach encountered some problems, 
which precipitated the overthrow of Nkrumah's party in 1966. Hutchful (2002) noted 
that since the focus of the state-led strategy was on redistributing the national 
prosperity, the state then became the father and mother, which resulted in colossal 
state expenditure. With the sharp decline in export revenues following the fall in 
commodity prices, it became extremely difficult to fund these socialist-oriented 
policies.    
The new military government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) led by 
General J.A. Ankrah and Kotoka abandoned Nkrumah’s socialist-oriented economic 
development projects and sort to empower the private sector. They started the 
country’s first negotiation with the Washington Consensus. The standby deal included 
a reverse of most of Nkrumah's state-led policies. The IMF prescribed trade 
liberalisation, contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, removal of subsidies, and 
the devaluation of the cedi (Boafo-Arthur, 1999:47). This free-market approach to 
economic growth and development was not received well by many recognised 
professional bodies such as the teacher’s union, lawyers and industrial workers’ union 
 
 
56 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: An Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1957), pp.xv-xvi. 
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in 1969. This compelled the military to hand power to Dr K. A. Busia’s constitutional 
government to form the second republic.  
Interestingly, the second republic57 was also a pro-IMF and started to address the 
inefficiencies with market-based policies. This free-market ideology was evident in 
the 1971 contractionary budget, where new taxes were imposed, development levy 
was introduced, withdrawal of state subsidies, abolishing of free education, 
devaluation of the cedi by 44%, and liberalisation of trade.  These reforms were not 
received well by most of the population and resulted in a military coup by a former 
student of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Colonel Kutu Acheampong, and 
the National Redemption Council (NRC). The NRC reversed almost all the neoliberal 
policies of Busia's government. The local currency was revalued by 42%, state welfare 
services were reinstated, and some external debts crucially rejected. Despite how 
damaging some of these policies were, it received widespread support, but in the end, 
worsened the country's developmental position. Shillington (1992) posits that the 
economic mismanagement, corruption, and incompetence of the Acheampong's 
regime drained off Ghana’s scarce resources. He contends that the hard-foreign 
exchange realised from the increased cocoa prices were primarily diverted from the 
state coffers. It was this high-level corruption that precipitated the first coming of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Flight Lieutenant J. J Rawlings 
in June 1979, intending to stabilise the economy. Gyimah-Boadi (1993:6) reckons the 
AFRC fought corruption, mismanagement, and profiteering before handing power to 
Dr Hilla Limann’s constitutional government to form the third republic.  
The government considered seeking external assistance to address the empty national 
coffers. However, domestic pressure did not permit Limann’s government to seek and 
implement the World Bank and the IMF neoliberal packages. The continued hardship 
of Ghanaians prompted the military-led by Rawlings, again, to stage another coup to 
overthrow Limann’s government on December 1981- and formed PNDC government- 
what most Ghanaians refer to as ‘the second coming of Rawlings’.  
 
 
57 The constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides the basic charter for the country’s second attempt 
at republican democratic government since independence in 1957.  
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The efforts by successive governments in Ghana to provide national self-sufficiency 
and to disassociate the economy from the Bretton Wood Institutions have been futile. 
Like many periphery countries, lack of the necessary material base makes it 
challenging to reject neo-colonialism. This weakness means that Ghana is forced to 
depend heavily on external economic forces, particularly the western countries. The 
integration of the economy into the capitalist world, therefore, reduces the opportunity 
for policy manoeuvre. This dependency culture makes the country vulnerable to 
capitalist interests. Smith (1979) argues, periphery countries cannot exist without their 
dependency on the core, but they also cannot exist within it. This is the challenge faced 
by many periphery countries within the capitalist world economy. 
It could be argued that the reason why some leaders in Ghana would accept neoliberal 
measures is because of the country's subordinate/inferior bargaining status to that of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. Ghana had limited ways, if any, of dealing with its 
economic woes. In his analysis of modernisation, Frank (1966) argues that 
underdevelopment is a consequence of the unequal distribution of resources and the 
exploitation of the periphery countries by the core. He argues that resources/raw 
materials flow from the periphery to the core countries while manufactured goods flow 
in the opposite direction to enrich the core countries. Thus, countries in the periphery 
are underdeveloped because the core requires cheap raw material and labour. The 
appropriation of economic surplus to the core is the cause of underdevelopment in the 
periphery.  Emmanuel (1972) adds that international trade leads to the core countries 
becoming richer at the expense of the countries in the periphery. He argues that high 
wages in the core countries are the critical factor in their development. This is because 
rising consumer incomes stimulate aggregate demand which leads to economic growth 
and development. Thus, any attempt to de-link a periphery country from such a 
structural dependent arrangement will be difficult, if not impossible. The inability of 
Ghana to process and add value to some of its raw materials places the economy at the 
periphery of the world market. The country, therefore, exports raw materials and a 
dumping ground for western manufactured products. The economy depends on 
external sources for most of its needs, thus, making it challenging to de-link itself from 
global economic institutions. Thereby, successive governments have been compelled 
to seek international assistance to embark on national development. 
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The problems in Ghana worsened by various domestic and international shocks. A 
severe drought hit SSA sub-region accompanied by a series of bush fires, which 
destroyed cocoa and other cash crops. The global oil crises in 1973-74 and 1979-80 
followed by global recession outstretched and magnified the domestic deterioration. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government deported over 1 million Ghanaians who went 
there to seek greener pastures during the hard times in Ghana. The continuous 
economic deterioration and its political consequences for the PNDC government 
forced them to accept the neoliberal orthodoxy (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). 
4.3.2 Political and economic developments 1983- 2017 
This period witnessed a stable political and economic environment, albeit under the 
PNDC military rule until December 1992 when the nation restored its multi-party 
democracy to begin the fourth republic. The stable political environment, albeit some 
failed coup attempts, empowered the PNDC government to embark on economic 
reforms. The reforms covered both the real and the financial sectors (see sections 4.4 
and 4.5). 
A general election was held on December 1992 and won by Rawlings and the 
(p)NDC58 party and was re-elected in December 1996. It is worth acknowledging that 
the re-election of Rawlings and the NDC government was the first time that an elected 
government had completed its term of office in the history of Ghana multi-party 
democracy. The market-based policies adopted from the IMF and the World Bank 
continued. However, significant budget deficits accompanied the return to 
constitutional regimes. Huge government spending in election years resulted in 
excessive government borrowing, accompanied by rising inflation.  
The year 2000 election witnessed the first transfer of political power from one political 
party to another and from one civilian government to another. This momentous event 
was historical in the politically turbulent SSA sub-region. The new NPP government 
continued with the neoliberal economic agenda and empowered the private sector 
through various government policies. CEPA (2003) contend that the dividend from a 
 
 
58 The PNDC military government formed the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party to 
contest the 1992 general election.  
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stable democracy was the massive external financing support to the private sector. The 
NPP government opted for HIPC initiative offered by the IMF and World Bank. This 
initiative saved the country a substantial amount of external debt obligation. The NPP 
was voted out of power in 2008 after serving two terms and power was smoothly and 
peacefully transferred back to the NDC. The NDC handed power back to the NPP after 
losing the 2016 general election. These political processes have enhanced Ghana's 
democratic credentials. It is important to note that successive governments and 
political parties have embraced the political stability and the free market ideology 
started in 1983/1992.  
4.4 Neoliberalism in Ghana  
Since the mid-1970s, SSA countries have suffered from slow economic growth, food 
shortages and famine, mass unemployment with widespread poverty, declining export 
earning, mounting national debt, and increasing marginalisation and isolation from the 
global economy. Although many periphery countries shared these experiences, the 
problem was more severe in Africa for many reasons, which include African 
democracy and its peasant transformation.  These issues made social, political and 
economic reforms imperative. Table 4.2 presents some of Ghana’s macroeconomic 
indicators from 1960-1995.  
Table 4. 2 Basic Indicators of Economic Performance (Percentage Annual Average Growth) 1960-
1995 
 1960-70 1970-83 1983-89 1990-95 
Real GDP 2.2 -0.8 5 4.3 
Gross Domestic Investment -3.1 -5.9 16.6 21.9 
Exports 0.1 -4.4 11.7 10.1 
Imports -1.5 -7.2 13.5 8.6 
Total Agriculture 2.6 -0.5 3.6 2 
Population 2.3 2.3 3.5 3 
Source: Author’s estimates figures from the World Bank (1960-1990) and Ghana Statistical Service 
(1990-1995)  
Table 4.2 illustrates the deterioration of the Ghanaian economy between independence 
and the early 1980s. The output of the economy declined while the population grew at 
an average rate of 2.7% per annum. Cocoa, the main cash crop and the primary foreign 
exchange earner for the country declined, which worsened the trade balance. As the 
foreign exchange problem became more severe, imports contracted from -1.5% in 
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1960-70 to -7.2% in 1970-83. The massive jump in gross domestic investment (1990-
1995) was due to a substantial investment in gold mining in 1993 because of the 
privatisation of the sector. The dual oil crises in the 1970s (1973 and 1979) coupled 
with the depreciation of the local currency added to the deterioration of the economy. 
Table 4.2 also demonstrates a relatively stable economy from 1983 onwards with 5% 
annual average real GDP growth and 3.6% yearly growth in agriculture output 
between 1983 and 1989. The high imports after SAP reduced to 8.6% with exports 
average of 10% in the early 1990s. 
Other economic indicators showed deterioration in the Ghanaian economy as inflation 
was running over 100% and imbalances in both domestic and external accounts 
became a permanent occurrence. These factors worsened economic development, as 
food and basic medical supplies became unaffordable for ordinary citizens. Inflation 
stayed above 100% in 1977, 1981 and 1983, where it peaked at 123% (figure 4.3). 
Figure 4. 3 Inflation Rates in Ghana 1965-1995 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ and Ghana 
Statistical Service (1999). 
Many interpretations have been given to explain the origin of the crisis, which has 
emaciated the Ghana economy and the wider society. The main school of thought are 
the 'internalists' whose view reflected neo-classical liberal, and the 'externalists' 
whose view mirrored neo-Marxist dependency approaches.  
The neo-classical liberal argument points to internal variables such as economically 
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problems due to inadequate state administrative capacity, excessive and debilitating 
state intervention, and corruption as the central causes of the crises in Ghana. The 
critical message that unites neo-classical liberal is their tendency to search for internal, 
predominantly political, often normative accounts as opposed to international, 
economic or structural explanations (Chazan, 1982). 
By contrast, neo-Marxist cum externalists have tended to argue that Ghana's economic 
deterioration can be attributed to the country's structural position at the peripheries of 
the global capitalist economy, a situation which inflicts severe restraints on 
independent attempts to create an integrated and self-reliant national economy. The 
advocates of this view contend that Ghana's underdevelopment is an unavoidable 
consequence of a colonial legacy, which bestowed economy dependent on the primary 
export sector to acquire resources necessary for its further development in the absence 
of any sustainable mode of internal accumulation. This dependency, they argue, has 
left the economy at the mercy of exogenous shocks and fluctuations in a manner that 
wrought (in the medium and long-term) against any significant development, an 
argument shared by Frank (1969) and Emmanuel (1972). They also highlight the 
hurtful operations of MNCs, whose activities have served to 'decapitalise' the economy 
through profit repatriation and the use of numerous under-the-counter strategies for 
surplus transferring like transfer pricing. This has been done in collaboration with their 
local comprador bourgeoisie 59  ruling elite, which has served parasitically off the 
resources of the 'swollen state’ and has freely 'mortgaged' the economy to foreign 
concerns in return for the benefits which accrue to them through their control of the 
state (Hansen, 1987). 
Although externalists’ argument is tenable in the context of Ghana, there is no doubt 
that no coherent explanation of the country’s economic woes can omit concerns raised 
by the internalists- such as state ineffectiveness, incompetence, and corruption. 
Jeffries (1989) argues that the liberals’ explanation offers a clear perspective of the 
root cause of Ghana’s economic decline. However, he acknowledges that the approach 
 
 
59 This is a section of the domestic middle class who act as agents for foreign investors and multinational 
corporations for their private gains (at times) at the expense of the whole country.  
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alone is insufficient in accounting for the catastrophic decline of the economy. Chazan 
(1982:14) remarks that: 
‘If the government alone were responsible for the decline, (as the pragmatic-
liberal school suggests) or if outside forces in consort with the state-linked 
classes must bear the blame (as the dependency school argues), then the unit 
of analysis remains the state or the state as it relates to the external variables.’  
What is lacking in this approach is any careful scrutiny of the central position of the 
state vis-a-vis the society it purports to reflect. Therefore, there is a belief that 
government may represent the society or outside interests, but not much attention has 
been given to the impact of governmental policies on society as a reason for Ghana's 
underdevelopment. However, Fouskas and Gökay (2019:47) argue that a key feature 
of contemporary capitalism is its uneven combined development across time and 
regions/territoriality; and as long as the political and economic policies in the 
periphery are designed and dictated by the core, there will always be winners and 
losers. They argue that the core countries are imperial in nature and impose their own 
political and economic systems as well as principles and cultures through the 
recruitment of local elites. Consequently, the domestic government may be forced to 
represent outside interests at the expense of society.    
While subscribing to the argument that the state has contributed greatly to the 
country’s economic woes, it is vital to qualify this position, for the centrality of the 
state should be understood as a reflection of the country’s underperformance as well 
as a factor aiding to create further underdevelopment.  
The trajectory of Ghana’s economic and political decline since independence to the 
early 1980s made it indispensable to pursue the painful process of SAP under the 
second Rawlings regime.   
The economic factors leading to poor performance, according to Sowa (2002) could 
be summarised as follows: 
1) The overvalued exchange rate that discourages exports and encourages 
imports; 
2) The printing of money to finance government deficit and its resultant 
inflation; 
3) The imposition of price controls at the manufacturing stage; 
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4) Misallocation of and misuse of imports licence which created inefficiencies 
and denied inputs and equipment to high priority areas; 
Other structural weaknesses included: 
1) The over-reliance of agriculture as the leading sector with little investment 
in the industry to address the declining productivity; 
2) Non- diversification of exports from cocoa, subjecting the economy to the 
volatile world commodity prices; 
3) Large public and service sector; and  
4) Insufficient mobilisation of internal resources for domestic capital 
formation.  
The consequences of economic decline after independence resulted in the deterioration 
of the standard of living and the general impoverishment of the citizens as a whole. 
Most indicators point to a worsening standard of living. Real GDP per capita declined 
from 634 cedis in 1971 to 394.8 cedis in 1983. Most Ghanaians could not afford basic 
necessities of life such as food, water and shelter. Index of food production per capita 
fell to 72 in 1982 with 1971 as the base of 100 (Ghana Statistical Service 1999; Sowa, 
2002).  
After more than two decades of abysmal economic performance, Ghana and at least 
33 other African countries adopted, or were forced to take the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) together with SAP (Britwum et al. 2001). The initial years of SAP 
involving stabilisation appeared successful. The economy grew at about 5% between 
1984 and 1989. Kilick and Malik (1992) observe that the reforms attracted 
unprecedented capital inflows and led to an overall balance of payment surpluses, 
despite large continuous deficit on the current account due to imports. They also opine 
that the more realistic exchange rate, together with good weather, the decline in 
smuggling due to better producer prices and increase in cocoa export revenue 
supported the GDP growth of 5% per year. Sowa (2002) observed budget surpluses 
from 1986, although he argued that it was due to increase foreign aid, which was 
included in the calculation. Although domestic credit did not expand as much, the 
increase in external inflows kept the growth of aggregate money supply high; inflation 
reduced from three-digit to about 25% per annum. The initial improvements in the 
macroeconomy had a positive impact on society and enabled the rising incidence of 
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poverty to be stabled. However, some of the conditions attached to the stabilisation, 
such as retrenchment of public sector workers and the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises forced many people back into poverty. 
The proponents of SAP attribute a significant part of Africa’s malaise to the magnitude 
of state intervention, and thus, the relatively large size of the public sector in SSA is 
to blame for the woes of the region (Mengistead and Logan, 1995). Africa is likely 
more interventionist than other regions; however, the interventionist explanation of 
the African problem is rather reductionist. Stiglitz (2002) argues that intervention in 
the periphery countries can be useful at times to the development and expansion of the 
private sector.    
The drawback of these neoliberal reforms is that it does not differentiate between types 
of state intervention in Africa, what Stiglitz (2002) calls 'one size fits all'; a policy 
based on the out-of-date belief that markets are omniscient and by themselves, lead to 
efficient outcomes. Summonu (1999) refers to the IMF policy as a 'bogus’ doctor who 
prescribes the same medicine for different aliments- market forces for the exchange 
rate, interest rates, and economic ailment. It is also doubtful whether SSA countries 
can be fully integrated into the global economy when there are internally disintegrated, 
and SAP does not address issues of international trade. Although SAP seems to 
address structural reforms in the domestic economy, it fails to appreciate the dynamics 
of the peasant sector. Due to these and many other issues, SAP continues to face 
opposition among many scholars and policymakers despite the general 
acknowledgement of the crisis of statist socio-economic systems in Africa. 
The dominant position of the subsistence sector within SSA economies is one of the 
most striking differences between Africa economies’ structure and those of other 
peripheral countries. In no other periphery region does the subsistence sector account 
for as much as 70-80% of the working population. Since the subsistence sector has 
significant implications for the performance of African economies, as well as for their 
ability to absorb international market shocks. Any developmental policy that ignores 
this vital sector may struggle to have a positive impact.  
The key elements of SAP are the neoliberal doctrine of market-based policies, limited 
government intervention, export-led growth, financial discipline, absolute and 
comparative advantage, and prosperity and economic growth. The World Bank and 
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the IMF have widely cited the economies of the Pacific Asia as good examples of the 
success of such neoliberal policies of market-oriented, outward-looking development 
strategies (World Bank, 1993; OECD, 1992), despite generally accepted evidence that 
the newly industrialised Pacific Asia countries developed with a maximum rather than 
a minimal state intervention (see, for instance, Ang, 2016).   
There was a general belief that long-run benefits of SAP outweigh the short-run social 
costs. It was not known that the long-run was what Keynes refers to- 'when all may be 
dead!' ([1936] 2006). Ghana implemented two phases of SAP. The first phase- SAP 1 
or ERP1 covered the period 1983-1986 and was focused on resuscitating the ailing 
economy. The aim was to stabilise the economy from further declining. It was centred 
on fiscal, monetary, and trade policy reforms. The second phase of SAP covered 1987-
1992, intending to consolidate the gains made from SAP 1. In the second phase, 
medium to long-term goals were set to try to incorporate stabilisation and economic 
growth. These goals include a 5% economic growth rate through increasing 
investment to over 25% from 10% of national income; increase savings to 15% by 
1990 from SAP 1 level of 7%; implement Public Enterprise Reform Programme 
(PERP); reduce government spending, denationalisation of non-performing SOEs; and 
establishing Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD) (Donkor, 1997:124). The state-centric method to development pursued 
since independence made these prudent measures very risky for the government. 
Nevertheless, SAP made SSA more integrated into the global economy because the 
conditions meted out were measured to open up the adjusting nations’ economies to 
FDI, imports, and possible export-led growth that can be used to reduce debt and 
poverty. 
However, some authors have argued that the negative aspects of SAP aimed at poverty 
alleviation, lightening debt burden and saving sinking economies of the SSA is 
enormous. According to Ismi (2004) and McGregor (2005), SAP was forced on SSA 
by the IMF and the World Bank to create conditions that benefit MNCs from the core. 
The liberalisation enabled these monopolies facing falling profits and stagnation of 
capital accumulation to move out from their home countries to protect falling profit 
and engage in financialisation cum globalisation of production. Strengthening this 
assessment, Osabu-kle (2000) asserts that during the period of SAP, the income of the 
poorest fifth of the world's population fell from 2.3% to 1.4% while the wealthiest fifth 
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of the world's population saw their income increased to 85% from 75%.  Those who 
make the rules on trade and liberalisation benefited at the expense of the poor.  This 
demonstrates that at least in the short-run, SAP made conditions worse and eroded 
some of the social gains such as employment, education and export earnings. There 
are several areas where the SAP initiative impoverished Ghanaians. The privatisation 
of state enterprise resulted in mass unemployment, forcing families into extreme 
poverty; trade reforms also led to a reduction of income for rural peasant farmers, and 
spending cut on education, health and other social services deepened poverty in 
communities. Even if there were some benefits of SAP, these were not evenly 
distributed as cuts to government social services affected the poor the most. Even the 
World Bank report (1997) acknowledged that conditions in 11 out of the 33 countries 
that adopted SAP deteriorated and further 9 countries only showed a slight 
improvement.  
On trade liberalisation, Sunmunu (1999) challenges the World Bank and the IMF to 
show a country in the world that does not protect its agriculture and the industrial 
sector(s) in one way or the other.  He questions why international financial institutions 
and donor countries compel poor Africa countries to liberalise their trade. He argues 
that these liberalisation measures are the cause of the destruction of African industries, 
with millions of job losses and conversion of SSA economies into a mere export of 
cheap primary products and the dumping grounds for finished goods of the core 
countries. This unjust and unequal liberalised trade could be argued to be one of the 
leading causes of chronic poverty in Africa. Trade liberalisation policy often involves 
the removal of subsidies on food, fertilisers, education, and other agricultural inputs; 
these have resulted in high food prices, malnutrition and hunger, and falling education 
enrolment. These inhumane policies affect the poor and the vulnerable in the 
community. In his analysis of unequal exchange, Emmanuel (1972) posits that 
peripheral countries consistently have unfavourable terms of trade; whatever they 
undertake and produce will always exchange a more substantial proportion of the 
nation's labour for a smaller proportion of foreign labour. He argues that capital and 
labour expended do not determine the value of exchange, but rather the reciprocal 
demands of the exchanging parties that determine prices. The prices received will 
determine the reward given to labour and capital.  Emmanuel rejects Ricardo's 
comparative costs advantage and the international division of labour and posits that in 
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peripheral countries the produce of labour will never match the value of a product of 
a comparable amount of labour in a core economy on the international market. This 
unequal exchange results in low wages and unfavourable terms of trade in the 
periphery for the benefit of the consumers in the core countries. He concludes that any 
form of imperialism is mercantile in nature. 
The World Bank and the IMF justified the massive retrenchment on the grounds that 
the public sector was unproductive and over-bloated. However, as too many 
professionals were forcibly retrenched in Ghana as part of the SAP agreement, it is 
difficult to understand who is going to tap and develop both human and natural 
resources for the development of Ghana. 
On privatisation of State Corporations, evidence from Chile60 suggests that this is to 
the benefit of the foreign investors and very few super-rich Ghanaians. The neoliberal 
ideologies of privatisation have been centred on efficiency and profitability, with little 
attention on the social costs and cultural dynamics of Ghana. The state has been the 
mother and father since independence, no wonder privatisation in Ghana was partly 
successful under a military regime. In its concluding seminar in Accra, the 
Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) argued that the existence of 
every government should be the satisfaction of the basic needs of the people. The 
public sector is, therefore, the backbone of any government and the vehicle for 
development.           
Although many critics agree to some forms of reforms to resuscitate the economies, 
they disagree with the diagnosis. They argue that the volatility in the international 
economy was to be blamed for the crises, in particular, the harsh commodity price 
changes in the 1970s. Kahler (1990) argues that low-income African countries were 
destabilised by various market imperfections, bottlenecks, and rigidities, and as a 
result, the neoliberal prescriptions were improper. Others question the economic 
wisdom of devaluation and trade liberalisation given the elasticities of supply of 
exports and demand for imports61 in SSA. Africa exports mainly primary commodities 
 
 
60 See for instance, David Harvey (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 
61 The Marshall Lerner condition advocates that for devaluation to be effective, the sum of elasticities 
of imports and exports should be more than one- elastic. 
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and imports manufactured finished goods. The low exports and imports elasticities 
increase domestic costs of servicing debt and the cost of imported inputs; as a result, 
the prescriptions were inappropriate (Cornia et al., 1992). Shuh (2010) argues that 
poor countries were forced to cut spending on education, health and other development 
projects, but debt servicing and other economic policies have been made the priority. 
That is, the World Bank and IMF are asking the poor countries to lower the standard 
of living of their citizens. Shuh further argues that periphery countries have been 
encouraged to export more to raise sufficient funds to pay off debts promptly. This has 
resulted in a price war, making their commodities even cheaper on the international 
market, which favours the western consumer at the expense of the poor as imports 
become expensive. This unequal exchange could be argued to be exploitation to the 
exporting country.    
Interestingly, Ayittey (2000) posits that many Africans oppose economic liberalisation 
purely on ideological grounds. This, he argues, is because of the deep-seated 
resentment to capitalism or free markets, an attitude which dates back to the colonial 
era.  Because the colonialists were capitalists thus, capitalism is as evil and exploitative 
as colonialism. Some intellectuals viewed the World Bank involvement as a neo-
colonial institution amplifying this bias against capitalism.  Ayittey concludes that the 
government opted for what he calls safe budget cuts on education, health and road 
maintenance. Real per capita spending on health and education was reduced drastically 
as a way of reducing government spending while protecting spending on militaries 
and bureaucracies. The cut in social expenditures undermined economic growth and 
shrank revenue collection. 
4.4.1 Neoliberalism and housing provision in Ghana 
Ghana, like many low-middle income countries, is plagued with an acute housing 
deficit. This remains one of the central development challenges. The rising demand 
for housing, coupled with supply constraints, have resulted in a huge gap, especially 
in the urban areas of the country. It is estimated that the country requires a minimum 
of 100,000 housing units yearly, but the estimated supply is just 35% of the 
requirement (ISSER 2013). Although there is lack of comprehensive housing policy 
in Ghana, it is essential to distil a distinct policy focus between pre-SAP and post-SAP 
periods.  
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The pre-SAP (post-independence) era involves active and direct state provision of 
public housing. State institutions such as Bank for Housing and Construction, First 
Ghana Building Society, State Housing Corporation and the Tema Development 
Corporation were established with the view of facilitating sustainable and affordable 
housing provision and finance. This Keynesian intervention in housing delivery 
provided low-cost houses in district and regional capitals which ended in early 1983 
when Ghana adopted SAP. Government policy on housing took a different turn after 
SAP, with much emphasis on private sector involvement in housing delivery from 
production, financing to the production of building materials. Thus, the role of the 
state in neoliberal housing policy is to provide a regulatory and economic framework 
for the market to thrive. However, as pointed out by ISSER (2013), the private sector 
has never provided any significant role in building low-cost houses for poor and low-
income segments in the country. 
Most of the housing units in Ghana are provided by the private informal sector, where 
individuals finance house building through informal sources such as self-financing 
and remittance. With an unstable macroeconomic environment coupled with high 
inflation and persistent depreciation of the domestic currency, Obeng-Odoom (2008) 
reckons it could take up to 15 years for an average person to acquire a two-bedroom 
housing unit. This incremental building tied funds into uncompleted buildings which 
could otherwise have been used for other productive projects. Nonetheless, these self-
financing remain the most popular viable option for many individuals wishing to own 
a house. 
Housing finance is a significant part of the World Bank's financial sector strategy and 
the overall aim of poverty alleviation and improving lives. Housing finance plays a 
major role in the strengthening of the housing market, the development of the financial 
sector and the overall health of the economy. Vibrant housing finance supports labour 
mobility, job creation in both high and low-skilled sectors, investment, and the overall 
improvement in the quality of life. 
Across the world and especially in Ghana, housing financing is one of the major 
development challenges due to a variety of factors, including demand as well as 
supply-side constraints. Despite the various financial sector reforms in Ghana, 
financing arrangements in the housing market remains underdeveloped and 
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unattractive to a large segment of the population. Teye et al. (2013) argue that the 
prevailing housing financing system in Ghana is minimal and only designed for high-
income earners in the urban areas and those in the diaspora. Consequently, for many 
people, informal sources - self-financing remains the only option available. Warnock 
and Warnock (2008) examined housing finance systems as a proportion of GDP in 62 
countries, including Ghana. Their findings reveal that housing financing (formal) in 
Ghana accounts for just 0.5% of GDP, the least among the countries investigated 
compared with 15.7% average in the sub-region. The UN-Habitat (2011: 98) presents 
that: 
‘The pattern through history has been to establish institutions to provide 
housing finance ostensibly targeted at ordinary urban Ghanaians. 
Governments have then watched them decline and fail and then established 
new institutions which have also failed. In the cycle of decline, each has turned 
to the high-income market for a safe environment for its lending. In reality, 
none of the institutions has targeted the majority of urban households who 
have remained without any recourse to housing finance.’ 
Indeed, while most of the above focused on the inadequate housing financing in urban 
areas, the problem is even worse in rural areas. The rural housing market is 
unattractive due to low-income and high levels of poverty. This has contributed to the 
poor housing conditions in rural communities of the country, and the rural occupants 
lack the necessary resource to make any improvement to their housing conditions.  
In most of the core countries, especially the UK and the US, the mortgage market is a 
capable and vibrant financier of the housing needs of the citizens. However, an 
efficient housing finance system is crucial for the supply and demand for houses and 
its accompanying services. The supply obstacles in Ghana involve high costs of land 
(especially in the urban areas), lack of adequate capital of universal banks to finance 
long-term projects, partly due to liquidity problems and the benefit gained from short-
term government securities; and the inability of mortgage providers to assess the 
credit-worthiness of potential borrowers as well as other unstable macroeconomic 
conditions (for instance, currency depreciation) in the country. These supply-side 
constraints limit the number of providers in the mortgage industry. Even in situations 
where supply is available, demand constraints, such as high house prices often quoted 
in foreign currencies (notably in US$) as a hedge against domestic currency 
depreciation, priced out many low and middle-income segments to enter the market. 
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Persistent high inflation and interest rates accompanied by unfavourable terms of loan 
repayment, and the cultural belief in many communities that it is forbidden to be in 
long-term debt amongst others have constrained demand for external financing for 
housing. These demand and supply constraints reinforce each other to limit the formal 
channels for housing financing system in Ghana. Thus, the reluctancy of mortgage 
providers to lend to prospective homeowners is matched by prospective borrowers 
(homeowners) averse to enter the mortgage market due to demand-side constraints. It 
is within this context that self-financing and informal means of housing in Ghana 
flourished. 
These challenges are evident in the number of loans disbursed for housing financing 
in 2011. According to the Bank of Ghana (2011), less than 3% ($ 26.1 million) of bank 
loans went into housing finance. This is very small even when compared with other 
low-middle income countries such as Sri Lanka and Kenya, where housing finance 
portfolio were over $1billion and $668 million, respectively, over the same period 
(Teye et al. 2013).   
The ‘real estate bubble’ is a major part in the mechanisms of financialisation, which 
happened in the world economy during the last four decades.  In simple terms, the 
main source of purchasing power in the housing market is bank credits/loans, in the 
form of mortgages, rather than households’ income. The more banks are willing to 
lend, the more money floods into the housing market.  This is one of the key reasons 
that housing prices have been able to race ahead of most household’s income. The 
credit that banks lend for mortgages is not money in someone else’s savings account, 
but new money created specifically and artificially to fund the loan. As banks become 
more and more willing to grant mortgages, the supply of money to the economy 
increases, and with that the purchasing power of the individuals increases even if the 
actual income of most household does not.  It was the deregulation and liberalisation 
of the credit market in the 1970s and 1980s that kick-started the shift towards this 
preference for mortgage lending over other activities, as banks and building societies 
were for the first time allowed to grant credit to households against the value of their 
homes. The incentive for the banks for this preference is clear: If a bank or mortgage 
company lends against a property and the borrower does not keep up their repayments, 
the bank ends up repossessing the house and the land it sits on, and sells it at a higher 
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price since the prices continuously grow, or at least expected to grow. As land and 
house prices rise, households are compelled to take out larger mortgage loans to get 
on the housing ladder, boosting banks’ profits and capital. The boost in profits and 
capital enables banks to issue more loans, which further pushes up prices. This process 
can continue even when house prices are more than the households’ incomes, 
sustaining the expectation that prices will continue to rise.  The practise can continue 
until there is an economic shock and a very large number of people’s incomes can no 
longer keep up with debt repayments. Indeed, as the ratio of house prices and mortgage 
debt to income increases, the economy becomes more susceptible to any change that 
would spark a larger portion of households’ income to be taken up in debt repayments 
on their mortgages: such as a fall in salaries or rise in interest rates.  Such a change, if 
significant enough, would see the whole process go into reverse: mortgage defaults, 
falls in house prices and therefore falls in households’ net wealth. This would trigger 
a contraction of bank lending, a recession in spending and, potentially, a financial 
crisis.  
There is almost a uniform agreement among experts that the 2008 global financial 
crisis started in the US sub-prime housing market as a result of such practices and 
failures (Lapavitsas, 2013, Storm, 2018, Fouskas and Gökay, 2012, 2019). It seems in 
Ghana too, neoliberal financialisation has relied on the housing market to some extent, 
in particular in the major cities.  The economic liberalisation and a corresponding 
increase in domestic and foreign private investments, especially in the housing 
industry, affected the situation in the urban areas where one can observe an 
overproduction of housing for high-income earners, and this led to a dramatic rise of 
gated communities. On the other hand, however, there has been virtually no provision 
of housing for low-income earners, thus exacerbating their continued dependence on 
the informal sector for housing provision in these areas. 
In Ghana, the private sector involvement in the housing market is dominated by a few 
large firms such as Regimanuel Gray ltd, which controls almost 50% (market share) 
of houses built by real estate developers. This is followed by NTHC properties with 
12%, State Housing Takoradi and Trasacco Estate Development with 8% and 7%, 
respectively. Although these oligopolies offer mortgage for prospective homeowners, 
the target segments have been the high-income group due to the high cost of buying, 
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large deposit requirement and the high-interest rate on mortgaging. Houses in the open 
market are too expensive for the low-income segments. Certainly, the high cost of 
housing is due to the high cost of land, which is a consequence of the liberalisation of 
the land market and its accompanied speculative activities escalating land prices. Thus, 
the adoption of neoliberal housing policy in Ghana has resulted in overproduction of 
housing for the high-income segment with little to none for low-income earners. 
Consequently, worsening the marginalisation of low-income groups, especially, the 
urban poor to depend on the informal sector for housing provision. Indeed, lack of 
direct government involvement in the housing market has resulted in the development 
of slums and inadequate housing in the country, especially in urban areas where 
domestic and foreign private developers focus on expensive houses for high-income 
earners.     
4.5 Financial sector reforms in Ghana- a historical perspective 
This section presents events in the pre- as well as post-structural adjustment financial 
sector reforms that cover the privatisation of state financial institutions together with 
the various changes in the financial sector. 
Pre-structural adjustment financial reforms 1957- 1982 
The financial sector in Ghana was dominated by state ownership between 1957 and 
1982. Successive governments, since independence, established state banks to widen 
access to credit facilities to SMEs. The reason that prompted this was the fact that 
Barclays Bank, Ghana Ltd., and Standard Chartered Bank (the only two existing 
(foreign) banks at the time) were reluctant to lend to domestic households, farmers, 
and SMEs due to high default rates. In response, eight state banks were established 
between 1953 and 1977 to provide credit to priority areas. Furthermore, the state 
acquired 40% stake in Barclays and Standard Chartered Banks (Bank of Ghana, 2000). 
Thus, the state banks dominate the banking industry pre-financial liberalisation era.   
The pre-liberalised era also featured a fixed exchange rate and state control of money 
supply. Different economic policies by the successive governments resulted in a series 
of devaluations notably in 1967, 1971 and 1978 (discussed above). There were some 
re-valuations in the period as well. The lack of a competitive environment in the 
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banking sector coupled with political patronage led to inefficiencies in the industry. 
However, the priority sectors in the economy were not starved of the needed credit. 
The high inflation rate accompanied by the negative real interest rates discouraged 
savings in the banking sectors, which led to excess liquidity stored outside the formal 
financial system. This undermined the mobilisation of savings to facilitate the private 
sector's investment. The inefficiencies also impeded financial deepening and 
solvencies in the banking sector. Consequently, policy recommendation concluded 
that the Ghanaian economy could attain a faster growth with financial sector reforms. 
Husain and Faruqee (1994) posit that mobilising the 16% savings stored outside the 
banking industry could stimulate growth rates and reduce poverty levels by a 
percentage point. In response to these financial sector inefficiencies, the government 
accepted, as part of SAP, the Financial Institution Sector Adjustment Programme 
(FINSAP 1 in 1983) and (FINSAP 2 in 1990). 
Post-liberalised-reforms 
The contemporary financial liberalisation has its roots from SAP. FINSAP 1 was 
aimed at restructuring the banking sector by mobilising savings and facilitating credit 
allocation. It also featured the establishment of Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust 
(NPART) with interest-bearing bonds, which were redeemable in yearly instalments 
within 6 years. The Banking Act of 1970 was not explicit on the minimum capital 
requirements and risk exposure. This was amended under the 1989 Banking Act, 
which mandates banks to hold 6% as the minimum capital requirement and operational 
rights to set interest rates.  
FINSAP 2 was implemented in 1990 with the aim of establishing money and capital 
markets, speed up loans recovery by NPART and the privatisation of state-owned 
banks. These were embarked on to promote competition and efficiency in the financial 
sector. The argument was that it would facilitate the private sector as the engine of 
growth. The Ghana Stock Exchange was established in 1990 with 12 listed companies 
and one government bond. 
The government of Ghana initiated the Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP) in 
2001 to further liberalise and deregulate the financial sector. The major development 
under FINSSP included central bank independence to promote price stability. 
Accordingly, the Monetary Policy Committee was established to set the policy rate to 
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act as a benchmark rate for setting interest rates by other financial institutions. One 
notable development under FINSSP central to this thesis is the concept of Universal 
Banking ACT 200362. This permits banks to perform investment, commercial and 
other activities without the need for a new/different licence. Accordingly, banks may 
choose to undertake any banking services in line with their capital and risk appetite. 
This was meant to facilitate flexibility of doing all banking activities with just one 
bank and encourage banks to engage in mortgage financing, insurance business, and 
other banking activities enshrined in the universal banking laws. However, banks were 
required to adhere to new capital requirements to qualify for the universal banking 
license. The risk of this universal banking reform is systemic risk - where a risk to one 
arm of a bank spreads to all parts and the entire financial system and the real sector of 
the economy.  
In 2004, a new regulatory change was enacted- the Banking Act (Act 673) to replace 
the existing banking laws. Some of the essential modifications include the expansion 
of the definition of banking activities to cover insurance business, mortgage financing, 
securities, portfolio management, and advisory services which comprise capital 
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, credit reference services, and the keeping and 
administration of securities. The new Act gave credence to the universal banking 
model of relaxing bank activity restrictions. 
This new banking status represents a significant shift from the traditional functions of 
commercial banks mobilising savings and advancing customer-specific loans that 
were kept on banks’ balance sheets for the duration of the loan. This has enabled 
universal banks to search for new fields of profitability. As Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) 
argues, banks can now generate profits by mediating transactions in open markets due 
to their investment banking status. At the same time, banks can make profits from 
households by providing mortgages and other unsecured loans. He remarks that 
securitisation epitomises a sharp acceleration of the trend towards investment banking, 
widely adopted by commercial banks. Lapavitsas concludes that these new ways of 
bank profitability are what constitute the financialisation of personal income of 
 
 
62 The banking laws before 2003 categorised banks into commercial, merchant and development banks 
and therefore banks were restricted in scope- what banks could engage in, and geography- where they 
choose to operate.   
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households/workers. Davis and Kim (2015) add that securitisation epitomises a 
fundamental shift in how contemporary finance is carried out. They argue that 
traditionally (pre-liberalisation and deregulation periods), commercial banks provide 
mortgage loans and hold them in their books until the maturity date of the loan; they 
termed this 'originate-and-hold'.  However, in the post-liberalisation and deregulation 
era, mortgages provided by commercial banks are sold off to securitisation trusts, 
which turn them into securities and trade them to financial investors, what the authors 
called originate-and-distribute’. Thus, securitisation changes the originate-and-hold' 
long-term relationship between a bank and its customers (a loan taker) into an abstract 
originate-and-distribute’ relationship between households and an unknown financial 
investor. This new relationship makes commercial banks mere underwriters of the 
mortgages/loans, while the loan takers are now the de facto issuers of securities on the 
international financial markets. This is a fundamental shift in financial intermediation 
from banks to financial markets. 
Relaxation of Bank Entry Restrictions, and Abolishment of Secondary Reserve 
Requirements 2005-06 
As part of the reforms, and to enhance competition and efficiency, the Bank of Ghana 
in 2005 relaxed bank entry restrictions. Consequently, it adopted an open but gradual 
licensing approach that allows the entry of new domestic and foreign private banks. 
This approach was expected to encourage the modernisation of banking operations 
and facilitate the efficiency of the industry. The central bank in July 2005 reduced the 
secondary reserve requirements of banks from 35% to just 15%, and further abolished 
the 15% in August 2006, leaving only the primary reserve requirements of 9% held in 
cash (the secondary reserve requirements act as additional liquidity for banks). The 
cancelling of the secondary reserve requirements increased the supply of loanable 
funds to the private sector, enhanced competition in the loan market and deepened 
financial intermediation. Foreign bank entry in domestic financial markets has been 
argued to be a decisive feature of international financialisation (Dos Santos, 2009; 
Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013; Sarvas, 2018).  
Recapitalising Banks 
To improve stability and enhance credit anticipated by the reforms, the Bank of Ghana 
occasionally revised the minimum capital requirement upwards. The more recent 
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recapitalisation was by increasing the minimum capital requirements to Ghc 400 
million from Ghc120 million (i.e. from US$ 12.7 million to US$ 84.6 million, based 
on Bank of Ghana interbank exchange rate on 17th August 2018). This has drawn 
mixed reactions on the likely impact on the industry (Ghana Banking Survey, 2018). 
While some stakeholders commended the directive, others expressed concern on the 
impact on the industry and the economy at large. With this recapitalisation, both local 
and foreign banks were expected to comply with the directives by December 201863. 
In line with international standards and practices, the Central Bank increased the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) from 6% to 10% (see appendix 1 for the various 
financial sector reforms).   
Nigeria, like Ghana, has a history of recapitalising banks. In 2005, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) raised the minimum capital requirements from N1 billion to N25 
billion (i.e. from US$ 7.7 million to US$ 192.2 million based on CBN average 
interbank rate for December 2005). As is currently being witnessed in Ghana, 
uncertainties existed over the future of the Nigeria banking sector as the destiny of 
many banks hung in the balance. However, during the 16 months window, banks used 
different methods (including mergers) to raise the necessary capital to meet the 
directive (Ghana Banking Survey, 2018). A similar trend is anticipated in the Ghana 
banking industry. 
Supporters of the new capital requirement argue that few big banks will help accelerate 
economic growth and can underwrite big-ticket items as well as remain competitive 
and liquid. Besides, they believe stronger and larger banks can help decrease credit 
cost, improve access to credit, and reduce non-performing loans, amongst others. They 
also compare Ghana’s economy to larger economies like Nigeria and South Africa, 
with few but stronger and liquid banks. Nigeria has 24 banks, while South Africa has 
19 universal banks compared to 34 universal banks in Ghana (Bank of Ghana, 26th 
November 2018).  
 
 
63 Local banks have always been given longer time than foreign banks in the previous recapitalisation 
of the industry. For instance, in 2008, local banks were given up to 2012 to comply while foreign already 
in the country were to comply by December 2009.   
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4.6 Financialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: accounting for the 
Ghanaian paradox 
At the macroeconomic level and relative to the core and semi-periphery countries, 
Ghana's financial system is underdeveloped. Industrial enterprises are more reliant on 
bank credit as opposed to the core countries where capital markets development enable 
large firms to access debt and equity financing. Besides, the numerous reforms and 
the privatisation of state-owned banks did not increase banking competition in the 
country. Banks continue to lend disproportionately to the government, which in turn 
crowds out the private sector. However, the deregulation and the liberalisation of the 
financial market attracted more foreign banks into the economy with new forms of 
financial services, with lending and profit-making shifting towards households' 
income. The capital flows associated with the liberalisation of the capital account has 
resulted in a reversal of net capital flows. The indicators of financialisation outlined 
in the literature are: 1) Financial liberalisation and deregulation; 2) Foreign financial 
flows; 3) Financialisation of non-financial enterprises; 4) Increasing household debt 
and rising financial profit; 5) The shift towards market based financial system and the 
declining real economic sector (Crotty, 2003; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; 
Orhangazi, 2008, 2011; Stockhammer, 2012; Lapavitsas, 2009, 2011, 2013; Storm, 
2018). 
4.6.1 Under-financed 
Periphery countries can be assumed to have, 'all other things being equal', low levels 
of financial sector deepening relative to the overall size of the economic output. 
Besides, the financial deepening of an economy mirrors the specificities of the 
country's historical and institutional settings. Ghana, by international standard 
measures, is under-financed. Goldsmith (1969) argues that the proportion of the 
financial sector relative to a country's growth will rise in line with the prosperity of 
the country, levelling out around 3-4 times of GDP. Ghana, on the other hand, displays 
financial under-development even when compared to other low middle-income 
countries. This under-development is noticeable in the overall monetary aggregates, 
the ratio of broad money relative to GDP, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to 
GDP, total credit to private non-financial sector, bank assets relative to GDP and 
ATM/Bank branches per 1000km2. Following the financial sector reforms in the 
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country, the domestic banking industry opened to foreign competition. The banking 
industry is highly diversified, comprising of 34 licensed universal banks, 17 of them 
foreign-owned banks accounting for almost 54% of the total industry market share in 
2018. Apart from these universal banks, there are 138 Rural and Community Banks 
(RCBs), which account for 3.2% of total financial sector assets. There are also 63 Non-
Banking Financial Institutions (NBFIs), and 503 Microfinance Institutions (Bank of 
Ghana, 2018). The dominance of foreign-owned banks in the Ghanaian banking sector 
demonstrates a financial system that is vulnerable to shocks from the global financial 
system (table 4.3). 
Table 4. 3 List of Universal Banks in Ghana as of June 2018  
Source: Ghana Banking Survey (2018). 
The universal banks in Ghana consist of about 85% of the total banking assets and 
mainly offer credit to corporate customers and concentrate on the regional capitals. 
Because of the high minimum deposit requirements, it is estimated that universal 
banks reach only about 5% of households. In contrast, RCBs extend credit to farmers, 
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government employees and small and micro businesses and entrepreneurs and 
represent about 5% of total banking assets, but account for half of the total banking 
outlets in the country (AfDB, 2012). RCBs and other informal systems offer an 
important role in extending credit to the private sector and households to smooth out 
investment and consumption. These banks are particularly important in the 
development of rural areas. 
Financial development has been measured by various financial indicators, such as the 
ratio of the money supply to GDP (Goldsmith, 1969; King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 
2005). To measure financial depth in the periphery, the IMF has been using the ratio 
of broad money64 relative to economic growth. Figure 4.4 below shows that Ghana's 
financial depth (a measure of the financial sector relative to the economic output) is 
relatively less than South Africa and certainly far less than the UK. The ratio of broad 
money relative to GDP has remained below 30% until 2011 when it increased to 32%. 
Since then it has remained 32%. The ratio in South Africa has averaged 70%, more 
than doubled Ghana's during the period, while the UK peaked at 165% in 2009. 
Figure 4. 4 Broad Money Relative to GDP 2004-2018- Selected Countries 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the IMF 
Another measure of financial depth is the stock market capitalisation, which is the 
market value of publicly-traded company's outstanding shares. Figure 4.5 below 
 
 
64 Broad money represents the total amount of money (notes and coins) that households and businesses 
can use for payments or hold as short-term instruments such as cash, bank account, gilts representing 
country’s money supply. 
0
50
100
150
200
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
Year
Percentage of Broad Money Relative to GDP (2004-
2019)
Ghana SA UK
114 
 
reveals that Ghana's stock market is underdeveloped relative to other low middle-
income countries such as Indonesia and India. This underdevelopment of the stock 
markets limits firms' ability to raise capital for investment purposes. There is no 
available data for Ghana from 2012, as shown in figure 4.5. 
Figure 4. 5 Stock market Capitalisation Relative to GDP selected Countries (2000-2017) 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the IMF 
In terms of market-based finance, stock market capitalisation relative to GDP in Ghana 
has been very low, averaging about 6% of GDP. The highest was in the year 2000 
when stock market capitalisation was 9.8% of GDP, while the lowest was during 2006 
at 3.4% of GDP. Ghana's stock market capitalisation has been below that of South 
Africa, India, and Indonesia, depicting under-financed economy. 
It was thought that during the recent recapitalisation of banks (discussed above) the 
Ghana Stock Exchange would be the vehicle where banks could raise the needed 
capital to meet the requirements. However, it failed to raise the combined amount of  
GHc 4.7 billion needed in time. This is partly due to low investor interest in the bourse 
because of the closure of seven banks recently and high yield on government 
securities. The lucrative high returns on government securities coupled with its low-
risk nature made them a better choice for investors. For instance, with government 
securities trading at 14% in the primary market, and 20% in the secondary market, 
investors will opt for profitable securities than to play on the stock market. The low 
liquidity on the bourse is a challenge for fund managers to trade en bloc, thereby their 
general aversion to the capital market (Databank head of research, 2018). 
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Figure 4. 6 Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector Selected Countries (2000-2016) 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the IMF 
Figure 4.6 shows that credit provided by domestic banks to the private non-financial 
sector (include corporations and households) in Ghana has been rising steadily but 
relatively low compared to South Africa, India, and Indonesia. This was at just 7.2% 
in 2000 but rose to 17.8% in 2016. Private sector credit in India rose from 62% in 2000 
to 71.6% in 2016, while in South Africa it has been above 70% during the period. The 
figure had plateaued in Indonesia at around 38% over the period. This is another 
standard measure illustrating financial underdevelopment in Ghana. 
Figure 4. 7 Deposit Money Bank Assets and Central Bank Assets Relative to GDP Ghana (1973-
2016) 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the 
Bank of Ghana (2018) 
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Deposit Money Bank (DMB) assets is another indicator of the depth of the financial 
market. Figure 4.7 illustrates the underdevelopment of the financial sector in Ghana. 
Both central bank assets and deposit money bank assets started in 1973 at 8% and 7% 
respectively. Central bank assets have been higher than deposit money bank assets for 
most of the pre-financial reform periods. However, since 2004, deposit money bank 
assets have been higher than the central bank assets with the gap getting wider every 
year over the period shown. For example, in 2013, deposit money assets relative to 
GDP was 24% while that of the central bank was under 9%; however, in 2016 the 
figures were 27% and 9.5% respectively. It should be acknowledged that financial 
reforms (discussed above) might have contributed to this asymmetry. The Bank of 
Ghana attained its independence in 2002 while the universal banking Act was enacted 
in 2003. Other reforms issues such as recapitalisation of banks, relaxation of Bank 
Entry Restrictions, and Abolishment of Secondary Reserve Requirements 2005-06 
may also have contributed to the increase in DMB assets relative to GDP in the 
economy. However, despite these increases, financial sector development in Ghana 
based on the evidence above is relatively weak.  
Apart from these conventional ways of examining the size and intermediation of 
financial sector development in a country, this thesis goes beyond by using new 
indicators to examine financial access- bank branches per 1000km2 and bank accounts 
for 15 years and over. Financial access demonstrates the ability of individuals and 
businesses to obtain financial services, including credit, deposit, payment and other 
financial products. Those individuals and businesses that have no or minimal access 
to any financial services are known as the unbanked and underserved, respectively.  
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Figure 4. 8 15 Years and Over with Bank Account at a Formal Financial Institution Selected 
Countries 2011-2017 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
Figure 4.8 above demonstrates further a weak financial sector in Ghana. The number 
of adults with accounts at a formal financial institution in Ghana has been below 40% 
throughout the period except for 2017 when it rose to 42% of the market segment. On 
the other hand, South Africa and India have more than half of the adult population 
with an account at a formal financial institution. They peaked at 68% and 79% 
respectively. Indonesia was below Ghana between 2012 and 2014 at 19%, but since 
2014 has been marginally higher than Ghana and peaked at 48% in 2017. This measure 
of access illustrates that financial sector development in Ghana is not strong by 
international standards. 
According to the World Bank (2013) on access to financial services in Ghana, 40% of 
the extreme poor, 29% of women and 27% of the youth had no access to banking 
services. Moreover, residents in rural regions are less likely than those in urban areas 
to access and use financial services. Several reasons could account for this, including 
the availability and proximity to a bank and the ability to offer the minimum deposit 
required to access and use financial services. As most poor people live in rural areas, 
it is not surprising that there is lack of access and use of financial services. The World 
Bank (2013) outlines that in high-income countries such as the USA, the UK and other 
core economies, over 90% of adults have a bank account. This is in contrast to 57% in 
the upper middle-income countries, 28% in the lower middle income and just 24% in 
the lower-income countries. On this account, it could be argued that 42% financial 
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access in Ghana, a low middle-income country demonstrates a lower number of 
unbanked and underserved compared to the average low middle-income economy. So, 
this is the Ghana paradox.  
Figure 4. 9 Commercial/Universal Bank Branches per 1000km2 in Ghana (2004- 2017) 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the 
Bank of Ghana (2018) 
Figure 4.9 shows the geographical outreach of universal/commercial bank branches 
per 1000km2. This measure of financial sector access shows that only two commercial 
bank branches were available in 1000km2 geographical outreach during 2006. At its 
peak in 2017 (with all the waves of financial sector reforms that followed SAP) the 
figure shows only 6.6 branches in geographical outreach of commercial/universal 
bank branches per 1000km2 demonstrating underdeveloped financial sector. 
The analyses presented demonstrate that Ghana is relatively under-financed by 
international standard measures. However, despite the under-financed position of the 
country, it is essential to assess if Ghana is financialising. To address this paradox, it 
is crucial to examine the macroeconomic picture of the country. 
4.6.2 …yet financialising  
The dominance of the financial sector to the rest of the economy has been one of the 
crucial aspects of financialisation in the core. The rising proportion of bank assets 
relative to GDP indicate financial sector depth. Figure 4.10 below depicts a sudden 
rise in bank assets as a share of GDP (albeit under-financed economy) during 1997 
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FINSAP and continue to increase in every year over the period. For those economies 
considered as archetypes of financialisation- the UK and the US, the proportion of 
DMB assets relative to GDP has been intense, as shown in figure 4.11 below. 
Figure 4. 10 Deposit Money Bank Assets Relative to GDP (Ghana) 1975-2015 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the IMF 
For example, in the US, DMB remained around 60% of GDP since 1973, while in the 
UK the figure peaked at 200% in 2009 and steadily declined to 1.3 times of GDP. 
Given this evidence, it is not difficult to present Ghana as either financialised or 
financialising. 
Figure 4. 11 Deposit Money Bank Assets Relative to GDP Selected Countries 1973-2015 
 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the IMF 
Another measure of international financialisation is the rise of cross-border capital 
flows. The growth of these flows into periphery countries constitutes the global 
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dimension of financialisation (Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013; Dos 
Santos, 2013; Storm, 2018). Gabor (2012) argues that the inflows of investment of 
foreign banks contribute to the financialisation of domestic financial systems. Ghana 
is not new to foreign banks; after all, the first two banks in the country during the 
colonial era were foreign-owned banks. However, as Lapavitsas (2009) argues, 
foreign banks entry facilitates financialisation in the periphery countries. The growth 
of foreign banks in the domestic financial market appears that the banking sector is 
exceptionally profitable and thereby attracting foreign entry. Foreign banks entry into 
the Ghanaian financial market has complex outcomes on the growth and performance 
of the sector. Advocates of financial globalisation argue the superior efficiencies in 
improving domestic financial systems and enhancing credit shortages for SMEs 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001; Clarke et al., 2003). However, there are doubts 
among mainstream economists on whether foreign banks have the appropriate skills 
to assess the soft information needing for lending to SMEs in the periphery countries 
(Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 2008). 
Foreign bank entry in Ghana has been on the rise, and their assets account for 69% at 
the end of 2012 (see figure 4.12). These banks have expanded provision of mortgages 
and credit cards to domestic workers facilitating the financialisation of households' 
income. 
Figure 4. 12 Percentage of Foreign Bank Assets Relative to Total Bank Assets in Ghana 2005-2012  
 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Federal Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/  and the 
Bank pf Ghana (2016) 
One notable consequence of foreign banks entry in Ghana has been the dynamics of 
lending practices. The expansion of lending aimed at personal incomes of high-income 
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and middle-income workers, the introduction of mortgage and credit cards lending as 
well as other financial services are noticeable. The lucrative and profitable nature of 
these practices has lured local banks into the field, thereby accelerating the 
financialisation of personal income. Dos Santos (2011, 2013) presents evidence 
suggesting that foreign banks are the key agencies accelerating financialised activities; 
that is, making an excessive profit through practices that are unrelated to lending, such 
as trading, commission and assertive household lending. The key feature has been 
rising personal indebtedness because of these activities. Dos Santos (2011) highlights 
credit cards and mortgage debt in Brazil as consequences of foreign banks entry. 
Mader (2015) remarks that the aggressive lending by foreign banks and microfinance 
contributed to the 2010 Indian crisis, which was marked by over-indebtedness, 
suicides and violence. The evidence in Ghana is still inconsistent, but the pace of 
change is frightening among the middle-income segment (see table 7.2 for the growth 
of credit cards issued). 
Another notable thread in the literature of financialisation is the power and rising 
financial profit relative to the productive sector. Examining financialisation in the US, 
Krippner (2005, 2011) finds the dominant power of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
(FIRE) share of output. She reported that FIRE has grown from 10% of output in the 
post-war era to almost 25% in the early 2000s. However, the change in FIRE share of 
employment in the US marginally increased from 5% to 7%. Lack of data makes it 
challenging to estimate profitability by sectors in Ghana. However, banks profit before 
tax margin and Return on Equity give an indication of profitability in the industry. 
Figure 4. 13 Universal Banks Profit before Tax Margin (2011-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Ghana Banking Survey (2012-2018) 
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Figure 4.13 illustrates a healthy profit before tax margin. The banking industry net 
profit before tax increased by 30.7% from GHc 2.54 billion in 2016 to GHc3.32 billion 
in 2017, which shows a higher growth than 2016. Profit before tax margin of 36.4% 
in 2017 is the highest margin since 2015. Details of Ghana Banking survey (2018) 
shows that the banking industry net interest income also increased from GHc 6.1 
billion in 2016 to GHc 6.5 billion in 2017, a growth of 6%. The increase of interest 
income from cash and short-term funds and investment security in 2017 was 
significantly less than 2016, which is primarily due to the decline in yield of 
government securities in 2017. The report further adds that fees and commission 
income grew by 10% in 2017, which was largely attributed to the strong economic 
growth in the country. The strong performance from trading income, fee and 
commissions and investment income improved the overall industry profitability 
despite slow growth in the industry interest income- a feature of contemporary 
financialised capitalism.   However, it is worth noting that the top ten banks share on 
the average 60% net profit before tax margin, and the industry holdings of government 
securities increased by 43%. The data also reveals that 57% of Ghana commercial 
bank's (GCB) investment income came from government securities. A useful and 
secure source of income for the banking sector. 
Another measure of profitability is the Return on Equity (RoE)65. This indicates how 
shareholders/investors funds are used to generate profit/net income in a business. A 
sustainable and positive RoE as in the case of Ghana means the banking industry is 
generating shareholder value by making profitable investments, which generate 
returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 Return on Equity (RoE) is calculated as net income/profit divided by shareholders equity. The higher 
the ROE, the more efficient managers generate income from equity financing.  
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Figure 4. 14 Return on Equity for Ghana, the UK and the US Banks 
 
Source: Author’s estimates, figures from the Ghana Banking Survey (2000-2018) and the Federal 
Reserve https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
Figure 4.14 shows that RoE in Ghana banking industry has been higher and positive 
throughout the period. With the average RoE of 41.9% for Ghana, 10.4% for the UK 
and 9% for the US, there is no doubt why foreign banks are attracted to the Ghanaian 
financial sector. The industry RoE recovered from the decline to 11% (the lowest in 
the industry history in 2009-which may be due to the global financial crisis) and 
recorded a healthy return of 21.9% in 2016. This is due to stronger profit performance 
in recent years. The industry net profit increased by 29.3% to GHc2.3 billion in 2016. 
Thus, as long as rising financial profits could be used as a measure of financialisation 
(as in the literature), Ghana could be argued to be financialising.   
This increasing dominance of the financial sector relative to industry and agriculture, 
and the incessant short-term lending to government and households instead of long-
term lending to industry suggests that the Ghanaian economy (albeit under-financed) 
is financialising. 
Ordinary Ghanaians have been drawn into the realm of finance because the continuous 
economic growth has not been shared equitably; wages have been stagnant while 
industry and agriculture profits have been falling. Households need access to 
healthcare, education, housing and a variety of other needs. The state historically 
provided some of these needs. However, a new phenomenon emerged since the 
implementation of SAP, which has been a retreat of the state and introduction of 
private provision. As this is happening, finance has emerged as a facilitator, thus, 
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financial markets make profits from household needs of these social amenities. 
Changes in institutions and ideology through waves of deregulations in both the labour 
market and financial markets have given rise to neoliberalism- the idea that the state 
is bad, and the market is good. These changes have created a profoundly unequal 
society. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) argues that financialisation is fundamentally about 
inequality epitomised by the changing behaviour/conducts between banks, industrial 
enterprises, and households. Thus, finance has acted as a critical lever in increasing 
inequality by creating wealth through access to financial assets and privileged ways 
of trading and positioning in the financial system. 
Ghanaian household financialisation, like many in the periphery, is distinct from the 
core. Banks lend to the government while households are increasing their borrowing, 
predominantly the middle class of a short-term nature through hire purchase and loan 
advances. Microfinance, Susu schemes 66 , and mobile money platforms target the 
informal sector with short-term loans advances with high-interest rates. However, on 
the macroeconomic level, financialisation is still very low. 
The evidence presented points to the fact that Ghana’s case of financialisation is a 
subordinate/inferior one, which is an uneven combination of the transformations that 
characterise inter-sectoral relations in a new era of capitalism. That is, Ghana is under-
financed yet financialising. When the banking system and other financial institutions 
focus on making quick financial returns rather than making a real long-term 
investment, the economy balloons and creates a bubble which awaits bursting. Making 
money out of money with the capitalists eating off the hard labour of the poor, thus, 
the ordinary Ghanaian dream of sharing national prosperity has been taken by rather 
a few elites. For the rest of the citizens, prosperity has only been accessible on credit. 
The lower and middle-income households took on more debt to finance spending on 
education, healthcare and housing. This practice has been facilitated by the 
deregulation and liberalisation of the financial markets, which attract households with 
a modest income to borrow in order to meet their basic spending needs. Therefore, the 
Ghanaian economy is financialising using international standard measures. However, 
 
 
66 This is an informal means of collecting and saving money through a savings club or partnership. 
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there are some distinct characteristics of financialisation in Ghana, due to the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial sector.    
4.6.3 Reverse of net capital flows- a subordinate/inferior financialisation  
The origin of financialisation in SSA can be found in SAP and its related liberalisation 
and deregulation of the financial sector in the 1980s, which abolished price and 
quantity control in domestic financial systems. The World Bank and the IMF steered 
periphery countries to adopt market-based domestic finance to open up domestic 
economies to global capital markets, with the view that capital would flow to the 
periphery countries to stimulate economic development. However, it has been shown 
that as periphery countries become more closely integrated with the global capital 
markets, capital flows in the opposite direction- from the periphery to the core 
countries. A trend Powell (2013), and later Lapavitsas (2013) term subordinate 
financialisation67. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) posits that capital flows have become 
negative on the net basis for the periphery countries, notably SSA. This, he argues, 
has been a striking feature of international financialisation, marking a profound 
difference with the period of imperialism. This is because the reverse flow of capital 
has not been initiated in actions taken by capitalist enterprises and other private agents 
but originated in actions taken by the monetary authorities in both core and periphery 
countries and reinforced by the international monetary systems through the World 
Bank and the IMF. He concludes that the reverse capital flows are associated with the 
contemporary role of the US dollar as the world quasi-money, which has affected the 
hierarchy among capitalist economies in the global market as well as lending a 
subordinate character of financialisation in the periphery. A process Gowan (1999) 
refers to as 'Dollar Wall Street Regime Theory’ (DWSR). He argues that the vast 
majority of countries would like to hold the US dollar as their preferred reserves 
because most commodities are traded in US dollars. This strengthens the Wall Street 
as an international financial centre, enhancing the supremacy of the dollar. 
The key features to subordinate financialisation have been the flows of both 
international capital and international trade, particularly after the Asian crisis of 1997-
 
 
67 Jeff Powell (2013) first suggested subordinate financialisation in his analysis of Mexican non-
financial corporations, and later by Costas Lapavitsas (2013:245 see footnote). 
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98 (Harvey, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2013; Bortz and Kaltenbrunner 2018). Based on 
international trade, three broad sets of periphery countries stand out. The first consists 
of countries that have gained share in global manufacturing, most importantly the 
BRICs economies (semi-periphery), and thus earned large surpluses from export to 
the core, including consumer goods to the US and Western Europe. The second set of 
countries consists of hard commodities exporters such as oil and metal exporters. 
Rising commodity prices have resulted in considerable trade surpluses. The third set 
of countries comprises producers and exporters of agricultural raw materials. 
Unfortunately, countries in the third category, notably in SSA operate substantial trade 
deficit. However, judging by exports to relative GDP, there has been an improvement, 
thus, the closer integration of SSA into the world market as forced policies of trade 
liberalisation during the 1980s has not been generally positive. Consequently, the 
trajectory of the current account in the era of trade liberalisation has varied 
considerably among periphery countries in line with trade specialisation and other 
historically specific factors (Lapavitsas, 2013; Bortz and Kaltenbrunner 2018).     
Accumulation of reserve is ultimately the reason why the net international flow of 
capital has been reversed, leading to capital flowing from the periphery to core 
economies. Bortz and Kaltenbrunner (2018) argue that periphery countries occupy 
lower ranks of global currency hierarchy and thereby have to accumulate a large 
amount of forex reserve as a rational response to sudden capital outflows. The 
subordinate global currency hierarchy forces these countries to adopt high-interest 
rates to maintain the domestic currency, which in turn induces hot money flows. The 
World Bank and the IMF monitoring the levels of reserves relating to exports and 
domestic monetary growth have actively prescribed self-insurance. In practice, 
Lapavitsas (2013) posits three rules that have been used. These are; first, the ratio of 
reserves to imports- should be enough to defend any unexpected worsening of the 
balance of trade, which is a crucial problem in SSA. Secondly, the ratio of reserves to 
short-term external debt should be sufficient to cover all short-term external debt due 
for a period ahead, usually twelve months (the Greenspan- Guidotti rule). And finally, 
the ratio of reserves to the money supply should be enough to defend any unexpected 
capital outflow (typically reserves should correspond to 20% of M2). 
Furthermore, reserve accumulation has also been due to exchange rate policies 
adopted by SSA countries. Hard commodities exporting countries that have current 
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account surpluses have attempted to keep their currency from rising to be 
internationally competitive. However, targeting inflation, which has been a feature in 
neoliberalisation, means that exchange rates were pegged against the US dollar and 
other major trading currencies to control imported inflation. To be able to defend the 
peg, central banks in SSA have to accumulate large reserves as a buffer to be able to 
manipulate the exchange rate. By the same token- of controlling inflation, SSA has 
adopted high-interest rates, which have resulted in even rising exchange rates at the 
same time- a paradox emerges. The higher domestic interest rate has fuelled forms of 
'carry trade'- domestic residents' borrowing from abroad in order to invest in financial 
assets in SSA. As borrowers abroad increased, so did the pressure to hold more 
reserves.   
The costs of this accumulation have been high, measured either as spread between 
domestic and foreign interest rates or as the cost of sterilisation by central banks. 
Lapavitsas (2013) sees it as the periphery countries paying explicit tribute to the core 
countries, notably the US.  
Ghana has a long, albeit modest history of capital flows. The early establishment was 
predominantly in import-substitution industrialisation. However, the introduction of 
SAP commenced a relatively successful transition to the market-based open economy. 
The initial surge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was in response to policies 
adopted in 1986 to attract investment in natural resources after the new mining laws 
were passed. The privatisation of SOEs and most notably the partial privatisation of 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation to the South African mining company Lonmin in 1994 
attracted a total of $233 million of FDI (UNCTAD, 2011). Telekom Malaysia also 
acquired 30% shares in state-owned Ghana telecom. The discovery of oil and 
subsequent production in commercial quantities has attracted FDI to this and related 
sectors in the economy. Recent recapitalisation of universal banks is expected to result 
in mergers and acquisitions that will fuel capital inflow into the economy. 
The passage of the Ghana Investment Promotion Council Act 1994 established the 
framework for investment flows. The tax holiday, import duty exemptions for foreign 
investors, improved remittances of dividends and profits abroad, and improved 
judicial processes are some of the measures adopted to attract capital in the country. 
Besides, in 2005, Ghana obtained its first sovereign rating and then gained access to 
the global capital market. Furthermore, the security of investment provided by the 
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national constitution, as well as the Multilateral Investment Guaranteed and the 
investment Promotion Protection Agreements have given investors confidence and 
have attracted capital flows to the country (Bank of Ghana, 2015). 
Table 4. 4  Trade Balance, Current Transfers and Net Capital Flows to Ghana (in millions US$) 
2003-2014  
Source: Bank of Ghana (2015) 
Ghana witnessed an increase in capital flows after the 2008 global financial crisis, as 
well as continuous dependent on remittances from its overseas workers, which saw an 
increase of 50% over the period 2003-2014. The increase in the capital inflows could 
be due to the country's stable political-economic arrangements, and the legal 
protections given to foreign investors. Higher mineral prices accompanied a surge in 
FDI inflows in 2012 at $3,293.4 million, and a continuous rise in investment in the oil 
sector since the discovery of oil in 2007. Private transfers increased every year from 
$1,017.2 million in 2003 to $1,868.8 million in 2014, except for 2009 and 2013. 
Official transfer, on the other hand, has been more volatile starting at $227.7 million 
in 2003, rising to $603.7 million in 2006 before declining to $9.6 million in 2014 (table 
4.4). 
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Figure 4. 15 Trade Balance, Current Transfers and Capital Flows to Ghana (in millions US$) 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2015) 
Figure 4.15 shows that most of the capital flows into the economy have remained 
relatively stable/stagnant. However, the overall current account balance is in deficit 
throughout the period, with the largest deficit being in 2013. Only direct investment 
(net) saw a significant increase from a few hundred million US dollars to over 
$3billion a year since 2009. 
Table 4. 5 Sector Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment (in millions US$) 2010-2012  
 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2015) 
Table 4.5 shows that mining and quarrying (a global conglomerate multinational 
corporations) attracted the most FDI into the economy during the period. Investments 
into these sectors have more than tripled from $3,115.15 million to $9,919.02 million 
in 2012 due to the increase in prices of these commodities. Finance and insurance 
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(which includes banking) activities have also attracted considerable FDIs rising from 
over $900 million in 2010 to almost $1.4 billion at the end of 2012. FDIs into the 
manufacturing sector increased from $366 million in 2010 to $590 million at the end 
of 2012.  Agriculture, forestry and fishing, which employ most of the labour force 
attracted $70.43 million, an increase of $50.57 million from the 2010 level. The Real 
Estate activities attracted a marginal and falling FDI of $0.66 million due to the 
underdevelopment of the sub-sector. 
The development of domestic sovereign bond market attracted net inflows of $ 620.50 
million in 2010. However, the depreciation of the cedi has resulted in falling non-
residence participation despite the high yields on their investment. Ghana was the first 
SSA country to borrow from the international capital market when it issued a 10-year 
Euro bond in 2007 to raise $750 million at an interest rate of 8.5%. A second Eurobond 
was issued in 2013, which raised $1billion at a coupon of 8% with a maturity of 10 
years. Another Eurobond was issued in 2014 to raise $1billion. 
Therefore, to examine the net capital outflow from the Ghanaian economy, it is 
essential to analyse how the central bank addresses IMF and the World Bank ‘self-
insurance' policy that may arise from increasing liquid capital inflow.  
The liquid capital inflows into the country mandate the Central Bank to hold enough 
reserves to support the Ghana cedi and hence inflation to maintain a stable economy. 
To preserve the real purchasing power and maintain a high degree of liquidity of the 
accumulated reserve in the faces of rising inflows, the Central Bank has to utilise some 
of the accumulated reserves in a relatively less risky but liquid asset. In a situation like 
this, Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) argues that the safest way for periphery countries to 
accumulate reserve has been to purchase US public debt. However, this attempt by the 
Bank of Ghana to address the issue of rising liquidity inflows generates colossal 
opportunity cost as these resources cannot be utilised for any productive domestic 
investment. This unintended consequence impedes economic development in the 
peripheries. 
Thus, unintentionally, while private enterprises/individuals borrow from abroad at a 
rate lower than domestic rates, the Bank of Ghana proceeds to insure it by 
advancing/lending loan to the US at a much lower US official rate. Therefore, the 
beneficiaries of this carry trade are the US government, and the private domestic 
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borrowers at the expense of the whole Ghanaian economy. Consequently, the social 
cost of holding reserves is perhaps a reduction in GDP. The higher domestic interest 
rate to manage inflation and strengthen the local currency fuels/induces this process 
while at the same time increasing the cost of capital for domestic firms. It is clear that 
the rising inflows of liquid capital into Ghana is not due to rising returns on productive 
activities but gains from exchange rate trading and interest rate arbitrage. Private 
enterprises, notably domestic financial institutions, borrow cheaply from abroad to 
capitalise on higher returns on domestic financial assets. The process has facilitated 
privileged private borrowers' bourgeoisie a direct appropriation of the benefit of 
interest spread, a process which fuels internal differentiation in the economy with dire 
consequences of income inequality and poverty. Thus, making more money from 
money or M→M1 (in the money circuit of capital) mostly through carry trade and 
exchange rate arbitrage.  
4.7 Conclusion:     
Chapter four provided the country profile and the overview of Ghana’s political and 
economic development. The review illustrates that Ghana has undergone a massive 
transformation in its economic and political development since independence. The 
political and economic contradictions that symbolised the initial years after 
independence have been stabilised. The economy is now the second largest in the West 
Africa sub-region and the 12th largest on the continent.  
Nevertheless, the challenges of the initial years, which include three major problems 
of structural crisis, fiscal crisis, and political instability, plunged the country into the 
economic predicament. The confluence and the intensification of these interrelated 
problems reduced the efforts by successive governments to provide domestic self-
reliance agenda started at the independence. The predicaments forced Ghana to adopt 
ERP together with SAP in 1983. The ERP and SAP involved macroeconomic 
stabilisation, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises.   
The shift from state intervention to market-based policies resulted in various reforms, 
notably, financial sector reforms, which replaced the pre-adjustment reforms. Thus, 
all the specialised banks created by the various governments were wholly or partially 
privatised, abolished credit ceiling, and restructuring of the distress banks. The 
banking sector reforms also relaxed the entry of foreign banks, which resulted in 
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different forms of financial products in the economy. The universal banking concept 
allowed banks to perform commercial, development, merchant, and investment 
banking activities without a new licence. 
The distinctive feature of financialisation in Ghana is that the economy is under-
financed by international standard measures, yet it is financialising. The 
underdevelopment of the capital market limits industrial enterprises accesses to debt 
and equity financing. Consequently, firms are more reliant on bank credits as opposed 
to the core where large industrial firms can access a range of sources for financing. 
Banks continue to lend disproportionately to risk-free government securities, which 
crowds out the private sector. 
The liberalisation and the deregulation of the financial market enabled capital flows 
and the ascendency of finance in Ghana. However, the initial belief that financial 
liberalisation will induce capital inflows to periphery countries was short-lived. As 
countries opened their capital market, there has been a reverse flow of capital from the 
periphery to the core countries. Lapavitsas (2013) argues that accumulation of reserves 
pioneered by the World Bank and the IMF has been the catalyst for this negative 
reversal of capital from the periphery countries. Domestic policies to attract more 
investment and the high-interest rates in the periphery also contribute to net outflows 
of capital. The next chapter presents theoretical and empirical investigations to assess 
whether non-financial/industrial enterprises in Ghana are financialised, as presented 
in the literature of financialisation. 
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 : Dimensions of capital structure and liquidity 
management in Ghana 
5.1 Introduction   
Chapter four presented Ghana’s political-economic arrangements since independence 
and the factors that precipitated the neoliberal policy of SAP. An original analysis of 
the uniqueness of financialisation in SSA and its subordinate/inferior nature was 
presented. Chapter five examines the dimensions of capital structure and liquidity 
management. A firm's capital structure comprises of its liabilities-mix of debt-equity 
ratio. There are two primary sources of finance for a firm: internal and external 
financing; internal financing is related to retained profits, and external sources of 
financing could be in the form of borrowing (debt) or issue of share (equity). A critical 
issue that faces firms in their external financing decision is the proportion of debt and 
equity to be used. These external financing options illustrate the capital structure of a 
firm. Abor (2008) argues that a wrong financing decision can endanger an economy 
due to the significant role played by firms in the provision of jobs to the people, paying 
wages and thereby reducing poverty, which is a vital issue facing most periphery 
countries, in particular Ghana. It follows that making the right and accurate financial 
decision can stimulate economic growth and development. This is relevant to private 
as well as public sector enterprises that can access external financing. 
The first part of this chapter establishes the theoretical bases by reviewing theories on 
capital structure from the weaknesses of the traditional view to the pecking order. The 
second part provides an empirical assessment to ascertain if industrial enterprises in 
Ghana are financialised, by assessing the capital structure of firms to ascertain if firms 
rely heavily on external financing by issuing a long-term bond or bank credit. One of 
the key assertions in the literature on financialisation discussed in this thesis is the 
transformation of firms financing behaviour from long-term to short-term. Section 5.1 
reviews fundamental theories of capital structure. Financialisation and capital 
structure accumulation are examined in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the 
classification of capital structure in Ghana. The chapter ends with the original analysis 
of the key challenges facing firms/industrial enterprises in the capital accumulation 
process. 
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5.2 Theories of capital structure  
The theories of capital structure are wide and varied in the field of corporate finance 
and other related studies. Eldomiaty (2007) and Salim and Yadav (2012) argue that 
various capital structure theories are based on diverse assumptions which highlight the 
complexity of firms’ financing behaviour. Some of these theories are reviewed below 
Capital structure: traditionalists’ view 
The traditionalists seek to explain the capital structure of a firm based on intuition. 
They posit a direct relationship between the value of a firm and its capital structure. 
Accordingly, the liability-mix of a debt-equity ratio is significant to the value of a firm. 
The theory is of the view that for a firm to operate efficiently/profitably, they should 
have an optimal level of gearing so that the weighted average cost of capital is 
minimised, and the value of the firm maximised. Thereby, firms face damaging 
consequences of their overall performance and survival if they operate beyond the 
optimal level of gearing. Consequently, the optimal level is reached when the cost of 
capital is minimised or the value of firm maximised (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 
1997). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) challenged the traditionalist theory. They outlined some 
key limitations of the theory. They argued that it is irrelevant to influence the capital 
structure by applying only debt or equity finance or a certain proportion of each. That 
is a mix of the debt-equity ratio cannot influence the value of a firm. These weaknesses 
prompted them to propose the irrelevance theory. 
Value-irrelevance theory by Modigliani-Miller 
The value-irrelevance theory pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1958) argues that 
in perfect capital markets, the capital structure decision- a mix of the debt-equity ratio 
cannot influence the value of the firm. This theory relies heavily on several 
assumptions (including perfect capital market, insiders and outsiders have no 
information asymmetry, no transaction cost, and debt is risk-free). Advocates of this 
theory argue that there is no optimal capital structure, and therefore, firms can make 
use of as much and many debts and equity as possible. They posit that the value of a 
firm depends on the efficient use of its assets to generate future income. Thus, dividend 
and interest on debts may not influence the value of a firm. Consequently, managers 
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should look at alternative ways of increasing the total value of a firm rather than simply 
manipulating a mix of debt-equity ratio.  
Critiques argue that in a financialised capitalism, capital markets are not perfect, and 
most debts in the capital markets are risky. Besides, information asymmetry exists 
within investors and firms as well as between insiders and outsiders. As noted by 
Strebulaev (2007), a small adjustment of costs may cause considerable variations in 
the capital structure. In recognition of the weaknesses in the theory, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963: 433) acknowledged the benefits of income tax and introduced a new 
model of value-irrelevance theory to incorporate this68.  As the proportion of debt to 
equity rises, the market value of the firm rises by the present value of the interest tax 
shield. Therefore, the cost of capital will not increase, even if the use of leverage rises 
disproportionately. However, Solomon (1963) and Salim and Yadav (2012) are of the 
view that in an excessive leverage position, the cost of capital must increase. They 
argue that extreme levels of debt will prompt the market to demand a higher rate of 
return. Thereby, it follows that to minimise the weighted average cost of capital, firms 
should avoid a pure debt position and seek an optimal mix of debt-equity ratio.  
However, as recognised by Miller (1988: 102), the theory was not intended to suggest 
that ‘…the debt-equity ratio was indeterminate…' given this position, Myers (2001) 
opines that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model should be seen as a benchmark 
and not the ideal result. The prepositions are merely illuminating that financing does 
not matter, except for specific transaction costs. 
As the literature on capital structure evolves, it is clear that there is no consensus on a 
particular/precise capital structure model. However, the common view is that the 
value-irrelevance theory provides the foundation for contemporary studies of capital 
structure (Salim and Yadav, 2012). These include the popular trade-off model and the 
pecking order theory. 
 
 
 
 
68 Interest on the debt is a tax-deductible expense, this means that a firm tax bill will decrease as it 
employs more debt  
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Capital structure: trade-off theory 
The traditional trade-off theory proposes that there is an optimal level of leverage- 
debt to equity ratio for all firms. This optimal debt ratio is determined by the point 
where costs of financial distress offset the advantages of tax shield- the trade-off 
between the losses and gains of borrowing (Brennan & Schwartz, 1978; DeAngelo 
and Masulis, 1980). This theory presupposed cost and benefit associated with debt and 
equity mix. Consequently, there must be an optimal capital structure that trades off the 
marginal benefits and marginal cost of debts after considering the imperfections in the 
market (such as, agency costs, taxes and bankruptcy costs). As debt level falls, the 
marginal benefit rises; however, the marginal cost of debt falls as debt falls. Thereby, 
a rational firm will seek to finance its operations by maximising the trade-off point of 
the debt-equity mix 
Despite its popularity, some limitations have been identified in the trade-off theory. 
Chen (2004) argues that the theory fails to account for corporate behaviour regarding 
stock market changes, which continuously cause stock prices to rise and fall. 
Furthermore, the theory assumes that profitability and leverage are positively related; 
therefore, firms will borrow more to benefit from tax to shield their income. However, 
some empirical evidence available points to the contrary (Chakraborty, 2010; Ahmed 
Sheikh and Wang, 2011). The competing theory to trade-off hypothesis is the pecking 
order theory. 
Capital structure: pecking-order theory 
One of the prominent theories of capital structure is the pecking-order model which 
seeks to explain various options of financing among firms, something which was 
entirely ignored by other theories. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) suggest 
that capital structure is driven by a firm's desire to finance new investment, in order, 
by first looking internally before seeking external financing. External financing should 
start with low-risk debt, and if these attempts fail or not enough capital raised, then 
equity finance can be sort. Internally generated funds such as retained earnings have 
the least issue cost compared to equity finance. Unlike the trade-off theory, pecking-
order does not suggest an optimal capital structure. It, however, demonstrates the 
preference for internal financing as opposed to external financing. 
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Despite the popularity of pecking-order theory, a more significant proportion of it has 
been on the core countries (e.g. Seifert and Gonenc, 2008; Lemmon and Zender, 2010), 
with very few studies based on the periphery countries. The differences in the 
institutional structures in these regions limit the usefulness of the theory worldwide. 
Other empirical evidence also points to the contrary with firms opting for external 
funds even though they have access to retain profit. A study conducted by Minton and 
Wruck (2002) concludes that firms pursue credit from the capital market to fund 
investment at the time that they have not fully utilised retained profit. This argument 
contradicts pecking order theory-where firms would expect to exploit all internally 
generated funds before seeking external funds. Seifert and Gonenc (2010) point out 
that pecking order financing is dominant only in those emerging economies where 
there are issues of asymmetric information and high agency costs. Their findings lend 
support to the theory that financing decisions are a function of the prevailing market 
conditions firms operate. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the pecking order theory is inconsistent. 
This may be either due to the methodology employed or that the financing decisions 
are subject to other factors that may affect capital structure differently. 
5.3 Financialisation and capital structure accumulation in Ghana   
The recent increase in financial activities in Ghana has been caused by many factors, 
notably the liberalisation and deregulation of the financial sector. These factors, 
primarily (maybe unintentionally) exacerbated the already high cost of capital in 
Ghana, bearing in mind that there are high returns on financial assets than a real 
productive asset. Consequently, the financial sector has attracted the most excellent 
human capital as well as real capital from the economy. 
Ghana witnessed accelerated economic growth in the last three decades of 
implementing neoliberal policy prescriptions. Indeed, this economic growth promoted 
Ghana to a low middle-income status. Paradoxically, the wellbeing of most Ghanaians, 
including those in the rural areas, the peasants, and the working classes have not 
improved meaningfully, and they still suffer relentless poverty. This thesis argues that 
neoliberal policy prescriptions undermined Ghana's ability to diversify its economy 
into industrialisation, particularly manufacturing. 
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The work of Hilferding, Keynes and Marx, to mention but a few, suggests that profit 
is the magnate that attracts capital to a capitalist production process. Consequently, if 
sufficient profit could not be earned from a particular productive venture, capital will 
migrate to seek refuge in profitable ventures, especially in financial speculation. 
Accordingly, it is argued in this thesis that to understand the paradox of Ghana's 
accelerated economic growth without sufficient development, it is essential to 
examine why there is low profitability in the real sector of the economy. Given that, 
capital migrates to sectors where maximum profit could be earned.   
In line with Hilferding’s (1981[1910]) observation that the prerequisite for the export 
of capital (FDI)69 is the changes in the rate of return on capital, sufficient profit should 
be earned in a venture in order to entice long-term capital to that sector. The low rate 
of profitability in the real productive sector could be the crucial reason why the 
economy has failed to attract substantial long-term capital to accelerate real capital 
accumulation process for sustainable development.  
Additionally, it is contended that the neoliberal policies implemented in the 1980s 
undermined rather than resolved capital accumulation constraints in the country. This 
is because the neoliberal policies unintentionally encouraged factors that undermined 
the possibility of the real productive assets to earn commensurate returns to facilitate 
the flow of capital to these sectors to ensure the survival of industrial enterprises. 
Rising profit in the financial sector incentivised managers to divert funds into financial 
assets at the expense of productive investment.  Thus, the pace of real capital 
accumulation has been disappointing in the era of financialisation due to rising 
financial profit.  
5.4 Classification of capital accumulation process in Ghana 
It is essential to classify Ghana's capital accumulation process and then investigate the 
impact of neoliberal reforms on the pace of real capital accumulation in the country. 
The importance of SMEs in sustainable development cannot be underestimated. Hall 
et al., (2004) and Ayyagari et al. (2007) posit that SMEs account for about 20% to 50% 
of global GDP. Ahiawodzi and Adade (2012) remark that SMEs are most vital in 
 
 
69 Foreign Direct Investment, which is intended to earn sufficient profit abroad. 
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accelerating growth and livelihoods in the peripheries. They argue that about 90% of 
all enterprises in Africa are SMEs and they account for an average of 50% to 60% of 
all employment on the continent. In Ghana, Quartey (2008) and Abor and Quartey 
(2010) presented the significance of SMEs in Ghana. They remark that about 90% of 
all firms are SMEs and account for about 70% of GDP, and over 80% of 
manufacturing jobs in the economy. 
However, despite the significance of SMEs in accelerating economic growth, creating 
employment, increasing income and development, access to affordable capital remains 
a challenge of their very survival. 
Many scholars have contended that profit is the carrot that induces certainly most 
entrepreneurs to go into business. For example, Luxembourg (1972 [1913]) argues 
that profit motive is what directs/dictates the mode of capitalist production. Minsky 
(1986) remarks that the price mechanism must facilitate sufficient rewards to 
encourage present and future production. Consequently, the present income must 
certify the past debt obligation. In other words, today's profit must certify the previous 
debt obligation. Therefore, an entrepreneur should be able to validate today's debt 
obligation from future income before they can embark on any investment. In short, no 
profitable entrepreneur would invest without sufficient return on the investment to 
ensure continuous survival. 
In order to extract profit, a firm has to ensure that the price-cost margin is sufficient to 
guarantee the returns to the production process, to replace the initial investment, 
compensate its cost, and other related costs associated with the production process. 
These related costs such as wages for labour time, and compensation for the 
entrepreneur, should be less than the revenue generated in order to have a leftover for 
further accumulation (Smith, 2005 [1776]; Marx, 1990 [1867]; Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 
1986). Thereby, to guarantee sufficient profit, a firm has to maintain a high enough 
price-cost margin. 
However, most industrial enterprises in Ghana do not have sufficient market (global) 
power to sustain high enough profit margin. The price-taking firms, according to 
Minsky (1986), alter their marginal costs to respond to variations in demand. In such 
a competitive market environment, a sudden fall in demand might cause cash flow 
problems to enable the industrial enterprises to satisfy all of its cost commitments and 
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debt. Therefore, the options available are to reduce the production cost or embark on 
product differentiation to maintain high-profit margins. 
The challenges for these options are the lack of technology and expertise, particularly 
amongst SMEs in Ghana to exploit this benefit to gain some competitive advantage in 
a competitive global market.  
Furthermore, the lack of and inadequate human capital development in Ghana makes 
it difficult for SMEs to produce high-tech goods. The inability to produce 
differentiated and high-quality products limits their ability to command high prices in 
the global market. Another option that firms in Ghana could exploit is the cheap 
labour-power available in the country.  After all, semi-periphery economies such as 
China, India and others started their industrial revolution based on cheap labour-power, 
which gave them a comparative cost advantage (see Schuman, 2009). However, 
capitalists in SSA in general and Ghana in particular, are constrained by distinct 
problems, which hinder their ability to emulate these semi-periphery countries’ 
developmental trajectories. 
This thesis will uncover the critical factors obstructing industrial enterprises’ ability 
to make sufficient profit to ensure their continual existence. These factors have 
undermined the real capital accumulation process, together with sustainable economic 
development in Ghana. The key factors that will be addressed in this study include 
lack of affordable capital (due to high interest charged by moneylenders) and 
government policies. The consequences of the government of Ghana forced adopted 
neoliberal policies has resulted in lack of exposure due to the uneven competition in 
the global economy - unfair competition between Ghanaian capitalists and those from 
the core (mainly UK, Europe and the US) and semi- peripheries (mainly South Africa, 
China, and Dubai). This has led to ineffective appetite and demand for domestic 
products. 
The confluence of these obstructive factors hinders industrial enterprises’ ability to 
reproduce commensurate profit, and thereby causing the decline in the pace of real 
capital accumulation. Although these factors are individually distinctive, this thesis 
will demonstrate how these inhibiting factors complement each other to stagnate the 
pace of real capital accumulation in Ghana. Accordingly, this study will recommend 
that, to solve Ghana's economic predicaments and to alleviate poverty, these 
141 
 
constraints should be addressed collectively. Although Ghana has moved up on 
ranking in the recent World Bank ease of doing business, the country still needs to do 
more to support SMEs. According to the 2018 Ease of Doing Business Report70, 
Ghana ranked 114 out of 189, an improvement from the 120th position ranked in the 
previous report. The indicators as described in the report include getting electricity 
(improved from 122 in 2016 to 120 in 2017), resolving insolvency (improved from 
158 in 2016 to 155 in 2017) & trading across borders (improved from 167 in 2016 to 
154) (GIPC, 2018, World Bank, 2018). 
5.5 Contradictions in political-economic arrangements in Ghana 
Access to finance is one of the major constraints facing firms in Ghana. The World 
Bank Enterprise Survey (2013) shows that almost 60% of firms (irrespective the size 
of the firm), complain lack of finance is a significant problem. This constraint (lack of 
finance) is predominant in Ghana than SSA and disproportionately on small firms than 
medium and large firms (the World Bank Enterprise survey for Ghana, 2013). The 
factors impeding real capital accumulation are examined below. 
5.5.1 Financing challenges  
The financial system in Ghana before the 1980s was severely fragmented and limited 
by restrictive government-controlled policies that direct interest rates, control 
commercial banks and allocate credit to specific priority sectors.  SAP and FINSAP 
signify the removal of these restrictions and the empowerment of market competition 
in the banking industry. Government subsidies previously given to certain priority 
firms were removed. These had a massive impact on the performance of many small 
manufacturing firms. Access to credit is paramount to the success of any firm, as it 
assists the start-up of new ventures, enables investment in equipment, stock, staff and 
labour. Yet, the acquisition of credit can be challenging for firms. As pointed by 
Mensah (2004), Ghana's financial sector is relatively underdeveloped, with a lack of 
 
 
70 Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 189, with first-place being the best. A high ranking 
(a low numerical figure) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. The 
index averages the country's percentile rankings on ten topics covered in the World Bank's Doing 
Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component 
indicators. 
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institutional and legal structures that facilitates the management of firms, particularly 
SMEs risk. 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), banks are aware of the strategic 
importance of the SMEs market but are unwilling to adopt traditional approaches to 
access the market (Ghana Banking Survey 2018). Meanwhile, SMEs remark that 
banks do not understand and value them. This misalliance in perceptions can often be 
linked to the types of financing provided by the banks. In particular, banks are 
reluctant to offer both long term lending and working capital facilities that SMEs 
require for development. 
Figure 5. 1 Various Sources to Finance Investment. 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
A developed financial industry provides mobilised savings, payment systems, and 
eases investment opportunities. Efficient financial markets offer a range of sources of 
finance for firms by linking firms to various lenders and investors. This connection 
reduces firms' dependence on unreliable internal sources of finance such as family and 
friends and retained profit. It is clear from figure 5.1 above that enterprises in Ghana, 
SSA and low middle-income countries, rely heavily on internal sources of finance for 
investment. In Ghana, 76% of firms' investment come from their internally generated 
funds. This is, however, higher than SSA average of 74.8% and low middle-income 
countries 68.9%. Bank sources of finance for investment account for just 12.6% in 
Ghana, 9.9% in SSA, and 15.5% in low middle-income countries. Equity (sale of stock) 
financing for investment is lower in SSA and low middle-income, compared with their 
trade credit financing. The underdevelopment of Ghana's stock market is evident, with 
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just 4.7% of firms' sources of finance for investment coming from equity finance. Thus, 
the capital structure of firms in Ghana composed of mainly internal financing. This 
evidence contradicts the literature of financialisation discussed above. This, however, 
supports a geographical investigation into financialisation in the periphery, and Ghana 
in particular. Although banks’ source of finance for investment is low, firms in Ghana 
may be argued to follow pecking order capital structure theory. However, it is essential 
to note that the World Bank Enterprise Survey remarked that access to finance 
constraints was the primary issue among all firms surveyed. The over-reliance on 
internal funds signifies potentially ineffective financial markets and intermediaries. 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) contend that firms that have access to credit can 
expand faster and achieve optimum size, enhance performance and are more able to 
exploit other investment opportunities. The access to finance constraints will impede 
firms' success and expansion and therefore limit their ability to make sufficient profit 
to ensure continuous existence. 
There is limited access to alternative sources of finance in the economy. The role of 
other financial intermediaries like venture capital, lease companies, and the bond 
market, in terms of connecting firms with investors and lenders remains narrow, 
underdeveloped and considered insignificant sources of finance for industrial 
enterprises in Ghana. As a result, firms have narrow access to long-term funds required 
for meaningful investment. As pointed by Mu et al. (2013), the average market 
capitalisation (as a proportion of GDP) of the bond market in SSA from 2001 to 2010 
was just 1.2%. This signifies the illiquid capital market in SSA and the financing 
constraints in the region. With 76% of firms' investment coming from retained profit, 
it highlights the importance of retained profits as a vital source of funds for firms. 
However, the inhibiting factors restrain firms from making sufficient profit to retain 
for long- term investment opportunities. The consequences have been low wages, 
unemployment and poverty. 
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Figure 5. 2 Percentage of Working Capital that is Financed by External Sources 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
The sustainability of firms is crucial upon the firms’ working capital71. Figure 5.2 
above shows the proportion of working capital that is financed by external sources. 
The survey shows that in Ghana, 26.8% of firms' working capital comes from external 
sources. The figures for SSA and low middle-income countries are 22.3% and 27.2% 
respectively. Adequate working capital provides a cushion for a firm when extra cash 
is needed. 
Figure 5. 3 Percentage of Working Capital across Firm Size 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
 
 
71 Working capital is the capital of a business that is used in its day-to-day trading operations, calculated 
as the current assets minus the current liabilities. The benefit of working capital is that firms have more 
flexibility, enabling them to meet their customers' orders, expand their business, and invest in new 
products and services.  
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A glance at figure 5.3 illustrates the percentage of working capital financed by firms' 
size and shows that a higher proportion of firms' working capital irrespective of size 
comes from internal sources. With only 31% of large firms' working capital coming 
from external sources, the rest is generated internally. 
The inefficient and underdeveloped financial markets in Ghana is a sign of potentially 
insufficient financial intermediaries connecting firms with lenders. However, other 
factors also deter firms from applying for credit. Out of the 76.7% of firms who did 
not have access to bank credit, only a few cited that they have enough capital to carry 
on their daily activities. Other reasons for not applying for credit include unfavourable 
interest rates, high collateral requirements and bureaucratic procedures, among other 
things. 
Figure 5. 4 Financial Constraints and Loan Conditions in Ghana, SSA, and Lower Middle-Income 
Countries 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
Another dominant constraint regarding access to finance in Ghana and other periphery 
economies is the issue of high collateral security (figure 5.4). Lenders (due to high 
default rates) usually demand high collateral in their contractual agreements. The 
value of collateral required to access a bank loan is 240% in Ghana- 2.4 times the 
value of loan needed, 213% in SSA, and 190% in low middle-income countries. 
Almost 80% of bank loans require some form of collateral. These inhibiting factors 
deter firms from accessing credit from the formal financial sector and increase the cost 
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of firms that can get some form of bank credit. When borrowers cannot meet the 
collateral requirements of lenders, they are likely to go for short-term credit, which 
requires less collateral, but limits firms' ability to acquire fixed assets, and to exploit 
long-term investment opportunities. Abor (2008) and Ramlall (2009) highlight the 
significance of collateral in securing debt in SSA. They argue that firms without 
sufficient collateral are unlikely to be accepted for financial assistance by lenders. 
Thus, an industrial capitalist with profitable investment opportunities but lacks the 
adequate collateral may not be able to secure financial assistance for investment 
projects. 
Figure 5. 5 Financial Constraints across Firms Based on Size of Firm 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
Small firms are disproportionately impeded by access to finance constraints compared 
to their counterparts. The value of collateral needed to acquire a loan is 
disproportionately higher for small firms' 259.8%, than large firms' 215.8% (figure 
5.5). This is likely to impede the development of small firms and deter them from 
applying for a bank loan. 
One key determinant of loan repayment is the interest rate. A high-interest rate remains 
a severe obstruction of firms accessing bank credit. Since the deregulation of financial 
markets in the late 1980s, and the neoliberal agenda of controlling inflation as the main 
objective of governments, the interest rate has risen massively. Although Ghana has 
made a tremendous improvement in reducing the inflation rate recently, higher 
inflation has been persistent for many years. High inflation leads to a high lending rate. 
This high lending rate limits firms' ability to access a substantial loan, as they will find 
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it challenging to repay the principal plus the interest. The persistent fall in the rate of 
profit coupled with the rising cost of production makes it difficult for industrial 
enterprises to afford the higher cost of external capital. The Bank of Ghana (2016) 
presented that the cost of borrowing for firms in Ghana ranges from 25% to 40%. 
These high lending rates obstruct the private sector to finance investment by 
borrowing. 
Consequently, their capacity to expand, create employment and pay higher wages is 
limited.  Thus, in the Ghanaian case, real capital investment yields minimal returns, 
yet, much is still anticipated to service the debt due to higher interest rates. Essentially, 
firms are burdened with exorbitant interest charges and high production costs, which 
decimate their ability to earn enough profit. Thus, while interest on a loan has been in 
double digits, the rate of profits made from using the capital has been in single digits. 
Figure 5. 6 Monetary Policy Rate, Inflation (end of the year), and 91-Day Treasury Bill Rates 2000-
2016. 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the Bank of Ghana dataset (various) 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the monetary policy rate, inflation rate and Treasury bill rate in 
Ghana. Bank of Ghana monetary policy rates have moved in tandem with the trend of 
inflation over the period shown. The policy rate declined from 24% in 2000 to 12.5% 
in 2006 and increased to 25% in 2016 to curb rising inflation. The rising inflation and 
subsequent increase in policy rates impede firms' ability to access funds for long-term 
investment. Other market rates have followed a similar pattern with a steady fall 
during 2000-2006 and a rise afterwards. Interest rates on government securities have 
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followed the trend. The high fiscal deficits in 2008 and 2012, and the subsequent rising 
of domestic borrowing by the government to finance the deficits caused interest rates 
on government security to rise sharply in 2008 and 2012. The high interest on 
government securities also crowds out the private sector of the needed capital for any 
meaningful long-term investment. Since the government default rate is less or unlikely, 
investors and lenders are more comfortable lending to the government that gives 
higher returns on their secured investments. If investors can earn quick and generous 
returns on secure government securities, then there is no incentive for them to invest 
in riskier productive sectors. Any investor willing to lend to the private sector is likely 
to demand high collateral (as seen in figure 5.4) and high returns on their risky 
investment. 
The Bank of Ghana publishes Annual Percentage Rates (APR), and Average Interest 
(AI) paid on deposit for the public. This publication promotes transparency in the 
provision of banking services. The table below shows the cost of credits to households 
and industrial enterprises. 
Table 5. 1 Universal Bank Lending and Deposit Annual Percentage Rates as at 31st January 2018 
 
   Source: Bank of Ghana (2018) 
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Table 5.1 depicts a high average annual cost of borrowing for households at 33.7% for 
vehicle loans and other credits, and 33.2% for mortgages. GCB and Royal Bank charge 
as high as 40% on all forms of household credit, although the average policy rate has 
been 26%. It is difficult to predict with precision the exact amount of banks' revenue 
that originates from the household sector. However, an approximate picture can be 
used to assess those categories in which households account for most of the debtors. 
About 85% of mortgage debt and almost 90% of other consumer credit debt (such as 
credit card, education loan and other credits) is consistently held by households.  What 
is worrying is that other consumer credit (including credit cards) is unsecured, but 
banks are increasingly confident to provide.  
On this evidence, it is not difficult to conclude that households have been a significant 
source of income for banks. Industrial enterprises also face high costs of credit with 
agriculture 32.6%, manufacturing 33.0%, commerce 32.6% and 32.6% for 
construction. Omnibank and Royal Bank charge more than 38% for credit to all 
industrial enterprises. On this evidence, it could be argued that financial liberalisation 
and the various waves of financial reforms promised to bring about efficient and 
competitive financial markets and hence lower costs of credit, did not live up to 
expectation. It has resulted in high costs of capital for both households and industrial 
enterprises. This has obstructed firms' ability to invest, expand and employ new 
workforce. The high cost of household credit has also reduced aggregate demand with 
negative consequences for multiplier and accelerator processes in the economy. This 
limits firms' ability to make enough retained profits for long-term investments. Despite 
the high cost of credit, banks are reluctant to lend to firms due to high returns on 
government securities.     
Surprisingly, only a handful of studies have given enough attention to low access to 
affordable funds as a major cause of underdevelopment in Ghana. Although the more 
recent World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana recognises lack of finance as the 
critical obstacle hampering the potential development of firms in Ghana, it fails to 
examine the rising cost of capital with the rate of profit that could be made in the 
country. The survey only compares the cost of capital in Ghana to other periphery 
countries but fails to compare the cost of capital in the economy to the average rate of 
return obtainable elsewhere in the country. 
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Banks constrict their credit position on loans due to rising defaults. Non-performing 
loans in Ghana account for 19.7% of gross loans and advances as of December 2017.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ report on banking survey (2018) reveals that the industry 
loans and advances fell by Ghc3.0 billion constituting a 10% fall from 2016, despite a 
fall in the average base rate from 25.5% to 20% in 2017. Table 5.2 below depicts that 
between 2013 and 2016, loans and advances generally declined for most sectors. 
However, commerce and finance continues to be significant to the banking industry 
as it maintains the position as the leading recipient of bank loans and advances. Even 
though banks tightened their credit stance on loans and advances, the commerce and 
finance sector has generally maintained the 24% shares of the overall loans and 
advances. The service sector, which comprises the telecommunication network 
providers is the second-biggest recipient of bank loans and advances, which ranges 
from 26% in 2013 to 19.2% in 2017. The housing sector receives the lowest credit, 
and although it has been increased by 200% between 2013 and 2017, it remains less 
than 1% of loans and advances from banks. This further signifies the paradox of 
financialisation in Ghana. The housing market is underdeveloped, and as a result, 
mortgage debt is not a significant problem in the economy. The data shows that 
Ghanaian households have not had the same paradigm with those households in the 
core countries, which experienced a congruence increase in debts and housing prices 
in the era of financialised capitalism. 
Mining and quarrying sectors also saw a decline in loans and advances from 2.7% in 
2013 to 2.5% in 2017 after rising from 2014 to 2016. The sharp fall between December 
2016 and December 2017 was mainly due to the fall in gold prices on the global market, 
which forced mining companies to adjust their operational strategies and cut down 
production. This sub-sector (mining and quarrying) also has access to the international 
capital market because of its global ownership. The conversion of energy sector loans 
to bond, accounted for the decline in the energy sector loans and advances. The 
restructuring of energy sector loans under the Energy Sector Levy Act (ESLA) bond 
contributed to a 41% decline in loans and advances and enabled the energy sector to 
have alternative sources of finance. This phenomenon is synonymous to 
financialisation in the core economies, where large firms do not depend on bank credit 
for investment.  
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The agricultural sector accounts for most of the employment in the informal sector in 
Ghana and contributes about 22% to the GDP. However, bank loans and advances to 
the sector fell from 5.2% in 2013 to 2.9% in 2015. The decline in bank credit to the 
sector is attributed to high risk and uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, bank credit 
to the sector grew by 39% between December 2016 and December 2017. This is due 
to the recent government initiative such as Planting for Food and Jobs72 and the 
introduction of the Government Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for 
Agricultural Lending (GIRSAL). This is a guarantee fund which seeks to underwrite 
the risk exposure in the agricultural sector, and expected to promote lending by 
commercial/universal banks to the sector. 
Table 5. 2 Composition of Bank Loans and Advances (percentage) 2013-2017 
Source: Ghana Banking Survey (2018) 
The significance of access to finance cannot be ignored if these firms are to participate 
meaningfully to the growth and development of Ghana. However, despite various 
initiatives that have been adopted by the government of Ghana, many firms, in 
particular, SMEs continue to face challenges in accessing financing, particularly from 
the formal financial institutions. Financial system in Ghana remains relatively 
underdeveloped despite the numerous reforms since FINSAP. Andrianaivo and Yartey 
(2010) posit that bond market in many SSA are profoundly underdeveloped as 
 
 
72 This is Government of Ghana initiative designed to facilitate growth in food production to address 
the falling output in the agricultural sector as well as providing jobs for the youth. 
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governments continue to be the primary issuer of bonds in these countries, and 
conclude that the role of the corporate sector in the bond market is minimal. Lack of 
finance limits firms' ability to invest, employ and pay decent wages, which are key 
determinants to end both monetary and non-monetary aspects of poverty. 
5.5.2 Government policies  
Ghana still depends on the Western legacy bestowed to it by the British colonial rule. 
According to Boateng (2009), the 1963 Companies Act is still being applied to all 
companies in the country. However, the Act only recognises large corporations and 
not SMEs, which now contribute the most to the economy in terms of employment, 
income and GDP. He describes the legal system in SSA as shaky and the business 
environment as unregulated. Many markets in Ghana are isolated and underdeveloped. 
These markets include market vendors, food processing, handicrafts, garment (e.g. tie 
and dye) and other service sectors. They are subject to a long channel of distribution 
with many intermediaries between the producer and the consumer, resulting in a high 
cost of production or services. The long supply chain blurs the distinction between the 
suppliers and retailers.    
Good economic governance in areas such as taxation, regulation, and enterprises 
licensing and registration are essential pillars for the creation of enabling the business 
environment. Ineffective regulations fail to address market imperfections that limit 
productive investment and reconcile private and public interests. According to the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013), the number of permits and approvals 
that firms need to obtain and the time it takes to obtain them are expensive and time-
consuming. This adds to the bureaucratic costs of doing business in the country. The 
report further argues that the prevailing legislation of the country also determines the 
mix of legal forms/ownerships private firms take, and this determines the level of 
protection for investors, thereby affecting the incentive to invest. Other obstructive 
factors to business growth include: 
Corruption  
One of the inhibiting factors to business growth in Ghana is corruption. Corruption by 
public officials is a significant administrative and financial burden on businesses. 
Corruption creates a hostile business environment by discouraging the operational 
efficiency of businesses and increasing the costs and risks related to doing business. 
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Inefficient regulations impede firm’s overall efficiency as they present occasions for 
soliciting bribes where businesses are asked for bribes by a public official in order to 
complete a specified set of business transactions. Alvaro González et al. (2007) argue 
that on average, two out of every five firms in the periphery (Africa and Latin America) 
reported paying bribes in order to get things done; and one in six firms reported that 
they were expected to offer gifts when meeting public officials. The report concludes 
that Africa firms are three times as likely to be asked for unofficial payment to a public 
official to get things done than Latin America. Figure 5.7 below measures the 
composite index of corruption- the Graft Index73. The index shows a higher possibility 
of paying bribes and informal gifts in Ghana at 29.7% than the SSA average of 19.4% 
and low middle-income countries at 14.2%. Alvaro González et al. (2007) contend 
that bribes and informal gifts in SSA represent about 2.7% of sales. More worrisome 
is that the incidence of corruption and bribes are higher in the periphery, where there 
are pressing needs for development. For instance, whereas only 9% of firms in Chile 
argue that informal gifts are required to get things done, 87% of firms in Burkina Faso 
believe that informal gifts are required to complete business transactions (Alvaro 
González et al. 2007). These unofficial payments add to firms’ costs and thereby 
constraint profitability.     
Figure 5. 7 Graft Index of Corruption Ghana, Sub-Saharan Africa and Low Middle-Income countries 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
 
 
73 Measures the proportion of times a firm is asked or expected to make unofficial payment when 
soliciting six different public services, permits or licences. The World Bank uses it in its Enterprise 
Survey. 
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Government policies can affect the performance of firms in an economy. In as much 
as taxes are vital for the development of any nation, the level of tax rates and the 
complexity need to be carefully chosen. In countries where it is more difficult and 
costly to pay taxes, large shares of economic activity end up in the informal sector 
where businesses pay no taxes at all (Doing Business data). Corporation tax rates in 
Ghana have been 25% since 2006, with an all-time high of 32.5% in 2004 before 
dropping to 25% in 2006. This is higher than in the UK (19%), and the US (21%). 
Personal income tax for SMEs also stands at 25%. However, the income tax applicable 
to non-resident individuals is only 20% (Ghana Statistical Survey, 2018). 
The Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), empowers district assemblies to levy 
rates, tolls, poll taxes and licences on businesses and households in their localities. 
However, according to the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI, 2002) 
report on taxation and small-scale business operations, there is no consensus in the 
rates applied by districts, and the rates are rarely predictable, thereby, making SMEs 
less secure. The report remarked that the frequent complaints from SMEs were the 
overburden of taxes, impeding business growth and expansion. 
Government of Ghana trade liberalisation policies of the 1980s have exposed many 
local firms to global competition due to cheap importation of goods, and has impeded 
their growth. SAP opened up the domestic economy to foreign competition. This put 
pressure on domestic firms to compete with their global counterparts/monopolies 
whose superior resources and technological advancement enable them to produce 
higher quality products at lower costs. Furthermore, the weakening of the local 
currency against the major international currencies (see figure 5.8 below) increases 
the cost of equipment and raw materials, which adds to the already high cost of 
production. Consequently, poor quality locally made products turned to be more 
expensive than high-quality imported goods and services. This diverts demand away 
from locally made goods to the imported ones. These issues have had a damaging 
effect on the performance of domestic firms. 
Falling exchange rates should have been beneficial for exporting firms. However, only 
18.9% of firms in the country engage in some forms of exporting activities, and most 
of the products that they export tend to be price inelastic, and therefore do not benefit 
from the depreciation of the Ghana cedi. These factors increase firms’ cost, causing 
their profit margins to fall and therefore, unattractive for investors to invest. 
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Figure 5. 8 Exchange Rate of the Ghana Cedi against the Pound, the Dollar and the Euro 2013-2017 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the Bank of Ghana (various) 
Figure 5.8 depicts the trend the exchange rates of the Ghana cedi has had against the 
major trading currencies. The Ghanaian cedi depreciated by 63% against the sterling 
over the period 2013-2017 and continued to depreciate in 2018 against the major 
trading currencies. Against the US dollar, the Ghana cedi recorded a depreciation of 
100%, and fell by 71% against the euro over the period. With the exception of the fall 
in the pound between 2015 and 2016, all the major trading currencies appreciated in 
value against the Ghana cedi throughout the period. The uncertainty and the 
‘dollarisation’ of the Ghanaian economy make it more burdensome on firms to be 
profitable. The continuous depreciation means that external investors (foreigners) will 
require a higher return on investment to cater for the depreciation. These external costs 
constraint firms’ ability to expand and employ workers to help to reduce poverty in 
the country sustainably.   
State of infrastructural development 
Infrastructural development plays a crucial role in contributing to the cost of doing 
business, deepening trade and FDI. However, empirical evidence shows acute and 
dilapidated infrastructure in the sub-region. The European Investment Bank (2013) 
presented that infrastructure development in SSA lags far behind other periphery 
economies. The report remarked areas of concern as electricity, irrigation, water and 
sanitation, information and communication technologies and transport networks. It 
estimated that chronic power shortage alone cost the region 1-2% of its economic 
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growth (EIB, 2013; World Bank, 2013). The provision and accessibility of social 
amenities such as electricity, clean water, good roads and appropriate office spaces 
pose a challenge to the development of firms. The dilapidated infrastructure facilities 
in Ghana impede the ability of firms to remain productive and profitable. 
Deficiencies in infrastructure impede the competitiveness of an economy, which 
obstructs business opportunities as well as increasing costs. Suitable infrastructure 
effectively links businesses to various stakeholders and facilitates contemporary 
production methods to reduce long-run average and marginal costs. For example, the 
chronic power supply will add to the already high cost of production and limit the 
ability of the firm to earn sufficient profit. Table 5.3 shows that on average, the number 
of power outage in a typical month in Ghana is 8.4, which is higher than SSA (7.8) 
and low middle-income countries (4.8). This means that Ghanaian firms face more 
disruption in a typical month than their competitors elsewhere do. The use of 
generators to supplement electricity supply adds high costs to firms’ cost of production, 
therefore reducing their profitability. The value lost due to power outage is 11.5% of 
sales in Ghana, while the SSA average is just 4.9% and 2.5% in low middle-income 
economies. The greater loss in value due to power outage coupled with delays in 
obtaining electrical connection in Ghana imposes high costs on enterprises and may 
act as barriers to entry and investment. 
Table 5. 3 Selected Infrastructure Indicators for Ghana, Sub-Saharan Africa and Low Middle-Income 
Countries. 
 Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Ghana (2013) 
Indicators Ghana 
Small 
firms 
Medium 
firms 
Large 
firms SSA 
Lower 
Middle 
income 
Number of a power outage in a 
typical month 8.4 7.9 9 10.1 7.8 4.8 
Value lost due to a power 
outage (% of sales) 11.5 11.3 11.3 12.7 4.9 2.5 
Number of water shortage in a 
typical month 2.7 2.7 2.2 3.6 2 1.5 
The average duration of water 
shortage (hours) 6.9 6.1 6.2 10.8 3.5 2.7 
Delays in obtaining an 
electrical connection 44.7 44.9 54.2 17.9 32.8 22.1 
Delays in obtaining a water 
connection 57.7 56.8 60.5 56 33.5 21.2 
157 
 
Efficient and reliable water supply is vital for many businesses, especially the 
manufacturing sector. Many manufacturing firms depend on reliable and efficient 
water supply for their survival. Table 5.3 shows that the number of water shortages in 
a typical month in Ghana (2.7) is higher than SSA (2.0) and low middle-income 
economies (1.5). On average, the duration of water shortage in Ghana is 6.9 longer 
than SSA (3.5), and low middle-income economies (2.7). These add further costs to 
firms in Ghana and lower their profitability. MyNewsGh.com reveals that more than 
50% of perishable foods produced in the country get destroyed without reaching the 
consumer due to either bad roads or lack of storage facilities. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the key theories of capital structure from the traditionalists’ 
view to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theory and provided original 
analysis of financialisation, albeit rising financial investments and profits and 
stagnating real economic sector. The traditional trade-off theory proposes an optimal 
level of debt relative to equity for all firms but does not explain the contemporary 
corporate behaviour concerning the stock market. Pecking-order theory, on the other 
hand, does not suggest optimal capital structure but favours internal financing to 
external financing; and on the external financing, preference should be given to low-
risk debt before equity financing is considered. 
Thus, the key limitation of the capital structure argument is that it assumed firms 
would use both internally-generated funds as well as external funds (debts and equity) 
towards productive investment. However, as it has been presented throughout this 
thesis and consistent with the heterodox economics understanding of the firm, it is 
uncertain whether firms will invest in real productive or financial assets; bearing in 
mind that returns on financial assets and government securities are lucrative and less 
risky. This is in line with the theory of financialisation presented in this thesis. 
However, the distinctive characteristic of the financialised corporation in Ghana 
(periphery), and the archetypical financialised corporation in the core (for example, 
the US and the UK) is that firms in Ghana (large and small) are forced to rely on 
internally-generated funds due to contradictions in the political-economic 
arrangements. The forced liberalisation has resulted in high-interest rates, which divert 
funds away from productive assets to financial assets and government securities. Thus, 
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lack of affordable capital for domestic industrial enterprises in Ghana due to high-
interest rates charged by moneylenders and demand for high collateral security 
coupled with limited alternative sources of finance, have resulted in stagnant profit in 
the productive sector in favour of rising financial profits. To a large extent, firms in 
Ghana still rely on the high-cost non-existing bank credit. Thus, industrial enterprises 
make little or no profit from their capital investment but are burdened with high-
interest charges and high production costs. The subordinate nature of the Ghanaian 
economy also impacts costs on firms resulting in deficient capital accumulation. This 
is due to the contradictions of the political-economic arrangements. This is consistent 
with the heterodox economics view of financialisation discussed above (see Crotty, 
2003; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2007; Stockhammer, 2012; 
Lapavitsas, 2013; Storm, 2018). These factors have impeded firms' ability to expand, 
employ and pay decent wages to their workers. Inability to do these has made a 
challenge for poverty alleviation in the country. The next chapter considers issues 
surrounding the meaning of poverty and argues that the inappropriate definition of 
poverty has resulted in wrong approaches to poverty alleviation, consequently mass 
and chronic poverty in SSA. 
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 : The issue of poverty 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented a detailed original analysis of firms' capital structure 
and the key challenges facing firms in Ghana. Lack of finance and government 
political and economic policies were identified as the major factors inhibiting the 
capital accumulation process in the country. This part of the thesis considers issues 
surrounding the definition of poverty, how poverty is measured in both national and 
international levels, and highlights the drawbacks associated with some of these 
measurements. Stiglitz (2015) remarks that one of the greatest challenging issues 
facing the world today is poverty and inequality. He argues that national and 
international governments have a responsibility to battle the vicious-circle dynamics 
of poverty and inequality. Thus, without governments' intervention, human talent, 
which is the most valuable thing we possess in the world, will go to waste. Besides, 
just as worryingly, the social divisions that poverty and inequality produce will eat 
away the trust on which a prosperous economy depends. Section 6.1 examines poverty 
and its challenging measurements. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 investigate absolute and 
relative poverty issues. The chapter ends with the long-standing debate on the impact 
of neoliberal globalisation/financialisation on poverty, by addressing the issues 
supporting the debate as well as the concerns of the critics. 
The extent of world poverty and inequality in recent times has been highlighted by 
Oxfam in Davos 2014 (World Economic Forum). Oxfam pointed out that the 
wealthiest 85 individuals in the world are as wealthy as the poorest half of the global 
population- ‘3.5 billion people own less than a tiny elite whose number can be fitted 
into a double-decker bus'. The report added that those classed as super rich have a 
combined wealth of over £1 trillion. The research further showed that the share of the 
world wealth owned by the wealthiest 1% increased by 4% to 48% between 2009 and 
2014, and that the wealthiest 1% were on track to own more than the rest of the 99% 
of the global population (Oxfam 2014). 
It is essential to recognise that poverty is not the same as inequality. Whereas poverty 
is concerned with the inability to maintain the basic standard of living, inequality deals 
with the relative standard of living across the whole society. However, there are some 
strong arguments about the importance of inequality in the poverty debate. It is 
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obvious that inequality means some people have less money and resources than others 
do. Those with fewer resources are referred to as relatively poor, but sometimes 
questions are asked whether these people are absolutely poor (Stiglitz, 2015, Piketty, 
2013). 
Since the 1990s, poverty reduction became the dominant development agenda. The 
World Bank and the UN took poverty as the central theme to increase the awareness 
of the seriousness of global poverty (World Bank 1997, UNDP 1997). It was meant to 
facilitate strategies to fight and eradicate global poverty.   
According to the World Bank Report, global extreme poverty declined substantially 
in the previous three decades. In 1981, more than half of people in the periphery 
countries lived on less than $1.25 a day. This rate has since decreased drastically to 
21% in 2010 from 52% in 1981. Besides, despite population increases of about 60% 
in the periphery, fewer people were living below the threshold of $1.25 a day in 2010 
(1.2 billion) compared with (1.9 billion) three decades ago (World Bank report, 2010).  
Figure 6. 1 The Evolution of Extreme Poverty Rates by Region 1981-2010  
 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates (2010) 
Figure 6.1 shows that China has been able to reduce its extreme poverty rates 
drastically from 84% in 1981 to just over 10% in 2010. Extreme poverty in Europe 
and Central Asia has been stable over the period, but rising in the 1990s. India's 
extreme poverty has been halved in the three decades, from 60% to 33%. However, it 
is essential to recognise that despite falling extreme poverty rates across continents, 
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SSA witnessed an increase in the number of poor individuals between 1981 and 2010. 
The extreme poverty rates increased from 51% to 58% between 1981 and 1999, and 
fell to 48% in 2010. However, because of the increase in population, the absolute 
number of impoverished people actually increased (see figure 6.2 below). More than 
twice as many impoverished individuals lived in SSA in 2010 (414 million) than there 
were in 1981 (205 million). The number of poor individuals in SSA has increased 
throughout the period. 
In the case of poverty reduction in China, Ang (2016) presents a cyclical process that 
cuts through the usual debate about whether economic growth or strong institutions 
should come first in the process of economic development. She posits that strong 
institutions and good governance allow markets to emerge. Emerging markets activity 
may generate problems that require the state to build further stronger institutions to 
deal with markets’ inefficiencies. Good governance will further stimulate and preserve 
markets development. However, China's recent developmental trajectory cannot be 
attributed to a single cause of action but a somewhat contingent interactive process, 
which Ang calls ‘directed improvisation.’ She concludes that the creative adaptation, 
which has been remarkably agile in the Chinese system, may be difficult for others to 
follow. However, Ang's assessment illustrates the significance of government and 
influential institutions in the fight against poverty. Heavy reliance on neoliberal 
market-based policies to reduce poverty has been unsuccessful in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Kiely (2005) remarks that the developmental successes in China and other East Asian 
countries that became apparent in the late 1970s and 1980s originated from the state 
policies carried in the 1960s. He argues that the state-directed capital investment 
through credit allocation, state planning, capital controls and public-sector investment 
were the key factors to the successes of China and other East Asian countries. In his 
view, successful capital development requires state regulation of the capitalists. 
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Figure 6. 2 The Number of Poor by Region (million) 1981-2010 
Source: World Bank report (2010) 
Figure 6. 3 Regional Share of the World’s Extreme poor population (%) 1981-2010 
Source: World Bank estimate (2010) 
Figure 6.3 shows that in 1981, extreme poverty in SSA accounted for just 11% of the 
global poverty; by 2010, the region alone represented more than a third of the extreme 
global poverty. India's contribution also went up from 22% to 33% while China's 
contribution fell from 43% in 1981 to 13% in 2010. The Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) contribution has been stable, ranging from 7 to 10%. 
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Figure 6. 4 Proportion of Population in Absolute Poverty ($1.90 per day in 2011 PPP) 
 
Source:https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25078/9781464809583.pdf 
Figure 6.4 further illustrates the significance of chronic poverty rates in SSA. The gap 
between absolute poverty rates in East Asia and SSA has widened over the period 
shown. The two regions had the same absolute poverty rates in 1992 at about 56%, but 
since then, East Asia poverty has declined sharply to 3.5% while SSA remained at 41% 
in 2012. Strong institutions and good governance to control market inefficiencies (a 
feature of ordoliberal) are argued to be the main reason for such sustainable economic 
development in East Asia. 
Figure 6. 5 Global Extreme Poverty Rate and Headcount, 1990-2015 
 
Source: PovcalNet (online analysis tool), World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/. 
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Figure 6.5 above presents the recent global extreme poverty rates (incidence) and 
poverty headcount (number of poor) over the period. The global extreme poverty rate 
has decreased from 35.9% in 1990 to 10% in 2015. At the same time, the number of 
extreme poor individuals also fell from 1.895 billion in 1990 to 736 million in 2015. 
However, as shown in figure 6.4 above, the overall figure masks the uneven 
development across continents. 
6.2 Poverty measurement conundrum   
Regardless of the policy focus to alleviate extreme global poverty, there are still 
debates on the definition, measurement, method and data used to determine poverty 
lines. The major theme in the debate is the difficulty in comparing the standard of 
living of people consuming a variety of products at various price levels using different 
currencies. Ferreira et al. (2012, 2015) and Ravallion (2014, 2017) argue that the 
challenge is to define a uniform threshold that represents a common standard of living 
across the world; below that threshold an individual will be regarded as poor. Since 
early 1990, the World Bank adopted the national poverty lines of some of the poorest 
countries as the threshold for the International Poverty Line (IPL) - the World Bank 
poverty line. This threshold is expressed in US dollars converted into local currency 
using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 74  exchange rates for international 
comparison. The first World Bank poverty line (threshold) was set at $1.01 using 1985 
PPPs and used in the World Development Report. This was later updated to $1.08 per 
day using the 1993 PPPs. A new national poverty line was later proposed in 2005 and 
set at $1.25 in 2005 PPPs (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula, 2009). With the release of 
2011 PPP conversion factors in 2014, a new international poverty line was set at $1.90 
(in 2011 PPP) per person per day. The World Bank’s recent aim of reducing the global 
extreme poverty rate to less than 3% has adopted Ferreira et al.’s (2015) proposal of 
new poverty rates at two higher thresholds. These are $3.20 per day and $5.50 per 
person per day for the lower and upper thresholds, respectively. It has been argued that 
a substantial number of the world’s poor now reside in middle-income countries where 
 
 
74 The specific PPP conversion factors used for this exercise are those for private consumption, which 
come from the International Comparison Program (ICP). www.worldbank.org/data/ICP for information 
on ICP. See Reddy and Pogge (2008). How Not to Count the Poor? Oxford University Press. 
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economies usually have a more demanding assessment of poverty. The new threshold, 
therefore, represents typical standards in low-income as well as middle-income 
countries. Furthermore, it recognises that the issue of poverty is dependent on social 
circumstances (World Bank, 2018). This prompted the World Bank to incorporate 
monetary measurement - income/consumption as well as non-monetary indicators - 
low educational attainment, access to health and other essential services and the 
environmental issues in the definition of poverty.   
Figure 6. 6 Projections to 2030 of Global Extreme Poverty 
 
Source: PovcalNet (online analysis tool), World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/; World Development Indicators; World Economic 
Outlook; Global Economic Prospects; Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Figure 6.6 shows the projections of extreme poverty by 2030 with a target of less than 
3%. With the 2018 poverty rate of 8.6%, the World Bank believes that the 2020 target 
of less than 8% is likely to be achieved. However, the pace has slowed since 2013. 
The figure shows that between 2013 and 2015, the extreme poverty rate only fell by 
0.6% annually. This represents the slowest decline for the previous 25 years average, 
where poverty rates declined by one percentage point every year. The four growth 
assumptions demonstrate scenarios where countries projected growth rates from 2018-
2030 are (from top to bottom): 1. a country's average growth from 2005-2015; 2. the 
historical average for the region between 2005 and 2015; 3. twice the historical 
regional growth average; 4. if growth is pro-poor- if the bottom 40% on the average 
grows faster than the rest of the country (World Bank 2018). Thus, by 2030, the global 
extreme poverty rate will depend on the particular growth assumption realised. What 
should be recognised is that in a financialised capitalism, economic growth could be 
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induced by household spending financed by debt, which may not be sustainable when 
the debt bubble bursts. 
Many governments have pursued poverty reduction programmes in recent years in 
many parts of the world, particularly in SSA. National governments and policymakers, 
international donor agencies, and non-governmental organisations have all devoted a 
lot of attention, effort and resources towards achieving poverty reduction. The goal of 
achieving poverty reduction drove the United Nations at the turn of the 21st century to 
establish a set of milestones popularly known as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) for periphery countries to reach by 2015. These goals represented a 
partnership between the core and periphery countries ‘to create an environment at both 
national and international levels, which is conducive to development and elimination 
of poverty (UNDP, 2010).  
Ghana, under the IMF, has implemented various programmes over the last four 
decades to eradicate poverty. These programmes include Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in 1983, Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2002-2004 (GPRS I), 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2005-2009 (GPRS II) and the recent 
medium-term development policy framework. Ghana Shared Growth and 
Development Agenda, 2009-2013 (GSGDA) also focuses on accelerated economic 
growth with the ultimate aim of alleviating poverty (GoG/NDPC, 2009, 2013). 
It should be recognised that what is perceived as poverty sets out the basis on which 
strategies are formulated to fight poverty alleviation. However, lack of consensus in 
the literature has led to many proposed measures (Atkinson, 1987; Ferreira et al. 2012, 
2015; Ravallion, 2014, 2017). 
Poverty in Ghana is on the downward trajectory (see figure 6.7 below); however, the 
number is still high. The poverty measurement used in Ghana reflects the minimum 
income/expenditure required to satisfy the basic needs. When income/expenditure 
falls below this threshold, a person is classified as poor. The $1.90 a day poverty line 
for extreme poverty has been the standard adopted by the international organisation 
and the World Bank to reflect the minimum consumption/income level necessary to 
meet one's basic needs. Although this minimum requirement differs over time and 
across countries, it allows governments and other agencies to compare poverty across 
regions/countries with a common reference point (Harrison, 2007; Ferreira et al., 2012, 
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2015; Ravallion, 2014, 2017). The poverty headcount measurement could be 
presented as a percentage (the incidence of poverty) or as the number of people who 
are poor. However, the headcount measurement does not indicate the extent of poverty, 
that is how poor the poor are. 
Poverty gap is another significant measurement of poverty. This measures the distance 
below the threshold as a percentage of the poverty line- how far individuals fall below 
the poverty line. It indicates the extent of poverty in an economy (Atkinson, 1987; 
Harrison, 2007). The poverty gap, however, does not consider inequality amongst the 
poor but instead measures the intensity to which people on the average fall below the 
threshold. World development report (1990), stated that the poverty line could be 
thought of as comparing two elements; firstly, the income required to afford a 
minimum standard of nutrition and other basic necessities and, secondly, the necessary 
income that differs across countries, representing the cost of engaging in the daily life 
of that community. 
Ghana has periodically conducted several surveys known as the Ghana Living 
Standard Survey (GLSS) since 1980 to determine the incidence of poverty across 
localities and socio-economic groups in the country. From these surveys, 
consumption/expenditure-based poverty measurement is used to ascertain a poverty 
line, which indicates the levels of consumption below which one is classified as poor. 
The more recent survey conducted by Ghana Statistical Service, 2018 – GLSS7 
outlines two key poverty lines based on the January 2013 price level expressed in 
constant prices of Greater Accra. This is because food items are more expensive in 
Greater Accra than other regions, whereas, for non-food items, other regions (except 
the three northern regions) are more expensive than the capital. The poverty lines are: 
• A lower poverty line of Ghc.792.05 per adult per year: this focuses on what is 
required to meet the nutritional intake of an individual. Individuals whose total 
expenditure falls below this threshold are classified to be in extreme poverty. 
This is because even if they allocate the whole household budget to food, they 
would not be able to meet the minimum nutrition requirements (if they consume 
the average consumption basket). This threshold is 27.1% of the mean 
consumption level in 2012/2013. 
• An upper poverty line of Ghc1314.00 per adult per year: this considers 
essential food and non-food consumption. Individuals consuming above this 
threshold can be considered able to purchase enough food to meet the 
nutritional requirements and the essential non-food intake. This threshold is 
44.9% of the mean consumption level in 2012/2013. 
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The lower poverty line indicates an individual expenditure of Ghc2.17 per adult per 
day or $1.10 per day for the extreme poverty line; and Ghc3.6 per adult per day or 
$1.80 per day for the upper poverty line (based on the January 2012 exchange rate). It 
is interesting to note that the domestic currency has since depreciated against the dollar 
and other major currencies on the foreign exchange market. The Ghana cedi has 
depreciated 100% against the US dollar between 2013 and 2017 (see figure 5.8). 
However, both poverty lines remain the same. Therefore, the Ghana Statistical Service 
and other agencies should appreciate the links between exchange rates and other 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, interest rate, poverty and unemployment 
in the country. They should go beyond using the GLSS to identify the basket and 
engage all ten regions to validate further the basket and the weight associated with 
determining the incidence of poverty. Local people should be involved in determining 
the basket as well as the weight associated. 
It is challenging to set a fixed poverty line using the value of consumption needed to 
satisfy minimum subsistence needs. Calorie or nutritional requirements may also give 
a misleading picture because it depends on which food basket is chosen. Townsend 
(1962) argues that there are many gaps in the existing knowledge of the quantitative 
aspects of a man's needs. He criticises the British Medical Association (BMA) 
committee report that a man requires 1750 calories or more a day depending on his 
daily activity (p.216).  
In his later work, Townsend (2010, 2014) remarks that there is little evidence to 
suggest that any individual fatty acids are requisite for the nutrition of a man. He 
argues that doubts exist concerning the necessary intake of calcium, iron, protein and 
other vitamins, especially vitamin C. It is also important to acknowledge that some 
individuals make their purchases not only by the tastes and nutrition, but by the way 
the product is advertised and packaged. That is, brand loyalty has a significant 
influence on what some people consume. These individuals may not be aware of the 
nutritional content of the food they consume. 
Another conundrum in poverty measurement is how poverty numbers should be 
presented. While the incidence of poverty (the percentage of the poor) has been falling 
over the years, the absolute number of individuals has not changed (with increases in 
some regions) over the same period. Advocates of neoliberal globalisation frequently 
use the incidence of poverty to prove a positive relationship between increasing 
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globalisation/financialisation and poverty alleviation. Critics, on the other hand, point 
to the absolute number of poor individuals in regions such as SSA to argue their case 
(Harrison, 2007). 
Poverty in Africa has a disproportionate effect on women. Women use most of their 
time nurturing and rearing children, working on the farm, fetching firewood and water 
and also doing almost all the household chores with little or no income in return. 
Women lack access to education and better employment opportunities. These make it 
difficult for women in the periphery countries to escape poverty (Kyei, 2000). 
One other significant problem of poverty measurement is that those who define and 
measure poverty have no living experience of what poverty entails. These are usually 
the elite of the World Bank, IMF, OECD, UN, Statisticians, Economists, and other 
international agencies. They rely on data extracted from large-scale demographic and 
income surveys at the household level and subject these to econometric/quantitative 
analysis. These elites can only have an outsider's view of what it is to be poor, a view 
which is entirely distorted (Chambers, 1995; Kyei, 2000). Some might argue that one 
should not have a living experience in poverty to be able to define poverty, but it is 
essential to recognise that inappropriate measurement of poverty will lead to a wrong 
policy to alleviate poverty.  Owusu and Yankson (2007) remark that methods used in 
measuring poverty are very crucial because it affects the approaches that policymakers 
approve to alleviate poverty and form the basis on which the analyses of the poor are 
administered. Agbenyega (1998, as cited in Kyei, 2000) points out that primarily, 
statistics and qualitative analysis of the poor are used in the same way as a drunken 
man uses a lamp post - not for its primary purpose of illumination but for supporting 
their preconceived notions. This presents a conundrum to draw up an appropriate 
programme to alleviate poverty. If the problem has been defined or measured by an 
outsider who has no experience in what the problem (poverty) is; and as this work will 
outline later, the poor must be involved in designing programmes that will help 
alleviate poverty. Chambers (1995: 180) argues that poor people's criteria differ from 
those assumed for them by professionals and outlines the reasons why this is the case.   
In the first place, he argues, economics concepts, methods, and measures dominate the 
development discourse and have been accepted as the norm of development practices 
and policymaking. It is essential to acknowledge that this is not in any way to 
underestimate the importance of economic concepts and methods. However, 
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economists' view of poverty tends to become the standard and dominant meaning and 
measurement for other disciplines and professions. 
Furthermore, the poor in the core countries have been mainly urban and have tended 
to rely on and receive some form of income support, such as welfare benefits in the 
United Kingdom. Consequently, the economic status of the poor is easily captured in 
income/consumption. Transplant this measure in the periphery assumes that similar 
conditions prevail. Poverty in Ghana is a rural phenomenon (see table 6.1 below) 
characterised by hardship, suffering, lack of opportunities and hopelessness. 
Moreover, income or consumption poverty is measurable. Thus, non-monetary aspects 
of poverty can also be measured by given shadow prices and combined into a single 
scale. These make it possible for poverty lines to be measured and drawn to facilitate 
international comparisons. Consequently, governments and other agencies could be 
assessed on how well they are presumed to be working to alleviate poverty. This, 
therefore, gives professionals the supremacy and pride, which tend to go unchallenged. 
Thus, the measurable then become measured, which becomes a reality and what 
matters, standardising the diverse, and excluding the divergence and difference.  
Besides, it is erroneously assumed that poor households are mostly concerned with 
income/consumption to meet the basic needs to survive. Therefore, the more deprived 
the poor find themselves, the more acceptable economic reductionism 
income/consumption poverty becomes. Consequently, income/consumption poverty 
becomes pro-poor. This, however, does not eradicate poverty but rather postpones the 
problem. 
Chambers concludes that these point to the reasons why income-consumption poverty 
has some dominance as a measure of world poverty. Kaberr (1996, as cited in Kyei, 
2000) remarks that the principal concern of the majority of economists is with 
income/consumption poverty; with the quantifiable and the merchandisable. The 
equation of poverty with the household income, he argues, demonstrates the 
measurement and the institutional flaws of mainstream economics. 
It is essential to recognise that there is lack of consensus regarding a precise definition 
of poverty. Within the Social Sciences, many attempts have been made to have a 
coherent definition within numerous poverty research and studies (Townsend, 1962; 
Atkinson, 1987; Chambers, 1995; Kyei, 2000; Ravallion, 2001, 2014; Harrison, 2007; 
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Ferreira et al. 2012, 2015). However, no agreed definition unites the various 
approaches available to Social Sciences. But, unless local people have standards to 
define and recognise the poor, it will be challenging to design and administer 
programmes to alleviate poverty (Harrison, 2007; Ferreira et al. 2012, 2015).   
Lack of, and, deficiency are the common themes held in most definitions of poverty. 
Beyond this general view, nothing unites the various disciplines on what represents 
poverty. Besides, this notion only constitutes the simple relativity of the concept. This 
narrow definition colonises the general usage. Income/consumption poverty is used as 
a proxy for other deprivations and then subsumes them. It has been common to view 
poverty as more than a monetary problem, but then allowing the quantifiable and 
measurable to seize control and dominate (Chambers, 1995; Ferreira et al. 2012, 2015). 
Chambers argues that income poverty, though significant, is only one aspect of 
deprivation, and maintains that poverty includes lack of physical necessities, assets, 
and income. 
Chambers (1995:180) outlines the following characteristics as the reality of the rural 
poor, which is a phenomenon in the periphery, and Ghana in particular: 
 Physical weakness, which includes disability, sickness, pain and suffering. 
 Powerlessness- the poor are powerless and lack influence. Some easily ignore 
them and are exploited by others. 
 Isolated in communication and lacking contact and information.  
 Humiliation- this is often overlooked because it does not lend itself to 
measurement. Lack of self-respect and independence. 
 Social inferiority- this includes gender, race and ethnic origin or being 
referred to as low in society in terms of occupation, social class, tribe or even 
caste. 
Thus, poverty is more than just income and consumption as it includes the lack of what 
is necessary for well-being, and its scope should encompass social, economic and 
other forms of disadvantages outlined above- powerlessness, isolation, humiliation 
and physical weakness. 
The measurement and analysis of poverty in Ghana have focused on consumption 
poverty, comprising food and non-food items. Since GLSS was conducted, seven 
rounds of data have been collected. However, this thesis will focus on the recent 
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rounds of data collected from 2005/06, 2012/13, and 2016/17. This is due to the 
similarities of the questionnaires used, thereby making it viable to compare their 
results. 
Figure 6. 7 Poverty Incidence by locality 2005-2017 (Poverty line= GHc 1,314) 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2018) - GLSS7 
Figure 6.7 illustrates a downward trend in poverty in Ghana. It is also clear that poverty 
is predominantly a rural phenomenon. For example, the Greater Accra Metropolitan 
Area (GAMA) has consistently recorded the lowest poverty incidence in the last two 
rounds of the survey. In percentage terms, the number of people classified as poor has 
decreased from 51.7% in 1991 to just over 24% in 2013. This means that Ghana 
attained the Millennium Development Goal target 1-, which seeks to halve poverty 
incidence by 2015 from the 1990 rate. Since 2013, there has been a marginal decline 
in the poverty rate from 24.2% to 23.4% in 2017. However, during the same period, 
economic growth has averaged 5%, while the average annual per capita income for 
2014-2017 was GHc5,540.8, which is double the 2010—2013 average per capita 
income of GHc2,672.2. This paradox explains the myth of finance-growth-poverty 
alleviation nexus in Ghana. The expansion of the economy impacts marginally on the 
poor. 
It is also essential to recognise that the general picture of falling poverty rate conceals 
significant differences across localities, administrative regions, economic activity and 
even gender. Although poverty rates in urban areas such as Accra (GAMA) have 
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decreased from 12% in 2005 to just 2% in 2017, some pockets of these urban centres 
are characterised by overcrowding, poor sanitation, and an occasional outbreak of 
diseases (for instance the cholera outbreak in Accra in July-August 2014). Poverty 
rates in urban coastal have actually increased from 6.4% in 2005 to 8.3% in 2017. A 
similar trend in rural savannah where the highest poverty headcount is found, saw 
poverty rates increase from 64.2% in 2005 to 67.7% in 2017 after falling to 55% in 
2013. Rural forest and urban savannah, however, witnessed gradual falls in poverty 
rates from 33.1% and 30.1% in 2005 to 24.1% and 24.9% in 2017, respectively. The 
most recent improved national poverty rate of 23.4% indicates that roughly one in four 
Ghanaians is living in poverty and over two million are in extreme poverty. 
Table 6. 1 Poverty Incidence and Poverty Gap by Localities- 2005-2017 (Poverty Line = Ghc 1,314) 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2018)- GLSS7 report 
Table 6.1 shows that even though just about half of Ghana's population resides in rural 
areas, it contributes more than 80% consistently to the overall poverty incidence. Rural 
savannah accounted for almost 50% of poverty incidence in 2016/17 and has 
consistently contributed the most to the poverty incidence in the country. The 
persistent poverty in this region is worrying, and it will, therefore, be vital to analyse 
the principal causes of this (which is beyond the scope of this study) to inform future 
policies and programmes. 
Extreme poverty in Ghana is classified as to where a person's income is not sufficient 
to meet the necessary nutritional needs even if they spend the total consumption budget 
on food (Ghana Statistical Service, 2018, GLSS7 report). 
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Figure 6. 8 Extreme Poverty Incidence by Locality 2005-=2017 (Poverty line = GHc792.05) 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2018)- GLSS7 report 
Figure 6.8 illustrates that extreme poverty has declined from 16.5% in 2005/06 to 8.2% 
in 2016/17 (a decline by 8.3%). However, between 2013 and 2017, extreme poverty 
reduced by just 0.2%. This demonstrates that the reduction in the incidence of extreme 
poverty has slowed down. Based on the 2010 Population and Housing Census (PHC) 
(estimates for 2017), about 2.4 million Ghanaians predominantly in the rural areas are 
unable to consume the minimum daily requirements of calories per adult per 
equivalent of food per day. That is, even if they devote their total spending on food. 
What is surprising is that this figure is up by 200,000 from 2012/13 levels. Within 
these same periods, financial activities in the country are on the rise with the 
introduction of financial inclusion and its mobile money as a way of reducing poverty 
(detailed analysis in chapter 7). This paradox of rising financial activities and financial 
interests and rising poverty headcounts demonstrates that financialisation in Ghana is 
not having meaningful impacts on the living standards of the poor, especially those in 
the rural areas. 
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Table 6. 2 Extreme Poverty Incidence and Poverty Gap by Locality 2005-2017 (Extreme Poverty 
Line = GHc792.05) 
Source: (Ghana Statistical Service (2018) - GLSS7 report 
Table 6.2 demonstrates that the incidence of extreme poverty is a rural phenomenon. 
Over 2 million rural inhabitants are in extreme poverty (2010 PHC estimates for 2017). 
Extreme poverty is more pronounced on the local level than the overall poverty 
incidence. The rural-urban divide is more noticeable with rural savannah, again 
recording 8.8% increase from the 2012/13 levels to 36.1% in 2016/17, which is more 
than four times the national average and contributes over 75% to the incidence of 
extreme poverty. However, except for rural savannah, all regions recorded some 
decline in extreme poverty. GAMA contributes nothing to the extreme poverty 
incidence. With an estimated urban population of 14.7 million (based on 2010 PHC 
projections for 2017), only 1% of this figure is impoverished, and accounts for just 
6.2% of the national incidence. However, 15.6% of the rural population (estimated at 
14.2 million) are extremely poor and account for 93.8 of the overall extreme poverty 
indicators. It is clear that the World Bank and the IMF financial inclusion programmes 
aimed at the poor are not having the desired impact in rural Ghana. Drawing these 
poor people into the realms of finance is causing the incidence of extreme poverty to 
increase in places like rural savannah. 
Poverty is a rural phenomenon in Africa characterised by lack of opportunities, 
hardship, illiteracy, diseases, hunger and low life expectancy. The underlying goal of 
development enshrined in the constitution of Ghana is to improve the well-being of all 
citizens by alleviating poverty through a sustained increase in the wealth of the nation 
and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth (GoG, 1992 constitution). 
176 
 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and its associated liberalisation and the 
more recent financial inclusion policy initiated by the Bretton Wood Institutions have 
brought a renewed interest in the impact of liberalisation on sustainable economic 
development at the local levels. There is a growing consensus that the local people, 
NGOs, local governments and even the poor have a role to play in the fight against 
poverty. 
Poverty exists when individuals cannot maintain the necessary level of well-being that 
is considered minimum standards by that community (Ravallion, 2001, 2017; Ferreira 
et al. 2012, 2015). As argued by Gaiha (1993) and Ravallion (2014, 2017), it is not 
enough for policy purposes to know that poverty exists, but also essential to know how 
much poverty exists. The authors argue that much of the theoretical literature is mainly 
concerned with the aggregation problem; however, several problems exist relating to 
the identification issue. 
6.3 Absolute poverty 
Absolute poverty is when a household is unable to afford the basic needs of life, thus, 
having the bare minimum food to survive on. This is someone who struggles to make 
ends meet- lack of food, shelter and clothing. This poverty line is determined by using 
the standard of living measure, which is fixed for the whole period and accepted across 
countries. This makes it relatively easier to compare poverty levels across countries 
and regions. The threshold, however, fails to consider differences in income across 
countries. Gaiha (1993), Ravallion (2001) and Ferreira et al. (2012, 2015) contend that 
absolute poverty comparison considers two or more households of the same income 
budget to be either poor or not poor, regardless of when or where they were assessed.  
Poverty in administrative regions 
There is a wide disparity of the incidence of poverty and poverty gap in the ten regions 
of Ghana. The northern half of the country (Upper West, Northern Region, and Upper 
East) has consistently accounted for the highest incidence of poverty in the country 
since records began. GAMA area contributes the least incidence of poverty, with just 
2.5% in 2016/17 - 20.9 % lower compared with the national figure of 23.4%. However, 
half of the regions (five regions) in the country recorded an increase in the poverty 
level in 2016/17- worsening poverty conditions. These regions consist of the three 
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regions in the north, which recorded the top three highest poverty rates in the country- 
Upper West 70.9%, Northern region 61.1%, and Upper East 54.8%. Even among the 
top three poverty regions, the variation is pronounced. Western 21.1% and Volta 37.3% 
are the other two that experienced worsening rates in 2016/17 from 2012/13 levels. 
The rest of the regions, including GAMA areas, experienced decline in poverty rates 
(Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6. 9 Poverty Incidence by region 2005-2017 (Poverty line = GHc1,314) 
Source: Source: (Ghana Statistical Service (2018) - GLSS7 report 
Although the Upper West region recorded the highest poverty rate in the country, it 
contributes just 8.5% of the national figure. This is because the region has the smallest 
population in the country and adds 574,794.9 (based on 2010 PHC projections for 
2017) to the 6.8 million individuals regarded as poor in 2016/17. The Northern region 
of Ghana has been the largest contributor since 2005 and accounts for about 1.8 million 
people to the overall figure (Table 6.3). 
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Table 6. 3 Poverty Incidence and Poverty gap by region (%) 2006-2017 (Poverty Line = GHc1,314) 
Source: (Ghana Statistical Service (2018) - GLSS7 report 
About a quarter of Ghanaians are deemed poor, and there is a wide regional variation. 
Since records began, poverty has been very much a rural phenomenon. Majority of the 
residents in the three regions in the north are deemed poor or extremely poor. Rural 
savannah accounts for most of the poor people in the country. Therefore, poverty 
reduction in these regions will help to reduce the overall national figure. However, 
what is worrying is that the accepted neoliberal policy prescriptions of liberalisation 
and deregulation seem to be causing worsening living standards rather than improving 
them for those in rural areas. 
Absolute poverty is measured using a basket of goods considered to ensure the basic 
consumption needs of a household. The challenge of this measure is the constituents 
of these basic needs against which the line would be drawn. For many periphery 
countries, as Gaiha (1993) pointed out, basic food expenditure forms the essential 
component of the recommended nutritional consumption. A small allowance of non-
food expenditure is then added to determine the threshold. However, it is crucial to 
recognise that what is consumed in most poor households in rural Ghana comes from 
their subsistence farms and therefore not purchased from the market/shop, giving 
severe measurement issues of valuing home production. Kyei (2000) argues that there 
is lack of consensus on the choice of food energy needed to meet the recommended 
nutritional intake. Thus, the computations of the recommended nutritional intake are 
based on an estimate which is subject to a margin of error. Townsend (1962, 2014) 
and Ferreira et al. (2012, 2015) argue that the nutritional content of certain products 
varies depending on where and when the product is produced, and the value society 
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places on the product. For instance, yam is more valuable in Ghanaian society than 
cocoyam. This makes it difficult to rely on certain nutritional intake as an indicator of 
poverty.     
Furthermore, the level of poverty lines set is influenced by how food costs are analysed 
and whether they are based on experts’ opinion of the cheapest way of meeting foods’ 
needs or based on actual food that the poor people eat. The differences can be caused 
by whether the definition and measurement of poverty includes some basic services 
or not. Despite the agreement that poverty exists, there is a disagreement on how best 
to define and measure it. Different methodologies, the goods included as needs, price 
estimate techniques and proxy value estimates all lead to different results (Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite, 2013).   
6.4 Relative poverty 
Relative poverty is when income falls below a certain percentage of the mean income 
in a society. It does not compare a household to a fixed cut off income/consumption, 
but relative to the rest of the society.  When all levels of income in the economy 
increase, absolute poverty will fall; however, for relative poverty to fall, the rate of 
growth of low income must be above the rate of growth of average income. Thus, 
relative poverty is when a household cannot acquire adequately the common standard 
of living which is the customary behaviour in the society they live (Townsend, 1962, 
2010; Ravallion, 2014, 2017).  
It is challenging to translate relative poverty concept into a concrete measure. This 
measure ignores essential aspects of deprivation, such as the quality of goods and 
services, and relies heavily on income measurement of poverty. According to 
Townsend (1962, 2010), households are deemed rich or poor, depending on their share 
of the available resources. In his view, households that command less resources than 
the average in their society are classified as living in poverty, irrespective of where 
they live. 
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Using non-monetary deprivation 
It is contended that poverty is not just about lack of money, but lack of physical 
necessities, assets and command over resources (Chambers, 1965; Townsend, 1962, 
2014; Ferreira et al., 2012, 2015). The variety of problems related to the quantifiable 
income and monetary measurement of poverty justifies the inclusion of non-monetary 
means of poverty measurement. It is, however, essential to use both approaches in 
tandem to enable a proper assessment of the poor. Researchers and policymakers have 
given much attention and effort towards a more accurate definition of poverty that 
encompasses all aspects of poverty - monetary and non-monetary or income and non-
income aspects of poverty. In support of Chambers (1965) and Ferreira et al. (2012, 
2015), poverty is multi-dimensional and a household is poor when their income and 
other resources fall short of the average household, and as a result, excluded from 
society and are unable to meet the basic needs of the society. Townsend (1962, 2010) 
argues that individuals and families in a society can be classified as poor when they 
cannot participate in the activities of the society because they lack the necessary 
resources and the living condition to do so. 
Clearly, this definition of poverty goes beyond the economics of income and includes 
both the psychological and social aspects of well-being. It highlights the multi-
dimensional features of poverty. Human Development Index (HDI) recognises that 
there is much more to human development and well-being than just economic growth 
and GDP per capita. HDI indicators include quality of life indicators such as access to 
health and education, safe drinking water, life expectancy rate, infant mortality rate, 
illiteracy rate and happiness. Since the early 1990s, the World Bank measurement of 
global poverty using national poverty lines has been expressed in US dollars 
(discussed above). Thus, consumption or income information has been the benchmark 
to estimate poverty lines.  However, poverty is multidimensional, and the monetary 
measurement of poverty does not capture many important aspects of human well-
being. Poverty encompasses lack of income and shortfall in consumption, but also 
powerlessness, isolation, which refer to being inferior and unable to access education, 
health and lack of social and economic support as well as living in a hazardous 
environment. Without a comprehensive definition of poverty –monetary as well as 
non-monetary indicators, a homeless person living on $3.50 a day will not be regarded 
as being poor. A family on an income of $4 per person per day, but lacks access to 
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adequate sanitation, electricity, spends much time fetching firewood for cooking, and 
draws water directly from the river/well will not be captured in the poverty line. In 
short, the monetary-based measurement would not encompass all aspects of well-
being, because not all goods and services that households consume have market value 
(World Bank, 2018). For instance, common non-market goods without market prices 
such as public goods, clean environment and secure community. The prices of these 
public goods do not exist and therefore may not be accurately reflected consumption 
values. The monetary measurement of poverty illustrates Chambers’ (1965) argument 
that poverty becomes what has been measured. The World Bank and the IMF financial 
inclusion policy that the poor need access to finance to fulfil their potentials signifies 
that lack of access to finance is deemed as the primary cause of poverty, and therefore 
other social problems are less important. The financial inclusion as a way of 
empowering the poor makes poverty a financial problem, which requires new credit 
relation- the financialisation of poverty. This exemplifies Medar’s (2015) point that in 
the era of financialised capitalism, poverty has come to mean lack of decent finance, 
hence neoliberal economic policy has come to produce more financial relations- a new 
institution to manage the poor. 
6.5 Neoliberal globalisation and poverty 
The impact of neoliberal globalisation on inequality and poverty reduction has 
attracted the attention of governments and other international organisations. 
International trade is one of the standard measures of globalisation to ascertain the 
proportion of export relative to economic growth to determine the integration of the 
domestic economy into the global economy. Supporters of globalisation argue that the 
neoliberal policy of trade liberalisation has facilitated poverty reduction. They argue 
that international trade stimulates export-led growth, which fosters poverty alleviation 
(Sachs et al., 1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ravallion, 2018). Kiely (2005) questions 
the evidence and posits that liberalisation policies have contributed to rising inequality 
and poverty. He argues that increasing economic growth and falling poverty rates are 
the successes of anti-globalisation policies.  
Kiely (2005) argues that although the percentage of global trade measured by export 
relative to GDP has increased, the gains are uneven across regions. He remarks that 
by 1995, the share of SSA export had decreased from 5.5% to 1.5%. The more recent 
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figure shows Africa's share of global trade at 2.4% (WTO estimates, 2018). Advocates 
of neoliberal globalisation point to the increased interdependence and integration as a 
sign of countries benefiting from comparative advantage with the declining cost of 
production, resulting in competitive advantage in the global market.  
Figure 6. 10 Trade Balance for Ghana (1995-2017 in $billion) 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from WTO (2018) 
Figure 6.10 above shows that despite Ghana's greater integration into the global 
market, the economy has not reaped the benefit of globalisation as expressed by the 
neoliberals. The country has not benefited from the perceived cheap labour to exploit 
the comparative advantage. As the economy gets more integrated into the global 
economy, the trade deficit has worsened. The value of exports and imports have moved 
in tandem until 2011. Despite the rise in export, it always accompanied a rise in 
imports from 1995-2010. Exports rose after 2010 but saw a sharp decline to increase 
the trade deficit again. On this evidence, it is not difficult to argue that SAP and its 
associated liberalisation policies are a myth to poverty alleviation in Ghana. Kiely 
(2018) argues that only a handful of countries can meet the quality standards to export 
manufactured products to the core countries. A primary commodity-dependent region 
like SSA, the comparative advantage in some of the labour-intensive agriculture 
products could lead to oversupply resulting in falling prices, hence lower wages for 
workers. For example, Ghana and Ivory Coast produce the larger quantity of the 
world's cocoa (more than 75%) and get approximately $20 billion, while companies 
processing and adding value to the cocoa make more than $200 billion annually 
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(Collins Augustine Ntim, Deputy Minister for Local Government, 2018 
MyNewsGh.com). Thus, neoliberal policies facilitate divergence and unevenness, 
contrary to their convergence and equilibrium expectations. The rising import relative 
to export threatens domestic employment, particularly in the already declining 
manufacturing sector. It has been argued that globalisation process facilitates free 
trade in products significant to the core countries. 
Figure 6. 11 Exports relative to GDP for Ghana (1995-2017 in $billion) 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from WTO (2018) 
The proportion of exports relative to GDP is a significant measure of the benefits of 
globalisation to an economy. Figure 6.11 illustrates that the value of exports as a 
proportion of GDP has been stagnant from 1995-2010. The rise in the value of exports 
between 2011 and 2013 is due to the exploration of oil in commercial quantities. The 
value of export relative to GDP has actually declined since 2014. The forced 
liberalisation processes with the hope of facilitating export-led growth have not 
delivered the expected growth. This illustrates the weaknesses in the neoliberal 
policies in achieving sustainable economic development. UNCTAD (2018) is 
concerned about the declining share of manufacturing relative to GDP in most SSA 
economies. Manufacturing is the sector that can provide substantial employment to 
facilitate poverty alleviation. However, the inability to compete on the world market 
has resulted in SSA as a dumping ground for global manufacturing products, which 
continues to hurt local manufacturers. Thus, neoliberal globalisation has opened up 
SSA economies to imports and dumping while Africa has very little to sell to the core 
economies.  
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There is overwhelming evidence to support that international trade (export) plays a 
leading role in China's economic development. However, internal trade and other 
robust domestic policy reforms cannot be underestimated. China, for instance, 
liberalised imports very slowly and still maintains some forms of restrictive trade 
barriers (Ang, 2016; Kiely, 2018). 
Another measure of neoliberal globalisation is foreign investment-FDI. Capital 
movement, like global trade, is confined to a few core countries with minimal benefits 
to periphery countries. UNCTAD (2018) argues that global FDI, which was down 23% 
on the 2016 level concentrated in a few countries with a 26% decline in FDI to SSA. 
With the $42 billion FDI to SSA, a significant proportion of it was confined to the 
commodity-exporting countries. Harvey (2005) and Kiely (2005, 2018) argue that FDI 
to periphery economies usually does not result in new ventures but rather to benefit 
from undervalued privatisation of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) (see chapter 4 for 
the consequences of capital inflows to Ghana). However, Ackah and Aryeetey (2012) 
remark that the capital inflows into the mining and the financial sectors stimulated the 
performance of the Ghanaian economy. Nevertheless, they argue that globalisation has 
not provided any meaningful impact on domestic income and employment in the 
primary sector. Nsowah-Nuamah et al. (2012) contend that from 1991-2010, growth 
in domestic income was primarily due to increases in the level of education and 
training in all sectors. Thus, there is little evidence to conclude whether neoliberal 
policies had any impact on rising domestic income. FDI has been a significant source 
of external finance for periphery countries, accounting for 39% of total capital inflows 
(UNCTAD, 2018). The declining FDI limits SSA’s ability to grow and improve the 
living conditions of the people. It is worth noting that financial liberalisation has 
precipitated financial instability across the world with negative impacts on 
employment, income and the real economy (Harvey, 2005).  
The growth of MNCs has been another driving force of globalisation. Tandon (1999) 
posits that MNCs have seized control of national borders with the primary motive of 
satisfying shareholders. He reckons that these MNCs are not interested in providing 
job security and poverty alleviation. Stiglitz (2006) posits that many countries 
associate MNCs with the destruction of the globalisation process. He argues that some 
of these MNCs control revenues that are larger than the GDP of most periphery 
countries. He explains that 'Wal-Mart revenue of $285.2 billion was larger than the 
185 
 
combined GDP of SSA’ (p.186). This illuminates the power of these companies and 
how it can be difficult for smaller countries like Ghana to control the operations of 
these giant corporations. Consequently, MNCs pay low wages, destroy the 
environment and repatriate their profit without any challenges. Local businesses are 
essential to every economy; however, these SMEs are unable to compete with the 
global MNCs and therefore forced out of business, breaking the backbone of the 
economy.  
In his analysis of global inequality, Bourguignon (2016) argues that the gap between 
the core and periphery countries has narrowed due to the expansion of international 
trade, the rapid mobility of capital and skilled labour and the spread and transfer of 
technological innovation. However, he contends that at the same time, income 
distribution within countries has widened. The globalisation of capital means that 
income stream from capital has been rising faster than from labour (particularly the 
less skilled workforce). This argument is shared by Stiglitz (2015), and Piketty (2013) 
who remark that since the inception of neoliberal ideologies, wealth has been growing 
faster at the top than economic output, resulting in widespread inequality within and 
across countries. However, it is essential to acknowledge that other factors can 
influence inequality such as technological progress, the domestic capacity for 
economic growth as well as policies of redistribution of income.  
Advocates of neoliberalism argue that globalisation encourages international trade as 
well as investments which facilitate competition and efficiency, therefore leading to 
growth and poverty alleviation. However, there is lack of consensus regarding the 
positive relationship between economic growth and poverty alleviation in a 
financialised capitalism. When inequality is higher, the most impoverished household 
may not share the benefit of economic growth (Holden and Prokopenko, 2001; 
Odhiambo, 2009, 2011). 
Milanovic (2016) views neoliberal globalisation as a threat to social protection. He 
argues that the losers of globalisation are the lower middle class in the core countries, 
and the winners are the poor and middle-class in the periphery countries. Thus in his 
view, the power shift of low-skilled manufacturing jobs from the core to the semi-
periphery economies is a crucial factor accounting for winners-losers of neoliberal 
globalisation. Thus, neoliberal globalisation generates uneven global outcomes.  
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It is difficult to rely on cross-sectional data to make a generalisation.  Using cross 
section data, Dollar and Kraay (2004) argue that there is no relationship between 
increasing trade volumes and inequality on average. However, Lundberg and Squire 
(2003) posit that increasing trade volume has a minimal positive effect on inequality. 
The OECD (2011) remarks that neither financial liberalisation nor trade 
interconnectedness have accounted for rising inequality. This paradox illustrates that 
even if neoliberal globalisation has any benefit to those that are globalised, the gains 
that materialised seem to be at best quite modest. As argued by Bardhan (2005), there 
is a perverse degree of causation on both sides concerning neoliberal policies and 
poverty/inequality indicators. Nevertheless, the forced liberalisation policies that 
opened SSA economies to global competition have made it difficult for the region to 
achieve sustainable economic development. It is difficult to understand how the local 
SMEs will be able to compete fairly (on quality and price) with the global MNCs even 
on the domestic market, let alone the international market.   
6.6 Conclusion  
Poverty reduction had become a dominant development agenda since the 1990s when 
the World Bank Development report took poverty reduction as the central theme, and 
thus, increased the drive for poverty alleviation. However, as the global extreme 
poverty declined to 8.6%, the World Bank forecast extreme poverty in SSA to remain 
in double digits by 2030 unless there is a significant shift in policy. The Bank 
advocates for pro-poor investment to end extreme poverty by 2030. 
There is a long-standing debate about the measurement of poverty. This thesis argues 
that the inaccurate definition of poverty is a hindrance to the ineffective solutions that 
have been implemented to address the problem. Poverty should be defined to 
incorporate the dimensions of poverty, which include monetary as well as non-
monetary aspects of poverty. 
Poverty alleviation is a complex endeavour and needs time, effort, patience, and 
commitment, which requires a multifaceted approach. Poverty reduction programmes 
in the past have been guilty of compounding the problem instead of solving it. Previous 
programmes have provided aid in places when development and rehabilitation 
programmes are needed (Ackah and Aryeetey, 2012). Most commonly, organisers 
have failed to listen to the needs of the local communities who have living experience. 
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Even though the rural population represents just about half of the population in Ghana, 
it contributes 83.2% to the national poverty incidence. In short, rural residents in 
Ghana are more likely to live in poverty. 
The globalisation and trade liberalisation only resulted in an open economy for 
imports/dumping. The subsistence nature of the Ghanaian agricultural sector means 
that domestic subsistence farmers cannot benefit from globalisation. On the 
macroeconomic level, the exports of primary raw materials with inelastic price 
demand also limit any benefit associated with globalisation. 
This thesis presents that the ascendency of financial activities and financial motives 
on the one hand, and the rising poverty headcounts on the other, illustrate that 
financialisation in Ghana has not improved living standards for the poor, especially 
the rural population. This thesis argues that the neoliberal policy of economic 
liberalisation has not served the Ghanaian economy well. Thus, although the incidence 
of poverty has declined, there is no improvement in the poverty headcounts, and in 
some cases, worsened. The next chapter examines the financialisation of households 
by critically investigating financial inclusion policy and mobile money in Ghana. 
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 : Financialisation and households: from theory 
to the context of Ghana 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the issues surrounding the definition of poverty and 
the financialisation of poverty- when poverty is defined as a lack of decent finance. 
The chapter argued that the inaccurate definition of poverty has been the major 
hindrance to the poverty alleviation programmes. 
Two main objectives drive chapter seven. The first part is to establish the theoretical 
bases by reviewing the literature on household finance and to assess the importance of 
political economy in addressing household finance/debt. The second part provides an 
empirical assessment of financialisation of households in Ghana using Bank of Ghana 
and National Communication Authority data on financial inclusion policy pioneered 
by the World Bank and the IMF to measure/assess the transformation of households’ 
finance. Section 7.1 examines household debt through Modigliani Life Cycle and 
Friedman Permanent Income Hypotheses. The theories assume that a rational 
household will smooth out consumption over time by taking on debts. Section 7.2 
investigates the political economy of household finance and argues that household 
assets and liabilities are managed by financial agents, financial actors, and financial 
institutions with their idiosyncratic interests. Section 7.3 provides an overview of the 
payment systems in Ghana. The chapter ends with financialisation, financial inclusion 
and Mobile Money, providing the specificities of financialisation in Ghana.   
7.2 Theory of consumption function: household debt and the life 
cycle and permanent income hypotheses 
The Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) pioneered by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) 
assumes that a rational individual chooses their spending as they grow. The only 
constraint to this is the resources available to them over their lifetime. Consequently, 
individuals can take out debt to smooth out consumption when current income is 
insufficient to satisfy consumption needs. Thus, future income will validate the current 
debt stock. The theory also assumes that individuals’ debt levels will reduce in their 
middle age so that they can prepare for retirement. As a result, indebtedness in this 
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context is the transfer of the wealth of the nation from one generation to another.  This 
is because as one generation reduces debt, another starts to accumulate debt. Thereby, 
debt is a natural occurrence among rational consumers to meet current consumption 
needs to be validated by future income stream.   
However, the theory does not account for the household's ability to access debt and 
the need for collateral in securing the debt. This theory will be at odds with household 
financing behaviour in the periphery (notably in Ghana) where lenders require a 
substantial amount of collateral to secure credit. Even in the mainstream framework, 
it is doubtful if it can provide a robust theoretical account of contemporary household 
debt. 
The Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) is an alternative mainstream theory that 
explains household debt. The theory developed by Friedman (1954) is based on the 
premise that short-term changes in income could be compensated for by debt to 
facilitate smooth consumption. Meghir (2004) argues that the theory provides an 
empirical fact of why volatility in income does not affect consumption. He remarks 
why the long-run marginal propensity to consume from income is higher than the 
short-run. The theory posits that households consume a fraction of their permanent 
income in each period and that the marginal and average propensity to consume will 
be the same. The propensity to smooth consumption may differ depending on the 
interest rate, preferences and uncertainty. 
Unlike LCH, PIH is not restricted to brief stages of life to accumulate debt. However, 
as pointed out by Lapavitsas (2009, 2013), the theory has little explanatory power to 
account for the complexity of rising household debt accompanied by stagnant 
consumption and the recent spiralling house prices in the UK and elsewhere. Besides, 
if a household debt is as a result of predictable future income, debt should be 
sustainable. Conversely, the recent financial crisis illuminates the weaknesses in the 
theory. Moreover, if the household debt is due to rising house prices, then the theory 
offers a limited explanation on the contemporary misuse of other forms of credit like 
credit cards, Mobile Money (in low-income countries), pay-day-loans, and other 
shadow banking activities. 
The assumption that individuals can borrow as much as they want to limit the 
variations in consumption creates challenges for internal consistency for both theories. 
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This contradicts the introduction of liquidity constraints and adverse selection.  Kehoe 
and Levine (2001) argue that individuals may be restricted as to how much they can 
borrow, and some may not even access credit if they are uncertain about future income. 
Thus, the equilibrium quantity of borrowing depends on certain factors such as the 
terms on which one can obtain credit, the type of credit, and value of collateral 
available to the individual75. Carol (2002) and Bunker (2015) remark that rational 
individuals may not borrow if they are uncertain about validating payments when due. 
Thus, even if their expectations of future income rise, they will keep to their current 
consumption in line with their current earnings. Such behaviour contradicts the critical 
principle of the LCH theory that consumption profile could be isolated from the 
income profile. Very much the same outcome can be obtained in a theoretical model 
in which individuals want to borrow, but constraint. A household may need to save a 
fraction of current income to smoothing out future consumption, because they may be 
constrained to have consumption higher than their current income. This is often known 
as 'high frequency' smoothing of income, as opposed to 'low frequency of income 
smoothing that was hypothesised by Modigliani and Brumberg (Carroll, 2002; Deaton, 
2005) 
Behavioural economics poses a theoretical challenge to the central principle of the 
LCH/PIH theory. One of the key pillars in behavioural economics theory is the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2013). This tradition rejects the mainstream 
argument of a rational individual who assesses the costs and benefits of their actions 
and inactions. The behavioural theory posits that individuals’ economic behaviour 
depend on the present context, where lack of self-control impacts on decision-making. 
They argue that individuals exhibit time-inconsistent behaviour and focus on current 
consumption than future consumption (Deaton, 2005; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 
2013) 76 . The theory supports the argument that financial liberalisation provides 
excessive liquidity and therefore reduces welfare. The tradition also predicts that over-
 
 
75 As empirically examined in chapter five, the value of collateral to secure/obtain bank credit is 
considerably higher in low-middle income countries, and firms and households without sufficient 
collateral are unlikely to be granted bank credit. High-interest rate is another constraint to access credit 
in Ghana.    
76 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate a variety of ways in which household behaviour violate 
the axioms of expected utility theory. however, behavioural economics ignores the class implication. 
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indebtedness is due to myopic behaviour on the part of the individuals, who could not 
anticipate the future consequences of their actions. 
The behavioural theory provides realistic insights into household behaviour, but it fails 
to incorporate the dominant role of the current financial system in household debt. The 
choice to enter into a credit agreement, according to Nelson (2006) is a consequence 
of impediment in current affairs rather than an assertion of a preferred future. 
Rodrigues Teles Sampaio (2014) argues that these reductionist theories should be 
rejected when investigating household finance in favour of a wide-ranging systemic 
approach; an approach that identifies the structural transformation of the world market 
in the last four decades and caters for changes in diverse social and geographical 
settings. Lapavitsas (2013) and Dos Santos (2013) argue that only a method grounded 
in political-economic tradition can explain the changing conduct of banks, industrial 
enterprises and more importantly, household finance and consumer debt in 
contemporary financialised capitalism.  
7.3 The political economy of household finance 
Other disciplines such as sociology and culture economy77 have recently opened new 
avenues for research on household finance. For example, Erturk et al. (2007), Krippner 
(2011) and Mader (2015) present various techniques that the financial systems have 
facilitated households in the core, in particular, to participate in financial assets and 
liabilities. Since individuals lack the necessary financial knowledge to make an 
informed decision, a paradox emerges. Households play a minimal role in their 
financial dealings with the financial sector; thus, both sides of the household balance 
sheet are controlled and managed by financial agents, financial actors, and financial 
institutions with their idiosyncratic interests.     
The securitisation of assets and liabilities has become a trademark of the contemporary 
financial market, where households know very little in the transactions facilitated by 
the different forms of securities. Central to financialisation is securitisation- where 
 
 
77 See for instance, Sum and Jessop (2013) Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in 
its Place in Political Economy for a critique of contemporary institutional and cultural turns in 
heterodox economics and political economy.  
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illiquid assets are transformed through financial innovation into financial security 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Storm, 2018). 
However, a more comprehensive and inclusive work that offers better understanding 
within the realms of political economy could be attributed to Lapavitsas (2009, 2013), 
and Dos Santos (2009, 2010), and Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2009). These studies 
offer a more robust and realistic insight into the relationship between households and 
finance by bringing together the various findings of household financial behaviour 
through a thorough investigation of Marxist class analysis and power asymmetry. The 
study does not simply provide a comprehensive insight into the increasing household 
financial engagement as a consequence of financial liberalisation, but incorporates the 
activities of industrial enterprises and banks. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) posits against 
the background of a profound historical transformation of modern capitalism since the 
triumphant neoliberalism in the mid-1970s. He outlines vital changes associated with 
this transformation. First, industrial enterprises (in the core countries) are increasingly 
capable of financing investment out of retained profit, and this has given them some 
degree of autonomy from commercial banks. Leyshon and Thrift (2007) posit large 
blue-chip borrowers find it cheaper to access capital from the capital market through 
the securitisation of their asset rather than borrowing from banks. Since the big 
business can now play financial games and engage in financial activities on their 
account, this has changed the structure of their organisation. 
In Marxist terms, monopolies have become self-sufficient and do not require bank 
credit for fixed capital; thus, large corporations have become financialised. Secondly, 
banks’ responses to falling profit opportunities have been many. Banks have lent less 
to blue-chip borrowers and have now become financial transactors in the financial 
markets, and thus make profits from fees, commissions and trading. Leyshon and 
Thrift (2007) argue that banks were able to meet the borrowing needs of their 
customers through securitisation to circumvent global baking regulations, which could 
otherwise have restricted how much loans banks could give relative to their capital 
requirements. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) further contends that banks have also turned to 
households' income to generate profit, together with trading in the open market as well 
as mobilising savings and lending to households. Thirdly, households have been 
drawn into the home of the financial systems to facilitate access to necessities. 
Individual savings have also been increasingly mobilised by the formal and informal 
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financial systems. As presented by Dos Santos (2009, 2010), the continuous rising 
interest payment on credit cards and other forms of credit together with the usurious 
money dealing fees that banks earn out of consumers’ income account for between a 
third and half of the total profit of major US banks. The consequence of this unequal 
relationship is the rising household over-indebtedness during the last four decades.    
This new relation has been conceptualised by Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) as 'financial 
expropriation'- a source of profit that has transpired systematically in the last four 
decades, and argues that this expropriation should be separated from exploitation that 
occurs in production and remains the cornerstone of contemporary capitalist 
economies. He concludes that this source of profit primarily comes from the sphere of 
circulation. Insofar as it originates from household earnings, it comprises current flows 
of money. Although originating in the sphere of circulation, it embodies an 
exploitative nature because it involves economic processes. 
One significant feature of Lapavitsas and Dos Santos’ work, which needs 
acknowledging, is the power relation, which is ignored in mainstream theory. As 
households engage with the financial system to acquire the basic needs of life, such as 
a pension, housing, consumption, insurance and others, they have few options to 
circumvent the mechanisms of financial systems. Therefore, households' earnings 
become a source of financial expropriation. This differs qualitatively from finance 
directed to industrial enterprises, who are relatively of equal standing to the financial 
institutions in terms of social and economic powers. The financial products industrial 
enterprises obtain are used for the production and circulation of value and use-value. 
Households, on the other hand, are interested in acquiring use-value. Thus, diverse 
information and power enable financial institutions to engage separately with these 
economic agents. Consequently, as households increasingly engage with the financial 
system, the inherent disadvantage in information, power, and innovation have allowed 
financial institutions to exploit them. The superior and subordinate relations in this 
context is different from the exploitation in the production process. This financial 
expropriation originates from the power asymmetry between financial institutions and 
households’ need to access necessities such as pension and housing. 
One of the appropriate ways to examine exploitation between capital and labour is 
through the money circuit of capital developed by Marx. The general form of the 
circuit of industrial capital is M → C → P → C1 → M1. 
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In this circuit, the industrial capitalist advanced money capital (M) to acquire 
commodity inputs (C) which include labour-power (LP) and means of production (MP) 
which will then enter the means of production (P), and producing finished products 
(C1), which include the surplus-value created by labour-power over and above the 
value of advanced capital (M). This is shown by the sale of the output for more money 
capital (M1) - M1>M. This can be expressed as M → C<
𝑀𝑃
𝐿𝑃
  →P → C1 → M1. (Fine 
and Saad Filho, 2004: 52). 
The money circuit of capital demonstrates that financial expropriation could be located 
in the sphere of exchange, since this source of profits originates primarily from 
labourers' income. This is at partially odd with the classical position of exploitation in 
production, what Marx (1982 [1867]) terms as secondary exploitation, taken from 
profit from alienation, which is grounded in pre-capitalist modes of production as 
shown in the Marx’s Grundrisse: 
“What takes place is the exploitation by capital without the mode of production 
of capital. The rate of interest appears very high because it includes profit and 
even a part of wages. This form of usury, in which capital does not seize 
possession of production, hence is capital only formally, presupposes the pre-
dominance of pre-bourgeois modes of production”. (Marx, 1939 [1973]: 853) 
Although financial expropriation is qualitatively different from the exploitation in 
production, the consequence of dispossessing household and the power asymmetry 
that emerges is not necessary as a wage labourer in itself, but positioned in the sphere 
of circulation at the hands of usurers. Thus, this type of profit directly from workers’ 
income resonates usurer's profit. Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) argues that financial 
expropriation normally emerges because of commercialised production, which 
induces households to depend on money as a means of exchange. Therefore, the 
interests earned by the usurer derived from the incomes of households and industrial 
enterprises could potentially affect the minimum needed for reproduction. Financial 
expropriation has attained a new level in the era of financialisation due to the 
marketisation of social provision. This has resulted in rising financial profit coming 
directly from households and continuous vulnerability and exploitation of the working 
class, leading to rising inequality within and across countries. This analysis contains 
specific social element/content and goes beyond the simple transfer of income, which 
must be acknowledged in the study of household finance in contemporary capitalism. 
Thus, in a financialised capitalism, profits derived from households become the money 
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capital, which acts as a significant source of demand for products and in turn enables 
the circuit of the industrial capital accumulation process. This type of expropriation 
forms the basis of regulationists’ 'wage-labour-nexus' concerning contemporary 
financialised capitalism.     
7.4 Payment systems in Ghana- a route towards financialisation 
The payment system remains one of the fastest-growing components of the financial 
services industry in Ghana. Economic, financial, public policy, as well as 
improvements in local Financial Technology (FinTech) industry and global trends in 
payment systems development, have engineered the recent trend in payment systems 
improvement. 
The passage of Electronic-Money and Agent Guidelines Act (Act 662) prompted 
financial and non-financial institutions to provide various financial products and 
services to promote financial inclusion. The overall objective has been to promote 
financial inclusion and sustaining price stability. These financial products have been 
designed to promote digital savings, lending, and investment for the underserved and 
unbanked segments of the society. Various mobile money services in Ghana have 
attracted international attention. 
Ecobank (Ghana) Limited in partnership with Mobile Telecommunications Network 
(MNT) Ghana introduced treasury bills on MNT mobile platform. It was aimed to 
mobilise funds from the informal sector and to engender financial inclusion. Mobile 
money subscribers can purchase treasury bills as low as GHc 1.00 (about £0.16) using 
mobile money wallet. The 'TBILL4ALL' also allows the public, particularly the 
unbanked and underserved78 to buy Government domestic fixed income bonds using 
mobile money wallets at any time of the day. The interest earned at the time of launch 
(in 2018) was between 13-17% per annum. 
This is the first of its kind in the world, and consequently attracted international 
attention, particularly those in the sub-region. For example, the Central Bank of 
Tanzania organised study tours to Ghana to study the design and roll out the product. 
 
 
78 The unbanked are those who do not possess any form of financial account with the formal financial 
sectors; underserved represents those with partial engagement with the formal financial institutions. 
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Ecobank, in addition, provides Xpress microloan products using customers' mobile 
wallet. The loan product provides customers with secure and instant access to credit 
in emergency cases and the promotion of cash-lite economy as well as financial 
inclusion effort in the country.  
Background-Mobile Money services in Ghana  
Mobile payments have been adopted in many SSA countries to enhance financial 
inclusion promoted by the World Bank. Recent data shows rising usage of Mobile 
Money79 (MM) accounts in the region from 200,000 in 2006 to 277 million in 2016. 
MM was introduced in Ghana in 2009 (Bank of Ghana, 2018). The rise in the usage 
of MM as a means of payment has been attributed to the recent improvements in the 
mobile handset as well as the penetration and applicability of mobile phones amongst 
the underserved and unbanked segments of the population. The improvements in 
Point-Of-Sale (POS) infrastructures coupled with convenience, speed, flexibility, and 
affordability could not be underestimated in the surge of MM usage.  
By the end of December 2018, three mobile phone operators were providing MM 
services in Ghana- MTN Momo, AirtelTigo Money, and Vodafone Cash. This follows 
the merger between Airtel and Tigo in November 2017. The primary use of MM 
wallets in the country is transferring value between users (P2P), payment for goods 
and services such as mobile top-up, utility bills, television subscription, micro-credit 
and savings. Users receive quarterly payments of interest on float balances. The total 
float balance at the end of December 2017 was Ghc2,321.07 million, compared with 
a float of GHc1,257.40 in December 2016, an increase of 84.59%, but a growth of 
1,1748% since 2012 (figure 7.1). The arrangement for payment of interest on e-money 
float requires 80% of which should be accrued to customers and 20% to the electronic 
money issuer. 
 
 
 
 
79 Mobile Money is electronic cash backed by an equivalent amount of the Central Banknotes and coins 
stored using the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) in a mobile phone as an account identifier. The 
Mobile Money operators who issue the SIM cards keep the electronic account in the mobile phone for 
the users of Mobile Money.    
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Figure 7. 1 Mobile Money Float Balance 2012-2017 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2018) 
The MM industry provides employment for agents, service providers, and users, 
including financial technology companies, merchants, retailers, and aggregators. The 
table below shows a 48% increase in registered agents between 2016 and 2017, but 
the exponential growth of 2148% since 2012. The total volume and value of 
transactions increased from 18,042,241 and Ghc594.12 (million), respectively in 2012 
to 981,564,563 and Ghc155,844.84 (million), respectively in 2017. Thus, a growth of 
5,340% and 26,131%, respectively. This demonstrates an increase in the value of each 
transaction made.  
Table 7. 1: Mobile Money Transactions 2012- 2017 
Source: Author’s estimates using figures from the Bank of Ghana 
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The growth of MM transactions and volume since 2012 marked improvement in MM 
usage. However, this is not exclusive to Ghana. Other SSA countries such as Nigeria, 
Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa also recorded significant growth in MM transactions 
(Diniz, Albuquerque and Cerney, 2011). 
Figure 7. 2 Mobile Money Transactions in Ghana 2012-2017 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2018) 
Figure 7.2 shows increased activities of MM services in both volume and value of 
transactions since 2012. The excitement of MM when it was introduced in 2009 was 
short-lived in the first few years. After three years of the launch, only a handful of 
Ghanaians were actively using the service80. Both universal banks and community 
banks were not happy with the Central Bank and NCA circular because of the indirect 
competition and intrusion in their territory. The new agent and e-money regulatory 
reform by the Bank of Ghana in 2013 seemed to be mostly responsible for the growth 
of MM usage from 2013 onwards.  By 2017, there were over 11 million active MM 
accounts from the registered accounts of over 23 million. 
The MM agents act as liquidity managers that convert cash to and from the electronic 
form on demand. The prepaid nature of MM and the link to other financial services 
such as microloans and payment schemes explicitly designed to suit the poor, the 
unbanked and the underserved in the society, especially in the rural areas, has been 
remarkable. This has benefited the demand-side as well as the supply-side of the 
 
 
80. The first three years saw only 350,000 Ghanaians actively using MM. To put it into perspective, Jack 
and Suri (2011), and Martinez and Mckee (2011) examined growth trend of M-PESA (a mobile service 
operator in Kenya) and found that the operator (M-PESA) gained 2.37 million subscribers in the first 
year of implementation. 
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financial system. There is greater opportunity for the underserved, unbanked, and the 
poor in the rural areas to be engaged in financial services. Financial institutions also 
deliver bespoke financial services to these segments of the population who otherwise 
could not have been reached profitably. 
Despite the effort by the government to incorporate all adults into the financial sector, 
a report by the World Bank in April 2018 shows that over 7 million people do not 
engage with the financial system. This includes the much talked about MM and formal 
bank accounts to engage in financial services. These people excluded from any 
benefits of financial inclusion may not be significantly engaging with the economy 
since the World Bank sees financial inclusion as a crucial factor in economic 
development. The report argues that financial inclusion translates into other potential 
development benefits such as the ease of receiving and transferring money, getting 
insurance, investing in education and health, and smoothing out consumption through 
easy access to credit to withstand financial shocks. Overall, the report points out that 
1.7 billion adults worldwide do not have financial accounts down from 2.5 billion 
since the World Bank launched Global Findex- a database which tracks financial 
inclusion efforts around the world in 2011. 
The importance of MM could be seen in table 7.2 below as the dominant non-cash 
payment method as at the end of 2017 with 981.6 million volume of transactions more 
than debit cards (60.4 million) and cheques (7.3 million). Nevertheless, cheques 
continue to be the significant non-cash retail instrument with GHc179.6 billion 
compared with GHc155.8 billion mobile money. The number of cheques cleared as a 
proportion of total non-cash payments fell from 60.21% to just 49.33% over the period. 
At the same time, the value of mobile money increased from 31.02% to 42.81% in 
2017. The significance of MM financial services in the economy is depicted by the 
exponential growth in both the volume and value of 78.40% and 98.51% respectively 
in 2017. 
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Table 7. 2 Retail Payment Instruments in Ghana 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2018) 
Historically, credit cards have not been a popular payment instrument in Ghana. 
However, the recent growth in demand and supply of credit cards signifies ascendency 
of finance and appetite for credit in the economy. The number of credit cards issued 
has risen by 59.47% between 2016 and 2017 to 14,698. However, only five banks are 
authorised to issue credit cards in the country, emphasising the paradox of a nation 
that is under-financed, yet financialising. 
Figure 7. 3 Comparison between Bank Accounts and Mobile Money Accounts in Ghana 2013-2017 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2018) 
MM accounts had been on the rise since the introduction of e-money regulatory 
reforms in 2013. The growth in MM accounts overtook traditional bank services in 
2014, and this preference has persisted during 2017. The number of MM accounts rose 
from 4,393,721 in 2013 to nearly 24 million in 2017. In 2013, MM accounts were just 
57% of bank accounts; by 2017, it was 191.7% of traditional bank accounts. The 
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number of bank accounts increased from 7,361,255 in 2013 to 12, 452,734 (figure 7.3). 
This accounts for the complex nature of financialisation in Ghana as the formal 
financial sector is underdeveloped and serves a small proportion of the population. 
The role of mobile money in financial inclusion in Ghana  
The traditional banking system (despite the various waves of reforms) failed to provide 
adequate financial services to a large proportion of the Ghanaian population, 
especially low-income people, the poor, and those in the rural areas. This financial 
exclusion is a consequence of banking infrastructure gaps. The recent surge in MM 
accounts shows how the service has expanded to deliver and facilitate financial 
services/inclusion in the economy. The high growth of MM accounts and sizeable 
geographical coverage areas with access to mobile communication services, MM has 
the potential to enhance access to financial services than banks and thereby argues to 
facilitate financialised poverty reduction and economic growth. 
Several factors have accounted for such unconventional ways of banking in the 
Ghanaian economy. The demand-side constraints include lack of trust in the formal 
financial institutions. This has recently increased due to the collapse of various 
universal banks and microfinance institutions in the country. The most recent and 
high-profile cases include the collapse of DKM microfinance, UT Bank, and Capital 
Bank. The Central Bank in August 2018 also revoked the banking licence of five banks 
and appointed a receiver over the assets and liabilities of these banks81. Interestingly, 
all these collapsed banks were local banks and the history of predominantly local 
banks’ failures goes as far back as 2000 after the financial liberalisation (FINSAP). 
Other demand-side constraints include the bureaucratic and cumbersome 
documentation needed to open and operate bank accounts and lack of financial 
knowledge. Besides, inaccessibility due to lack of bank branches and challenges in 
reaching service points, and unaffordability as bank services are often expensive for 
low-income households. 
 
 
81 These collapsed banks were BIEGE Bank, Sovereign Bank, Construction Bank, UniBank, and Royal 
Bank. It follows the insolvency after investigations by the Central Bank. Deposit and selected assets 
and liabilities were transferred to a new bank- Consolidated Bank Ghana Ltd. 
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Table 7.3 below shows that 64.6% of households do not contribute to any savings 
scheme, while only 35.4% of households have some forms of savings bank accounts 
and are contributing to a saving scheme. The rural population have a higher proportion 
of no savings account of 78.5% than the urban locality with 46.4%, although rural 
male individuals are more than twice likely to have a savings account than their female 
counterparts, with 69.2% and 30.8%, respectively. 
Table 7. 3 Households with a Bank Account or Contributing to a Saving Scheme by Locality and 
Gender 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013) 
In the urban locality, 41.9% of households cited they did not have enough money or 
income to operate a savings scheme. The proportion is lower in the Greater Accra 
Metropolitan Area (GAMA), 39.4% than other urban areas of 41.7%. The process of 
opening a savings account is the least constraint for not having a bank and savings 
account. A high proportion of female 45.1% and male 42.3% cited lack of money or 
income as a reason for not having a savings account, while almost 29% of both male 
and female indicated that irregular income is a constraint for a savings account. For 
households in the urban locality, 21.7% did not find it necessary to operate a bank 
account, while 18.4% in the rural areas stated they were not interested. Few individuals 
surveyed were not aware of savings accounts and found financial institutions too far 
away with 2.4% and 1.3%, respectively (table 7.4). 
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Table 7. 4 Reasons for not having a Bank Account or Contributing to a Saving Scheme by Locality 
and Gender 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013) 
The supply-side constraints comprise high costs, bad household credit records, strict 
regulatory procedures and inappropriate product design. These factors, coupled with 
the demand-side constraints, deter households from partaking in the formal financial 
institutions. 
Mobile phones and MM have the potential to eliminate most of the barriers to financial 
inclusion and thereby enable those unbanked and excluded from the financial system 
to transact business cheaply and securely from their mobile phone. Another potential 
of MM is the large-scale financial connectedness among distant households. It is easy 
to connect domestic individuals with their domestic and international counterpart 
through remittance and transfers. Within the domestic economy, p2p 82  transfer 
increases money circulation, facilitates economic growth and contributes towards 
improving the well-being of the poor in the rural areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 P2p is the transfer of money on the MM platform from peer-to-peer. 
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Figure 7. 4 Mobile Phone Ownership and Access, by Demographic Groups (percentage of each 
demographic group who owns and can access a mobile phone) 
Source: InterMedia CGAP Ghana survey (N=3,002, 15+), December 2014 -January 2015. 
Figure 7.4 illustrates mobile phone ownership and access amongst all demographic 
groupings. However, there are noticeable similarities amongst female, rural and those 
below the poverty line, with all below 90% ownership of mobile phones. While nine 
in ten own a phone – among male, urban, and those above the poverty line groups, 
only eight in ten own a mobile phone among female, rural, and those below the poverty 
line category. Thus, poor female, irrespective of the locality and poor male in the rural 
localities are less likely to have a mobile phone, and therefore excluded from any 
benefits associated with MM services. 
7.5 Financialisation, financial inclusion and mobile money 
The push for financial inclusion through demonetisation and cashless economy by the 
Bank of Ghana and the World Bank should be seen as the pinnacle of financialisation 
in Ghana. As argued by Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2018), the digitalisation of India's 
economy, which was facilitated by the USAID, ministry of finance (India), global 
banks, and FinTech companies, is not intended to alleviate poverty, corruption and 
black money/market as suggested. They assert that the real purpose is for these 
FinTech oligopolies to profit directly through the exorbitant fee charges from such 
digital activities and to make money indirectly from the unbanked, underserved and 
the poor from the enormous data generated on users. The authors contend that these 
activities were creating new avenues for private firms to extract profit from the poor, 
and hence, the privatisation of the payment systems, which Palma (2009) calls rentiers’ 
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delight. With the help of the state and Central Banks, the reins of the formal payment 
systems have been given out unreservedly to offer new rents to these FinTech 
oligopolies and their partners. 
Equally, Mader (2015) rejects the claim that financial inclusion has positive effects on 
the living standards of the poor. He argues that it is more likely growth stimulates 
financial inclusion than financial inclusion driving growth and development. Financial 
businesses such as FinTech corporations require direct and indirect support from the 
government and central banks to make it a profitable scheme- a process Hildyard 
(2016) terms licenced larceny. This is best seen as a proxy for how successfully 
selected few (elites) have created institutions that extract value from the rest of society, 
especially from the poor. Mader's contribution contests the much-hyped financial 
inclusion promise that it helps individuals to manage their financial assets safely and 
efficiently, and hence pro-poor development intervention. He concludes that if the 
financial inclusion agenda is not challenged, it will hand more power to rentier 
capitalists to extract rents and redesign politics, and subordinate social development 
to capital markets development. 
The concept of mobile money has been one of the most exciting things to happen in 
the economies of SSA, and in particular Ghana. FinTech companies have enabled 
cashless systems where mobile phone users can send and receive money over the 
platform as well as transfer money between bank accounts and MM platforms. These 
have lessened transaction costs and have made life relatively comfortable for the 
underserved, unbanked, and the poor in the rural areas. Equally MM has been able to 
include many Ghanaians who were previously excluded from the formal financial 
sector into the realms of finance. MM accounts have outpaced the number of 
traditional bank accounts since 2014 and continue to grow at a faster rate. It provides 
convenience and reduces the cost of travel and time spent in visiting the few bank 
branches available. The growth of mobile money agents also provides employment 
and helps stimulate economic growth. There is no doubt that the investment 
opportunity provided by MM platform is an innovative way of enabling the excluded 
to be inclusive of investment opportunities. 
However, behind this financial inclusion policy is the cost of transactions to both the 
sender and the recipient in the chain of these MM transactions. Two key issues arise. 
Firstly, there is no uniformity in the charges of MM transactions in the country. MTN 
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Momo charges are different from AirtelTigo money, and Vodafone cash charges. One 
would have expected that the financial inclusion products designed to target the poor 
and the unbanked would be cheaper than the formal financial products. However, the 
opposite is what actually happens. Secondly, the double fees paid for a transaction- 
charges/commission for transferring money, and charges/commission for withdrawing 
money on the platform makes it expensive for the poor users. For example, it costs a 
user about 1-5% (of the amount transferred) to transfer money from his/her mobile 
wallet to another. The recipient will also pay about 1% (of the amount withdrawn) to 
withdraw the amount received from a vendor/agent/merchant. Part of this two-way 
transaction costs are paid to vendors as commission, and the rest is shared between the 
banks and the MMOs (the capitalists in the transactions) as business returns. The 
amount senders pay for transferring funds depends on transaction point, that is, 
whether the transaction took place at an agent’s shop or one's own mobile phone, and 
whether services are C2C, P2P, A2C or bill payments83. Consequently, in most cases, 
the sender has to send more than the amount required to the recipient to cover the 
transaction cost incurred by the recipient. 
The MM interoperability, which was launched on 10th May 2018, made it possible 
and more comfortable to transfer mobile money across networks for a fee. Figure 7.5 
below explains transaction costs within and across MMOs. For instance, it costs GHc1 
to transfer funds from Vodafone cash to MTN Momo; however, it costs GHc1.25 to 
transfer money the opposite way- from MTN Momo to Vodafone cash.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 C2C is money transfer from merchants/agents to non-mobile money users (5%); P2P is money 
transfer to a mobile money wallet (0.5%); A2C is money transfer from a mobile wallet to non-mobile 
money user (3%). Some forms of bill payment services are free of charge, e.g. Electricity and Water 
bills.  
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Figure 7. 5 The Amount (Commission) Paid in Fees for Transferring GHc10 
Source: David Quartey AirtelTigo, MTN, Vodafone, 
Mobile money charges are also regressive in structure. Innovations for Poverty Action 
(IPA) has highlighted the regressive structure of the fees paid by mobile money users. 
They examined 21 MM services across seven countries84 and concluded that most 
MMOs had prices which were regressive in structure. The average fees paid falls as 
the amount of transactions increases. This demonstrates that poor and low-income 
households, who usually transact lower amounts, pay more fees in percentage terms 
than middle and high-income segments of society who can transact a higher amount- 
GHc1000 or more.  
Mobile money users do not benefit from all the interests earned on their e-money float 
balances. Customers only take 80% of the interest earned on their balances, while 
MMOs and their partners take 20%. The double fees paid for a transaction coupled 
with little interest earned makes the MM services and its financial inclusion campaign 
susceptible to financial expropriation of the poor. This is an extraction of financial 
profits directly out of the working class, especially the poor layer of the society, who 
would otherwise have not been able to be exploited profitably by the formal financial 
systems. 
 
 
84 These countries were Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and India. 
208 
 
PwC has highlighted the threat of MM platform to the profitability of traditional 
banking in their annual banking survey 2018. MM possesses a threat to the use of 
banks for transferring a small amount of money in the economy, particularly the 
payment of bills. This explains why mobile money transactions surpassed all non-cash 
transactions (in volume) in 2016. If the current trend continues, MM transactions will 
soon dominate the payment systems with banks struggling to cope with the pace of the 
volume and value. The threat of MM is not just on the payment side of the transaction 
but also on the deposit side. The transfers (sending and receiving), deposit and 
withdrawal, make MM wallets quasi current account. With the recent directive from 
the Bank of Ghana that MMOs must pay a monthly interest on the float to customers, 
this has attracted deposits to the MM platforms at the expense of the traditional 
banking system. Other points of sale services such as discounts on items purchased 
and offers in restaurants make MM wallet appeal to the public. Accordingly, MMOs 
are now in direct competition with the traditional banks instead of working as partners 
and service providers in the industry-reminiscent of shadow banking. 
However, the MM platform has enabled partner banks in Ghana to enhance the 
mobilisation of bank deposits. Allotey (2016) contends that MM deposits account for 
about 30% of total bank deposits in the country. This raises the question as to whether 
MM platform is supporting the banking sector's deposit mobilisation efforts or actually 
competing for it. There is no doubt that MM platform has provided banks with 
convenient and cost-effective means of reaching millions of Ghanaians who were 
excluded from the formal financial systems. 
This thesis argues that MM products facilitate shifts towards financialised behaviour 
for households in the informal sector. The analyses suggest that MM is increasingly 
associated with financial inclusion, an indirect form of financialisation. However, the 
outcome is weaker for women and rural segments than men and urban areas. Financial 
inclusion studies have shown a gender gap in accessing financial products as well as 
rural-urban divides (see Bruhn and Love, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). 
Although the gap has narrowed through MM platform, the trend remains the same 
with rural and women segments less likely to be financially inclusive than men and 
urban residents. However, there is evidence to suggest that MM usage is associated 
with financialisation in the informal financial sector. 
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Consequently, this thesis argues that new financial technologies can be leveraged to 
achieve financialised practices without requiring access to the formal financial system. 
MM may induce individuals into new financialised behaviours in the informal sector. 
However, juxtaposed against each other, financialisation in the core countries and SSA 
has different connotations. In the core countries, financialisation may mean growing 
dependence on globalised and volatile financial institutions. However, in Ghana, 
financialisation of households could have positive as well as negative connotations. 
Financialisation in the informal sector may signify an increased economic security and 
financial investment in shares and government bonds, as well as savings for future 
consumption that may improve livelihood. The poor households, the unbanked, and 
the underserved could have access to financial services- on both the assets and the 
liabilities’ sides of the household balance sheet. They can save and earn interest on 
their MM float; they can access bank credit without the need to open a bank account. 
Drawing these people into the realms of finance could improve outcomes by buffering 
against shocks and expanding their income via interest earned and investments. Thus, 
MM could induce financialised behaviour of the poor without knowing.  
However, the exorbitant fees associated with some of the transactions in MM, 
reminiscent financial expropriation similar to financialisation in the core countries. As 
the World Bank and the IMF gear up to promote financial inclusion, finance and its 
way of thinking have come to dominate every aspect of the Ghanaian society, and 
individual well-being is being conceptualised through universal access to financial 
products. Mader (2015) argues that while many aspects of life in the core countries 
are already financialised from credit cards, student loans to defined contribution 
pensions, microfinance and MM are the major vehicles in the periphery lubricating 
the frontier of financial accumulation. This financial relation extends to every aspect 
of contemporary life. The World Bank and the IMF argue that access to finance will 
enrich the poor to fulfil their potential; this clearly confirms in the literature of 
neoliberal financialisation that economic and social successes or failures are the 
consequences of managing finance. Accordingly, social problems are increasingly 
determined by an individual's inability to access finance, and therefore have nothing 
to do with politics, economic justice such as unemployment, underemployment, zero-
hour contract, low wages or collective action. This demonstrates Chambers' 
(1995) point that poverty becomes what has been measured; in this case, new credit 
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relation is required which serves surplus extraction. Since microfinance and MM 
assume to be speaking the language of empowering the poor, Elyachar (2005) argues 
that financialisation is associated with accumulation through dispossession. He 
remarks that since the capitalists can obtain significant profit on capital by advancing 
money, there is no need to organise the factors of production to produce goods. This 
exemplifies Keynes' point that the expansion of finance is due to inappropriate 
economic policy that has directed investment into financial assets with negative 
impacts on the real economic sector- finance mostly finances finance in the era of 
financialisation. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The theoretical review revealed the weaknesses of the neoclassical theory 
contributions to household finance. The LCH and PIH assume that a rational 
household will smooth out consumption over time by taking on debts. The framework 
of political economy incorporates the historical and social element that has 
transformed household financial conduct in the neoliberal era. However, their 
approach is more robust to the international financial crisis of the last decade, which 
had household finance at its centre. The framework of political economy does not limit 
itself to the understanding of household engagement with the financial systems and 
financial products, but integrates the changing conduct of industrial enterprises and 
banks; thus, the financialisation of households, albeit class analysis and power 
asymmetries. The new relation has been conceptualised as Financial Expropriation 
by Lapavitsas (2013). This concept differs from the exploitation of workers in 
production. Financial expropriation draws on the unequal power relation between 
financial institutions and households accessing finance.  
The failure of the traditional banking system to provide for the needs of all classes in 
the economy resulted in the financial exclusion of the poor and those in the rural areas. 
The recent growth in MM account has drawn many households into the realms of 
finance and the government and the World Bank push for financial inclusion. The 
concept of MM has benefited the demand-side as well as the supply-side of the 
financial system. Both formal and informal financial institutions can provide bespoke 
financial services to all segments in the economy, particularly, the underserved, 
unbanked and the rural poor. The popularity of MM started in 2013 after the e-money 
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regulatory reform by the Bank of Ghana. Since then, MM account has outpaced the 
traditional bank account, and the preference continues. However, despite the 
widespread use of MM, it has been revealed in this thesis that poor female, irrespective 
of where they live and poor males in the rural areas, are less likely to have a mobile 
phone and therefore potentially excluded from any benefits associated with MM. 
The push for financial inclusion through MM and the demonetisation and cashless 
society by the Bank of Ghana has been argued in this thesis as the prominence of 
financialisation of households. As presented by Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2018), the 
activities have created new avenues for extracting profit, and therefore the 
privatisation of the payment systems in Ghana. The concept of MM has some benefits 
to the poor; for example, Ecobank and MTN TBill4All provide the opportunity for 
MM customers to benefits of interest payment. Furthermore, MM services have 
created jobs for agents and retailers as well as FinTech companies. However, the 
double fees/commission paid on each transaction and the regressive structure of the 
fees leads to the poor paying more in proportion. MM account holders are not 
receiving the full interest earned on their float. The 80:20 split between customers and 
MMO is reminiscent of financial expropriation discussed in the literature. Thus, the 
financial inclusion financialises poverty and therefore ignores the critical dimensions 
of poverty. The next chapter summarises the key findings of this thesis and offers 
policy recommendations. 
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Part three 
Econometric Analysis and Major Findings 
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 : Econometric analysis and discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The relationship between financial sector deepening and poverty alleviation has been 
the attention of many governments and other international agencies. Theoretically, the 
financial sector has a strong relationship with the real economy through the provision 
of financial resources to the factors of production, stimulating the production of real 
output, increasing employment opportunities and reducing poverty levels. 
Paradoxically, in many cases, countries experiencing fast financial development have 
demonstrated greater income inequality, implying that the effort to reduce poverty 
levels may not have been realised despite rapid development in the financial sector. 
The impact of financial system development on poverty alleviation is of particular 
significance for Ghana. Over the last few decades, it has been argued that the financial 
sector, through liberalisation and deregulation policies, has become the engine of 
growth for the real economic sector through supposedly real capital accumulation 
processes and technological advancement. However, the consequences of improving 
the socio-economic conditions of poor households is a critical discourse and highly 
contentious.  Evidently, there is lack of consensus in the literature on the impact of 
financial sector development on poverty. 
The finance-growth-poverty debate has been examined in the literature by focussing 
on the interaction between the development in the financial system and economic 
growth. This is because it has been assumed that rising economic growth reduces 
poverty, without focussing on the direct link between the development in the financial 
sector and trends in poverty (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973, and King and Levine, 
1993, Dollar and Kraay, 2002). 
Three hypotheses dominate contemporary debates of this finance-growth-poverty 
nexus. The supply-leading theorists argue that development in the financial system 
will accelerate growth rates which will facilitate poverty alleviation (Goldsmith, 1969; 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2004). The opposing 
debate to this is the demand-leading hypothesis, which posits that economic growth is 
the one that induces financial deepening (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988; Odhiambo, 
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2009). The third way presents that the development in the financial sector and growth 
rate Granger cause one another (Al-Yousif, 2002). 
As Ghana aspires to achieve a higher middle-income status sooner than later, it is 
evident that a concerted effort to reduce poverty in Ghana is urgently needed. Since 
the various economic development programmes undertaken to eradicate poverty will 
likely be effective with the assistance of resource mobilisation, substantial 
developments in the financial sector are expected to attract these resources. The 
Central Bank and the international financial institutions have made a concerted effort 
to provide a stable and enabling environment for the growth of the financial sector.  
Typically, the policy anticipation of financial sector reforms is to promote 
opportunities in economic development and trade and investment, thereby facilitating 
job creation and a reduction in poverty and inequality. From the standpoint of the 
liberal theorists, economies which are highly active in financial liberalisation tend to 
undergo higher economic growth and development, hence reducing the levels of 
poverty amidst poor households. 
The liberalisation policies that took place under SAP opened up the financial sector to 
domestic and foreign competition, making the sector probably the most dynamic and 
dominant sector in Ghana. However, the vibrant development in the financial sector 
has not given the accelerated development claimed by the advocates of supply-leading 
hypothesis. Besides, the development in the financial sector and somewhat economic 
growth have impacted on poverty alleviation slowly with wide regional variations. 
Despite the national poverty rate falling to 23.4% in 2016/17, the number of Ghanaians 
living in extreme poverty increased from 2.2 million to 2.4 million, an increase of 9% 
between 2005 and 2017. During the same period, financial sector development 
measured by private capital relative to GDP increased from just under 7% to 17.7%, 
and the proportion of broad money to the size of the economy rose from 20.5% to 33.3% 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2018; Federal Reserve, 2018).    
Very few studies in the context of SSA have fully empirically investigated the causal 
link that exists between the development in the financial sector and poverty alleviation, 
and economic growth and poverty alleviation, concurrently. It is often assumed that 
the development of the financial sector in either its assets or liabilities, demonstrates 
the capacity of the financial sector to mobilise funds that could be directed to the real 
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productive sector (Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Eastwood and Lipton, 2001; Quartey, 2008; 
Adu, Marbuah and Tei Mensah, 2013; Odhiambo, 2009, 2014), among others. 
The limitations of many previous studies have been the failure to address country-
specific challenges by making a generalisation from cross-country data as well as 
using the bivariate causality investigation, which is prone to variable omission bias. 
This thesis, therefore, argues that introducing other variables may alter the direction 
of the causality between financial deepening and economic growth as well as affecting 
the magnitude of the estimation. Consequently, the thesis adopts a multivariate 
framework to investigate the relationship between the increasing financial deepening, 
economic growth and poverty levels in Ghana. The purpose is to investigate whether 
the expansion in the financial system as a result of the financial deregulation and 
liberalisation have produced any meaningful impact on poverty alleviation in the 
Ghanaian context. 
8.2 Data description and sources  
This thesis adopts annual time-series from1965-2017 because it has been used widely 
for examining finance-growth-poverty nexus. The data is gathered from various 
sources including the World Bank and the IMF, the World Development Indicators 
(WDI), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Ghana 
statistical service, and the Bank of Ghana. 
Several proxies have been used in measuring poverty levels in periphery countries due 
to lack of poverty data pre-1990s. Annual income per capita has been used to proxy 
poverty levels. For example, Deininger and Squire (1996), and Lundberge and Squire 
(1998) employed annual income per capita and poverty headcount as proxies for the 
poor as well as the Gini coefficient to measure inequality. There are fundamental 
weaknesses of using these poverty data; as a result, these proxies would not be used 
in this thesis. For instance, income per capita fails to consider other dimensions of 
poverty. However, studies such as Woolard and Leibbrandt (1999), and Ravallion 
(1992, 2017) argue that a better proxy for poverty is headcount, which is normally 
stable and reliable than annual income per capita. 
This thesis follows the existing literature (Quartey, 2005) and employs poverty 
headcount (PoV) as a proxy for poverty. This follows the World Bank definition of 
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poverty85 (Odhiambo, 2009; Khan et al. 2012; Aye, 2013; Uddin et al., 2014; Chemli, 
2014). Non- monetary poverty in this study is measured using life expectancy (LEB) 
which measures the average number of years a new-born baby is expected to live (see, 
for instance, Quartey, 2005; Odhiambo, 2009; Khan et al. 2012; Aye, 2013; Uddin et 
al., 2014; Chemli, 2014). Mobile phone subscription per 100 (MoBst) is used to 
capture financial inclusion and access to microcredit and loans. This also measures 
financial access by the poor and the rural population. Apart from the poverty level 
(PoV), financial development and economic growth are also included in the model as 
control variables. 
Financial development proxies 
This thesis follows the conventional proxies that have been widely used in related 
studies to measure financial sector development. (See, for instance, Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin (1991), King and Levine (1992), Odedokun (1992, 1996a, 1996b,) and 
Levine (2004). The variables include private credit given by financial institutions 
(PRIVO). This represents credit granted by banks and other financial intermediaries 
relative to GDP. Liquid liability (Fdt) is one of the key measures used to 
indicate/assess the size of financial intermediaries, including all financial institutions 
in the economy as a percentage of GDP, representing financial deepening.  Odedokun 
(1992) describes this as one of the most econometrically feasible measures of financial 
accumulation that captures all the elements that affect the national output. The thesis 
adopts liquid liability because, to a greater degree, it influences employment, 
inequality and poverty. Liquid liability data were extracted from the PENN World 
Table, compiled by Feenstra et al. (2015). 
Economic growth is measured by GDP per capita (
𝑦𝑖
𝑁𝑖
), which is gross domestic product 
divided by the population. GDP per capita has been the standard indicator used to 
assess the performance of an economy (Adu et al., 2013). Trade openness (TROP) 
measures total trade (exports and imports) relative to GDP. This measures the extent 
of international openness. Inflation (CPI) is also included to measure the annual 
 
 
85 The World Bank (1990) indicates that poverty is ‘the inability to reach the subsistence level of life’ 
assessed through the basic needs of life. 
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average change in the price of goods and service. This is introduced to assess the effect 
of macroeconomic stabilisation on poverty (Odhiambo, 2014).  
8.3 Empirical model specification 
This thesis adopts the dynamic Granger causality test to investigate the direction of 
causality between finance-growth-poverty nexus in Ghana.  This econometric 
technique is applied in the context of the Ghanaian economy between 1965 and 2017 
due to its favourable response to both large and small samples of the dataset 
(Odhiambo, 2009, 2014). Vector autoregression technique is used and the Granger 
causality model is based on the error-correction mechanism as expressed below: 
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Where 1−tFd  is the log of the ratio of liquid liabilities/GDP representing the financial 
depth of the local Ghanaian economy for the period. GDP per capita is indicative of 
the log of the ratio of GDP relative to population, 
𝑦𝑖
𝑁𝑖
. 𝐸𝑡−1 is the error correction term 
lagged one period, 
𝑘𝑖
𝑌𝑡
 is the real per capita income. 𝑃𝑜𝑉𝑡 is the log of poverty measured 
by poverty headcount. MoBst represents mobile money, which is indicative of banking 
expansion and financial inclusion in the local economy and LEBt represents life 
expectancy at birth.  
Given that, the thesis investigates the relationship between financial sector 
development and poverty levels in Ghana. The direct application of multivariate 
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regression techniques to equations above may not be appropriate due to issues of 
stationarity in macroeconomic time series variables. Related to this is that overlooking 
stationarity issues may lead to spurious regressions rending research findings 
unreliable. To avoid spurious regression, I investigated issues of stationarity by first 
conducting a test for a unit root in each series, then performed a co-integration test on 
a number of vectors in the system, provided that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
in each unit root of the times series. In the end, I tested for the long-run causality 
between the development in the financial system, economic growth and poverty levels 
with co-integration tests and then Granger causality test.  
i. Unit root test: 
First, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) Unit Root Test was performed followed by the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. This is the crucial property of how the sampled 
economic variable influences the behaviour of statistics. Generally, the ADF using 
generally least squares (GLS) is a more robust test than the DF test. Let a variable X 
be 𝑌𝑡 the Unit Root Test with the following hypothesis.  
Testing Hypothesis for Unit Root: 
𝑯𝟎: 𝝆 = 𝟎 (Presence of unit root) 
𝑯𝟏: 𝝆 = 𝟏 (No unit root) 
The Decision Rule Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
a) If t stat values > ADF critical value, then do not reject the null hypothesis 
which implies that unit root exists in time series data. 
b) If t stat values < ADF critical value, then reject the null hypothesis which 
implies that unit root does not exist in time-series data. 
ii. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test: 
The ADF test was performed on the time series data for the period 1965 to 2017. The 
ADF test considers the lag transformation. The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic used 
in the ADF test is a negative figure. Most importantly, the more negative it is, the 
stronger the rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root.    
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑞 + 𝑓𝑇 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + ∅ ∑ ∆𝑌𝑡−1 + ∄𝑡…………………………. (6) 
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iii. Co-integration test: 
The presence of a long-term relationship between the financial system deepening and 
poverty alleviation in Ghana was investigated. This was achieved by performing an 
exploration exercise on the significant long-run relationship between financial 
development and poverty indicators. If the financial development and poverty 
variables are found to be statistically co-integrated, it will provide economic evidence 
for the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables. Engle and Granger 
(1987) assert that a set of economic series may not be stationary, there may still exist 
some linearity in the variables, which may be symptomatic of dynamic equilibrium in 
the long run. As a result, this study employs the maximum-likelihood test procedure 
of Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991) to the time series variables.  
iv. Granger causality test: 
It follows that, if two economic variables exhibit a long-run relationship with each 
other, the usual practice is to investigate causality. Accordingly, two or more economic 
variables are co-integrated on the premise that causality exists at least in one direction 
(see, for example, Engel and Granger, 1987). Thus, if co-integration exits between 
variables, the error correction mechanism can be obtained from the autoregressive 
distributed lag technique. This is followed by performing the Granger causality test on 
whether financial deepening Granger causes poverty reduction and vice-versa using 
the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) framework. VECM specification imposes 
a restriction on the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables to determine the 
convergence of the variables by allowing a range of short-run dynamics. Because the 
deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected via a number of partial short-run 
adjustments.  
8.4 Empirical results and estimations 
i. Results of unit root test 
Unit root and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of economic variables are 
presented in the table below. The ADF test results show that for GDP per capita (
𝑦𝑖
𝑁𝑖
), 
Poverty headcount (Povt), Trade Openness (TROP), Financial Deepening (Fdt), life 
expectancy at birth (LEBt), private credit (PRIVO) and Inflation Rates (CPI) variables 
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are in level form. Model results indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be 
accepted at the conventional significance level. Evidently, the ADF statistics is less 
than their respective critical values, and thus, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that 
the economic variables are not statistically different from zero. This implies that with 
critical values less than the ADF statistics at 10% levels of significance is indicative 
of the variables being integrated of order 1 [I(1)] (Table 8.1).   
Table 8. 1 ADF Unit Root Test 
 
Notes: (1) D denotes the first difference operator; (2) L denotes the log of variables (3) ***,** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
ii. Results of co-integration test –financial development, economic growth and 
poverty alleviation 
Table 8.2 below presents the co-integration tests between the variables, financial 
deepening, economic growth and poverty reduction levels. Co-integration test is 
indicative of the statistical implication of the existence of a long-run relationship 
between variables. It follows that the co-integration test suggests that if economic 
variables are integrated of the same order, then they are co-integrated. Similarly, 
Lutkepohl (2005) and Hamilton (1994) suggests that where the modulus of each 
eigenvalue of a co-integration matrix is less than unity, the estimated VECM is stable. 
See appendix 2 for eigenvalues stability condition. 
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 Table 8. 2 Results of Co-integration Test 
Johansen tests for co-integration 
Trend: constant                                                           Number of obs =      51 
Sample:  1967 - 2017                                                     Lags =       1 
Notes: (1) * Indicates one co-integrating equation at 5% confidence level (2) MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
From table 8.2, the null hypothesis of no co-integrating vector cannot be accepted for 
the variables. As a result, the empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of a long-
run relationship between the variables, such that there exists a long-run interaction 
between financial sector deepening and poverty levels in the local Ghanaian economy. 
Model results reject the null hypothesis that the number of co-integration vectors is 
zero, which is in favour of the alternative hypothesis that there exist two co-integrating 
vectors. Therefore, the co-integration is equal to or less than one if each of the original 
variables is I(1), since there exists a linear combination of variables that are stationary. 
As a result, there is a long-run equilibrium interaction between the economic variables 
under discussion.   
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Table 8. 3 Short and Long-run Dynamics of the Ghana VECM   
                                                                                                 
 
 Notes: (1) D denotes the first difference operator; (2) L denotes the log of variables (3) ***,** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels       
respectively 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1
Exogenous Variables Endogenous Variables 
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The VECM developed in this chapter indicates the short- and long-term interactions 
between poverty (PoVt), economic growth (
𝑦𝑖
𝑁𝑖
), financial deepening (Fdt), financial 
inclusion (MoBst), and life expectancy at birth (LEBt). The model results show that in 
the short-term, economic growth has an adverse effect on poverty reduction in Ghana. 
This implies that economic growth does not Granger-cause poverty reduction in the 
Ghanaian economy. This result is not surprising, given that there is a high level of 
inequality in Ghana despite an increase in economic growth (discussed in chapter 1). 
As Holden and Prokopenko (2001) and Odhiambo (2009, 2011) presented, if the level 
of income inequality rises, it is possible that the poorest households will not benefit 
from the country's economic growth. The rich will accumulate all the benefits of 
growth while the most deprived households witness stagnant and declining incomes. 
Thus, if there is higher income inequality in a country, the poor will not share the 
benefits of economic growth. However, the model shows a long-run positive effect of 
economic growth on poverty reduction. A number of studies have reckoned the 
positive relationship between economic growth and poverty rate. Dollar and Kraay 
(2004) and Ravallion et al. (2009) using cross-section data argue that a growth rate of 
10% on the average could influence positively on poverty levels by 20%. Thus, the 
central role of economic growth is employment opportunities, which leads to higher 
demand for labour and rising income, which is crucial for poverty alleviation.  
The model result in table 9.3 also shows that a 1% increase in financial inclusion 
(MoBst) leads to a 0.02% reduction in the poverty levels in the short-term. This is a 
peculiar case in the Ghanaian economy where domestic savers usually save outside 
the formal financial sector, which leads to excess liquidity stored outside the financial 
sector. Evidently, mobilising 16% of savings held outside the formal financial 
institutions could induce economic growth and facilitate poverty alleviation by a 
percentage point (Husain and Faruqee, 1994). Other advocates of financial inclusion 
have argued that it facilitates the poor to access credit that may induce 
entrepreneurship and micro-business start-up (Keho, 2017).  However, in the long-
term, a 1% increase in financial inclusion impacts adversely on poverty levels by 6.3%. 
This finding supports Mader’s (2015) assertion that financial inclusion has been used 
as a weapon to extract surplus from the poor, which has resulted in indebtedness and 
suicides in rural Indian communities. He argues that financial inclusion as a way of 
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ending poverty rather financialises poverty by promoting alternative ways of 
dispossession.  
Furthermore, the model indicates a short-run negative effect of financial development 
(Fdt) on poverty. This is consistent with many heterodox literature, for instance, 
Epstein (2005) posits that financial development in the US represents a loss in income 
to US citizens. He argues that every dollar to what he calls ‘roaring banking’ leads to 
more than a dollar loss to the economy and hence poverty. Bortz and Kaltenbrunner 
(2018) argue that the development in the financial sector driven by finance financing 
finance and Shareholder Value Orientation has slowed productive investment, 
employment, reduced wages and caused rising inequality and poverty. Mader (2015) 
remarks that rent-seeking activities called financial inclusion have resulted in rising 
poverty in India.  
However, there is a long-run positive relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. There is a positive and significant relationship between short-term 
financial deepening and economic growth, indicating that a 10% increase in financial 
deepening causes economic growth to increase by 1.03%. This outcome provides 
some support to the supply-leading hypothesis that active financial sector facilitates 
resource mobilisation that could be channelled to productive investment. The result 
offers marginal support to the argument that developed financial systems enable 
entrepreneurs' access to various financial services and risks insurance that facilitates 
real sector investment and rising productivity levels (Levine, 2004). 
Financial deepening (Fdt) and financial inclusion measured by (MoBst) shows a 
positive relationship in the short-run but insignificant. But in the long-run, there is a 
negative relationship. The model results also reveal a short-run negative relationship 
between financial deepening and life expectancy at birth. However, there is a long-run 
positive impact of financial deepening and life expectancy at birth.    
 iii. Results of Granger causality test –financial development, economic growth 
and poverty reduction 
Table 8.4 below shows that the lagged values of GDP per capita do not cause poverty 
reduction. Evidently, the p-value of the Chi-square is 0.734>0.05. Therefore, we can 
accept the null hypothesis. Similarly, financial deepening does not Granger cause 
poverty reduction because of the p-value of the Chi-square (0.594>0.05). The same 
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can be said of life expectancy with p-value 0.443>0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
can be accepted. However, the null hypothesis stating that the lagged values of private 
credit do not cause poverty reduction cannot be accepted at 5% level of significance 
since p-value of the Chi-square for private credit is small (0.007<0.05). This shows 
that the lagged values of private credit Granger cause poverty reduction. Also, the p-
value for financial inclusion is very small (0.000<0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis 
stating that the lagged values of financial inclusion do not cause poverty reduction 
cannot be accepted at 5% level of significance. This implies that GDP per capita does 
not Granger-cause poverty, and the direction of causality is, therefore, from financial 
inclusion and private capital to poverty.  
Table 8. 4 Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-Poverty vs other variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df Prob > chi2 
Poverty GDP per capita 0.6197 2 0.7340 
Poverty DPrivateCredit  10.034 2 0.0070 
Poverty LFinancialDeepening 1.0433 2 0.5940 
Poverty Financial Inclusion 22.138 2 0.0000 
Poverty DLifeExpectancy at Birth 1.6276 2 0.4430 
Poverty ALL  44.362 10 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
From table 8.5 below, a p-value of the Chi-square of 0.602>0.05 shows that the lagged 
values of poverty do not cause GDP per capita, such that we can accept the null 
hypothesis. Likewise, the lagged variables of financial deepening do not cause GDP 
per capita as indicated by the p-value of the Chi-square (0.134>0.05). It can also be 
seen that the lagged values (p-value of 0.347>0.05) of financial inclusion do not cause 
GDP per capita. The null hypothesis for life expectancy at birth cannot be rejected 
since p-value of the Chi-square is 0.638>0.05. However, the lagged values of private 
credit cause GDP per capita as the p-value of the Chi-square is minimal (0.005<0.05). 
Therefore, the null hypothesis stating that the lagged values of private credit do not 
cause GDP per capita cannot be accepted at 5% level of significance. Therefore, the 
direction of causality is from private credit to GDP per capita.  
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Table 8. 5 Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-GDP per capita vs other variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df 
Prob > 
chi2 
GDP per capita Poverty 1.0145 2 0.602 
GDP per capita DPrivateCredit 10.664 2 0.005 
GDP per capita FinancialDeepening 4.0192 2 0.134 
GDP per capita Financial Inclusion 2.1183 2 0.347 
GDP per capita LifeExpectancy at Birth 0.90039 2 0.638 
GDP per capita ALL 25.35 10 0.005 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
From table 8.6, the null hypothesis that the lagged values of poverty do not cause 
private credit cannot be rejected as the corresponding p-value of the Chi-square (0.884) 
is greater than 0.05. Similarly, the lagged values of financial deepening do not cause 
private credit since the p-value of the Chi-square (0.516) is greater than 0.05. Also, 
the lagged values of financial inclusion and life expectancy at birth do not Granger 
cause private credit. However, the lagged values of GDP per capita is almost 0.05 and 
GDP per capita Granger causes private credit. Therefore, the direction of causality is 
from GDP per capita to private credit. 
Table 8. 6 Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-Private Credit vs other variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df 
Prob > 
chi2 
DPrivateCredit Poverty  0.24712 2 0.884 
DPrivateCredit GDPgrowthannual 5.2226 2 0.073 
DPrivateCredit LFinancialDepeening 1.3237 2 0.516 
DPrivateCredit Financial Inclusion 0.91649 2 0.632 
DPrivateCredit DLifeExpectancy at Birth 0.58938 2 0.745 
DPrivateCredit ALL 10.54 10 0.395 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
From table 8.7 below, the lagged values of poverty do not cause financial deepening. 
This is because of the p-value of the Chi-square (0.375>0.05); therefore, we can accept 
the null hypothesis. Besides, the lagged value of private credit is greater than 0.05 (p-
value 0.810>0.05), and the null hypothesis can be accepted. Furthermore, the lagged 
values of both financial inclusion and life expectancy are greater than 0.05, and their 
respective null hypothesis can be accepted. However, the p-value for GDP per capita 
is small (0.037<0.05), therefore the null hypothesis stating that the lagged values of 
GDP per capita do not cause financial deepening cannot be accepted at 5% level of 
significance. The direction of causality is from GDP per capita to financial deepening. 
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Table 8. 7 Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-Financial Deepening vs other 
variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df 
Prob > 
chi2 
LFinancialDeepening Poverty 1.9606 2 0.375 
LFinancialDeepening GDP per capita 6.5873 2 0.037 
LFinancialDeepening DPrivateCredit 0.42165 2 0.810 
LFinancialDeepening Financial Inclusion 2.4206 2 0.298 
LFinancialDeepening LifeExpectancy at Birth 0.24978 2 0.883 
LFinancialDeepening ALL 11.712 10 0.305 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
Table 8.8 below shows that the lagged values of poverty reduction cause financial 
inclusion as the corresponding p-value of the Chi-square (0.001) is less than 0.05.  
Likewise, the lagged values of private credit and financial deepening Granger cause 
financial inclusion as shown by their p-values of their Chi-square values 0.015 and 
0.017, respectively. However, the lagged values of GDP per capita and life expectancy 
do not Granger cause financial inclusion. Therefore, we can accept their respective 
null hypothesis as the p-values of their Chi-square values (0.258 and 0.181) is greater 
than 0.05, which illustrates that they are not significant. The direction of causality is 
therefore from poverty to financial inclusion and hence unidirectional Granger 
causality.  
Table 8. 8 Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-Financial Inclusion vs other variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df 
Prob > 
chi2 
Financial Inclusion Poverty 14.021 2 0.001 
Financial Inclusion GDP per capita 2.7109 2 0.258 
Financial Inclusion DPrivateCredit 8.3548 2 0.015 
Financial Inclusion FinancialDeepening 8.1418 2 0.017 
Financial Inclusion LifeExpectancy at Birth 3.4199 2 0.181 
Financial Inclusion ALL 26.86 10 0.003 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
iv. Selection order criteria  
Table 8.9 shows the lag order of the model as 1. This was chosen according to FPE, 
AIC, HQIC and SBIC with .003102*, 2.72299*, 2.99441* and 3.55563* values, 
respectively, suggesting the number of lags to be used as 1. For AIC, HQIC and SBIC, 
the lower the value the better the model. Models based on these criteria may produce 
superior forecast, because they are designed for minimising the forecast error variance, 
in small as well as large samples (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
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Table 8.9 Lag Length Selection 
Selection-order criteria 
   Sample:  1967 - 2017                          Number of obs      = 51 
Endogenous: lpov Mobs privatecredit GPGpercapita financial deepening 
Exogenous: ifl set _cons 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
v. Impulse response  
The impulse response function (irf) measures the reaction of the system’s variable to 
a shock of the disturbance vector. The irf diagram places one impulse in each row and 
one response variable in each column. The first row in figure 8.1 illustrates the impact 
of a one standard deviation impulse to financial deepening equation. The GDP per 
capita and private credit demonstrate minimal response and remain in a steady state 
throughout the period, that is there is neither a short-run nor a long run significant 
response of GDP per capita and private credit to a shock to financial deepening. 
Mobile money rises for about 2 periods, before declining slowly. Poverty falls slightly 
to a standard deviation shock to financial deepening for the first two periods and then 
elevated to a steady state for the rest of the period.  
The second row shows the effect of a one standard deviation shock to GDP per capita 
on other variables. GDP per capita falls slightly in the first two periods before 
stabilising for the rest of the period. Both private credit and financial deepening remain 
in a steady state throughout the period. Mobile money response with a minimal 
increase in the first 2 periods then remains steady in the long-run. Poverty declines to 
a shock of GDP per capita in the first period and then rises from periods 2 to 4 before 
stabilising for the rest of the periods. 
Financial deepening, GDP per capita and private credit remain in a steady state in both 
the short and long-run when there is a one standard deviation shock to mobile money. 
Poverty on the other hand gradually declines throughout the periods. 
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The fourth row reveals that a one standard deviation shock to poverty, causes poverty 
to decline sharply in the first 3 periods and then slowly afterwards to the end on the 
periods. Mobile money increases slowly to period 4 and then remain stable from 
periods 5 to 8.  
Finally, an impulse to the private credit causes highly persistent decline in poverty for 
both the short-run as well as the long-run. Mobile money on the hand increased 
throughout the period, with initially gradual increase up to period 3 then a sharp rise 
from period 3 to period 8. The GDP per capita rises temporarily in the first 2 periods 
and then remain in a steady state till period 8. Financial deepening reveals a gradual 
rise from period 1 to period 8. 
Figure 8. 1 Impulse Response Function (all variables) 
 
The orthogonalized irf (oirf) and impulse response function (irf) graph below reveal 
that the shapes of these functions are almost similar (except for the shock to mobile 
money on poverty) for the two models.  
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Figure 8. 2 Impulse Response Function- OIRF and IRF 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
Figure 8.2 shows that a one standard deviation shock to financial deepening causes 
minimal response to poverty in both the short-run as well as the long-run. The response 
of poverty to a shock to GDP reveals a short-run decline (both oirf and irf measures) 
in the first period. However, irf falls steeper than oirf. Both recover after period 1 to a 
steady state value but oirf stays below irf. A one standard deviation shock to mobile 
money temporarily increases poverty on both measures. The initial positive response 
gradually declines on oirf measure after period 1 until period 8. The irf measure, 
however, remains steady state in both the short-run and the long-run. The impact of a 
shock of private credit to poverty is an initial increase in both oirf and irf measures 
and a gradual decline for the rest of the period, with oirf declining steeper than the irf 
measure.  
8.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study employed the dynamic Granger causality test to examine the interaction 
between financial sector development and poverty alleviation in Ghana. The study 
adopted multivariate Granger causality analysis to circumvent the weaknesses in the 
bivariate causality tests. The model results offer weak support to the mainstream 
framework that deepening the financial system through financial liberalisation and 
deregulation policies Granger cause poverty alleviation. However, there is some 
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fragile support that development in the financial sector leads to economic growth. The 
finding of this econometric is consistent with heterodox economics view that 
development in the financial system diverts capital away from the real economic sector 
with adverse consequences for poverty and inequality (Lapavitsas, 2013; Storm, 2018; 
Kiely, 2018). The vector error correction model result shows a long-run negative effect 
of financial inclusion on poverty, which is consistent with previous studies 
investigating financial inclusion and poverty levels (Mader, 2015; Hildyard, 2016). 
The Granger causality Wald test in table 8.4 reveals that GDP per capita and financial 
deepening measured by liquid liabilities (Fdt) do not Granger cause poverty in Ghana. 
This finding is consistent with Holden and Prokopenko (2001) and Odhiambo’s (2009, 
2011) assertion that rising inequality reduces the benefit of growth to the poorest 
households. However, financial inclusion and private credit both Granger cause 
poverty alleviation in Ghana. Khan et al. (2012) and Chemli (2014) found similar 
evidence that financial sector deepening Granger cause poverty reduction in India. 
This evidence supports the mainstream theory that financial inclusion enables poor 
access to savings, which helps with domestic accumulation and microcredit, which 
facilitates micro-business set up. Private credit has been argued by the World Bank 
and other supply-leading theorists such as Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine (1993), 
Levine (2005) amongst others, as one of the most econometrically feasible measures 
of capital accumulation. Thus, financial development facilitates scarce financial 
resources to flow towards its most efficient use, hence productivity gains and growth, 
which promote job opportunities and rising household income.         
The Granger causality Wald test in table 8.5 shows that the lagged values of GDP per 
capita have a diverse significance of the coefficients of the other variables. Private 
capital provided by the financial institution significantly affects GDP per capita with 
a p-value of the Chi-square of 0.005. However, financial deepening and financial 
inclusion do not cause GDP per capita. However, there is an overall joint significance 
of the coefficient of other variables at the p-values of the Chi-square 0.005. The test 
also demonstrates that GDP per capita Granger causes private capital provided by 
financial institutions and private capital also Granger causes GDP per capita.  Thus, 
there is bi-directional causality between GDP per capita and private capital provided 
by financial institutions. This finding is consistent with Goldsmith (1969), King and 
Levine (1993), Quartey (2005), Esso (2010) and Adu et al. (2013). The authors 
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presented that private credit to non-financial corporations facilitates the capital 
accumulation and hence economic growth. However, Adusei (2013) presented a 
negative relationship between private credit to non-financial institutions and economic 
growth in Ghana. He argued that credit to the private sector does not necessarily 
translate into real sector productive investment.  
The result in this thesis also satisfies the finance-growth nexus debate on both sides of 
the argument. This is because the evidence presented demonstrates that private capital 
provided by the financial institutions is a cause and effect of economic growth 
measured by GDP per capita. Adu et al. (2013) remark that there is a positive and 
statistically significant impact of financial development measured by private capital 
on economic growth. Al-Yousif (2002) posits that there is a mutually causal 
relationship between financial sector development and economic growth, but cautions 
against generalisation from cross-sectional data. Conversely, Odhiambo (2009) found 
that economic growth Granger causes financial sector deepening, which facilitates 
poverty alleviation in South Africa. The policy implication is that banks should be 
encouraged to provide affordable credit to the private sector and supervise investments 
to make sure that the funds are channelled to productive ventures, which yield high 
returns.          
The Granger causality Wald test in table 8.6 demonstrates that poverty alleviation, 
private credit, financial inclusion and life expectancy at birth do not Granger cause 
financial deepening measured by liquid liabilities (Fdt) demonstrated by the p-values 
of the Chi-square values 0.375, 0.810, 0.298 and 0.883, respectively. The overall 
lagged values of financial deepening (Fdt) are jointly insignificant of the coefficients 
of the other variables with a Chi-square value of 0.305. However, there is 
unidirectional causality from GDP per capita to financial deepening. This finding 
supports the demand leading hypothesis that financial development is demand 
following (Lucas, 1988; Robinson, 1952).      
The Granger causality Wald test performed in table 8.8 shows that GDP per capita and 
life expectancy at birth do not Granger cause financial inclusion. However, poverty, 
private credit and financial deepening do Granger cause financial inclusion. This is 
illustrated by the p-values of their Chi-square values of 0.001, 0.015, and 0.017 
respectively, all demonstrating significant impact. This finding shows that there is no 
relationship between financial inclusion and GDP per capita in Ghana, as financial 
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inclusion does not Granger cause GDP per capita and vice versa.  However, there is a 
bidirectional causality running from poverty to financial inclusion and from financial 
inclusion to poverty. This supports the World Bank and the IMF assertion that 
financial inclusion facilitates the poor to fully participate in the domestic economy and 
enables them to realise their life goals. 
The findings from this econometric model provide robust insight into the conflicting 
findings in the literature. Many past studies have depended on a single financial 
development indicator, and therefore could not assess the varying impact of different 
financial sector variables on economic growth and poverty alleviation. Consequently, 
the choice of financial sector proxy on growth effect is significant to the findings. The 
evidence provided in this thesis shows that private credit provided by financial 
institutions stimulates capital accumulation, economic growth as well as poverty 
alleviation. Therefore, policy recommendation is to encourage financial institutions to 
provide long-term affordable capital/credit to SMEs and other industrial enterprises to 
facilitate real capital investment. This will promote employment, productivity, and 
enhance household income, which is crucial for sustainable development. The high 
cost of capital as a result of neoliberal financialisation in Ghana is inimical to 
sustainable development. Therefore, financialisation, as defined in this thesis, has 
contributed to the chronic poverty levels in Ghana.    
For financial development to promote sustainable economic growth in Ghana, 
financial market failures and the high cost of capital should be addressed to accelerate 
real sector investment by industrial enterprises. This would facilitate firms’ ability to 
expand and employ extra workforce as well as pay satisfactory wages that would 
induce consumption and eventually aggregate demand and economic growth in Ghana.  
Besides, the findings provide robust evidence of active government intervention and 
strong institutions to manage neoliberal market inefficiencies. In this neoliberal 
financialised capitalism, financial inclusion has been the response to poverty 
alleviation. However, as presented in this thesis, there is a mixed outcome on 
sustainable growth and poverty levels. What is certain is that financial inclusion has 
financialised poverty and has shifted the authorities’ attention to just the financial 
aspect of poverty issue by overlooking the other important non-monetary aspects of 
poverty in Ghana. 
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 : Summary and major findings 
9.1 Summary  
The hegemony of finance has been argued to be the distinctive component of 
contemporary capitalism. The absence of neoclassical theory from the theoretical 
debate on the growing importance of finance/financialisation should not be seen as a 
weakness in the assessment but rather the failure of the dominant school of thought in 
economics to recognise the rising importance of such a defining component of 
capitalism that emerged in the late 1970s. While orthodox economists are delighted of 
the exponential growth of finance and its financial actors and motives and reduce the 
debate of the phenomenon to financial deepening which facilitate trade and investment 
(PwC, 2014), heterodox economists are sceptical about the development of financial 
markets and instruments. Heterodox economics warn of its negative consequences on 
financial stability, income distribution, poverty, employment and productive 
investment. Thus, the heterodox approach views finance as an axle of economic 
growth and argues that a large financial sector could at best be a mixed blessing. The 
advocates of this approach contend that financial markets in neoliberal capitalism are 
mainly speculative in character, which precipitates financial instability (Epstein, 2005 
Kiely, 2005, 2018; Orhangazi, 2008; Toporowski, 2009; Stockhammer, 2012; 
Lapavitsas, 2013; Storm, 2018). Epstein questions the social efficacy of contemporary 
unregulated financial markets and argues that more resources are being diverted into 
financial activities that are alien to the production of goods. 
Political economists and other disciplines have captured the exponential rise of finance 
in the concept of financialisation. In this thesis, different strands of thoughts were 
reviewed in their understanding of financialisation- the stagnation in production; 
French Regulation school theory of financialisation, post-Keynesianism and 
financialisation, and the trans-nationalisation and liberalisation of finance. All these 
strands deliberately addressed issues on the global as opposed to national 
accumulation.  However, they failed to examine the changing conduct/behaviour of 
banks, industrial enterprises and households both within countries and across borders. 
Like post-Keynesians, Marxists recognise the connection between stagnating 
production on the one hand and the ascendency of finance on the other in the era of 
financialisation. However, they differ on the root cause of this financial expansion. 
While Post-Keynesians argue that the rise of finance is due to inappropriate economic 
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policy, Marxists believe the rise of finance is due to the declining productive sector. 
Post-Keynesians blame neoliberal policies such as liberalisation and deregulation of 
financial markets for the emergence of financialisation.  
The rise of finance and the financialisation of everything examined the consequences 
of the shift in financial intermediations from banks and other financial institutions to 
financial markets. The consequences of this shift are the rising profit of financial assets 
and the collateralisation of everything that can be collateralised. As financial profit 
grows, capital then migrates from the real economic sector to financial speculation. 
The concept of profit upon alienation provides the reasons why so much financial 
profit is accrued from mortgages, consumption loans to households, and from handling 
pension and other funds.  
The globalisation of finance draws on the internationalisation of the capital markets, 
which enable domestic and international debtors and creditors to engage in trading. 
This has reduced the independence of monetary authorities; capital movements tend 
to disrupt changes in interest rates. The privatisation and deregulations through SAP 
have created a situation where the domestic bourgeoisie have the freedom to transfer 
their wealth- both legal and illegal into financial markets outside their countries. 
The distinctive characteristic of financialisation in Ghana is that the economy is under-
financed by international standard measures, yet it is financialising. The 
underdevelopment of the capital market limits industrial enterprises’ accesses to debt 
and equity financing. Consequently, firms are more reliant on bank credit as opposed 
to the core countries where large firms can access a range of sources of finance. Banks 
continue to lend disproportionately to risk-free government securities, which crowds 
out the private sector. 
The forced liberalisation and the deregulation of the financial sector enabled capital 
flows and the ascendency of finance in Ghana. However, the initial belief that financial 
liberalisation will induce capital inflows into the periphery countries was short-lived. 
As countries opened the capital market, there has been a reverse flow of capital from 
the periphery to the core countries. Lapavitsas (2013) argues that the accumulation of 
reserves pioneered by the World Bank and the IMF has been the catalyst for this 
negative reversal flows of capital to the core countries. Domestic policies to attract 
more investments and the high-interest rates in the periphery countries also contribute 
to net outflows of capital.   
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The distinctive characteristic of financialised corporations in Ghana, and the 
archetypical financialised corporations in the core (for example, the US and UK) is 
that industrial enterprises in Ghana (large and small) are forced to rely on their non-
existing internally generated funds due to contradictions in the political-economic 
arrangements. The forced liberalisation has resulted in high-interest rates and diverted 
funds away from productive assets to financial assets and government securities. Thus, 
lack of affordable capital for domestic industrial enterprises in Ghana due to high-
interest rates charged by moneylenders and demand for high collateral security 
coupled with limited alternative sources of finance, have resulted in stagnant profit in 
the productive sector in favour of rising profit in the financial sector. To a large extent, 
firms in Ghana still rely on the high-cost non-existing bank credit. Thus, industrial 
enterprises make little or no profit from their capital investment, but are burdened with 
high-interest charges and high production costs. The subordinate nature of the 
Ghanaian economy also impacts costs on firms, resulting in deficient productive 
capital accumulation. Firms in Ghana are not returning to the undeveloped capital 
market; banks, however, are not lending to firms, but rather in government securities, 
which crowds out productive investment and weakens the real economic sector. 
Consequently, industrial enterprises are unable to employ many workers as well as 
pay higher wages. This has resulted in chronic poverty in the country, especially in 
rural areas. This is consistent with the heterodox economists' view of financialisation 
discussed above (see Orhangazi, 2008; Toporowski, 2009; Stockhammer, 2012; 
Lapavitsas, 2013 and Storm, 2018). 
This thesis presents that the ascendency of financial activities and financial motives 
on the one hand and the rising poverty headcounts on the other, illustrate that 
financialisation in Ghana has not improved living standards for the poor, especially 
the rural population. It is argued in this thesis that the neoliberal policy has not served 
Ghana economy well. Thus, although the incidence of poverty has decreased, there is 
no improvement in the poverty headcounts, and in some cases, it has worsened.   
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9.2 Major findings – the content of financialisation in Ghana 
Banking sector 
The various waves of financial reforms provided the opportunity for banks to expand 
their balance sheets on both assets side and the liabilities side. This thesis found rising 
profit for the banking industry, and limited lending to industrial enterprises for long-
term investment- a feature reminiscent of financialisation in the core. However, what 
is unique in the context of Ghana is excessive lending to the government. Banks have 
collaborated with mobile money operators or have devised their mobile application to 
engage directly with households. These have enabled banks to extract rising income 
from households in various ways- from interests' income to fees income. The 
investment (universal) banking status given to commercial banks in 2003 indicates a 
significant shift in the activities of the banking sector in Ghana. This freedom attracted 
many foreign banks to the country, together with many different forms of lending to 
the households and the government. Households hold a more significant proportion of 
bank debt, and what is worrying is the rate at which banks are increasingly confident 
to provide unsecured debt. Financial liberalisation did not enhance banking 
competition and efficiency and did not reduce the cost of capital for long-term 
productive investment. 
Industrial enterprises 
In the context of the Ghanaian economy, this thesis found no evidence of industrial 
enterprises increasing access to both debt and equity markets, and therefore do not 
depend on the domestic banking industry. Primarily, firms in Ghana (both large and 
small) rely heavily on the non-existing bank credit. This could be partly due to the 
underdevelopment of the domestic capital market in the country. Thus, the close 
relationship between these capitalist agents is contrary to what was expected from the 
literature of financialisation (see for instance, Orhangazi, 2008; Toporowski, 2009; 
Krippner, 2005, 2011; Stockhammer, 2012; Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013). This thesis, 
therefore, draws attention to the researchers of financialisation of industrial enterprises 
to consider the specificities of the location/countries and the development of the 
capital market. Thus, internal dynamics and domestic institutions should be scrutinised 
to understand the dynamics of financialisation in each geographical setting fully. In 
archetypical financialised economies such as the UK and the US, large firms could 
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benefit from the capital markets, transplant the same issue into the periphery where 
the capital market is underdeveloped, and the outcomes will differ.    
However, in line with the heterodox economics understanding of contemporary firms 
in an era of rising financial profit, banks have lent less to firms and more in financial 
assets. Industrial enterprises are then forced to relying on their non-existing internally 
generated funds. Consistent with the theory of financialisation, this thesis found 
stagnant and declining profit in the real economic sector and rising profit in the 
financial sector. However, the reasons for this asymmetry slightly differs from the core 
countries. Industrial enterprises in Ghana do not have access to varied sources of 
finance, with high interests on the government bond, which is less risky; 
banks/investors lend more to the government. Subsequently, banks/investors demand 
high collateral security from firms coupled with high interest on loans. These 
obstructive factors, together with other contradictions in the political-economic 
arrangement, impact high cost on firms and therefore limit their ability to make enough 
profit resulting in a downward spiral. Declining lending to the agricultural sector that 
employs the overwhelming majority of the working population has resulted in stagnant 
wages, inequality and mass unemployment. Consequently, chronic poverty in rural 
areas has risen. 
Households  
The increasing involvement of households with the financial system was demonstrated 
through the financial inclusion paradigm of the World Bank and the IMF. This 
engagement resulted in increasing access to short-term loans and some various 
investment opportunities for households. At the same time, the high-cost fee charges 
for mobile money transactions, which come from household income resonates 
financial expropriation. The interest made on mobile money float is shared between 
households and the capitalists involved in the transactions. These arrangements 
confirm financial expropriation in the literature of financialisation of household's 
income. However, the distinctive characteristics of household debt in Ghana, 
particularly mortgage and credit card debt, were found to be limited to the top income 
groups of the population. Few banks are authorised to issue credit cards and provide 
mortgage services. However, it was found in this thesis that despite limited coverage 
in the economy- albeit the underdevelopment of the financial sector, the growth of 
credit cards is still frightening with almost 60% growth between 2016 and 2017. This 
could be a future research interest. Even though households’ debt is mainly limited to 
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the top income layers, the unbanked, underserved and the poor have all been drawn 
into the realms of finance through various means, notably mobile money.  
The various waves of financial reforms, albeit financial liberalisation to promote 
financial inclusion to induce microcredit in the formal financial sector failed to expand 
access. A new form of engagement discovered in this thesis is the use of mobile money 
to entangle the unbanked, underserved, and the poor into the formal financial system. 
However, the experience is not balanced; the poor and the low-income households 
only have access to the most expensive transaction, resulting in wider income 
inequality and poverty. Thus, the neoliberal financial liberalisation policy to enhance 
poverty alleviation and achieve sustainable economic development is a myth. It has 
financialised poverty by providing the most expensive credit to household and 
industrial enterprises. The policy failed to address the primary causes of poverty such 
as unemployment, low wages, vulnerability and the high cost of capital in the economy.  
9.3 Policy recommendations  
The high domestic interest rates adopted by the central bank to reduce inflationary 
pressures act as a pull factor attracting international capital flows and the subsequent 
advance of this reserve to buy foreign government bond, particularly in the US. The 
implications of this have not been fully examined in this research, and therefore could 
be a focus of future research. 
The banking reforms that opened the banking sector to foreign competition did not 
primarily increase competition and efficiency, but resulted in new forms of lending to 
households and the government. State-owned banks should not be privatised for the 
sake of banking reforming. With the right supervision and operating environment, 
these banks could compete and provide the needed capital for industrial enterprises to 
perform efficiently. The government can also set up community banks to provide the 
needed capital to SMEs to ease the credit constraints. Furthermore, universal banks 
should be encouraged/incentivised to offer medium to long-term financing to 
industrial enterprises/capitalists at affordable rates and with minimum collateral. 
Besides, government deficits should be financed from other sources to enable banks 
to invest in the real sector of the economy. Banks are too reliant on short-term 
government gilts, which undermine their ability to explore other investment avenues. 
Good governance and strong institutions allow markets to emerge and can deal with 
market inefficiencies, as argued by Ang (2016). Ghana can look up to the Asia tigers 
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for inspiration. For instance, reforms to Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
started two decades ago, could help to boost manufacturing-based employment in 
many regions and towns where the incidence of poverty has been rising, particularly 
rural savannah. However, this alone will not be enough; investment in agriculture, a 
sector that employs the overwhelming majority of the labour force in the country will 
increase output and income for farmers. Irrigation, useful transport links, storage 
facilities, training and education of farmers on modern ways of farming could reduce 
chronic hunger, rural isolation and vulnerability of the rural people. Investment well-
tuned to local needs and conditions should be able to benefit hunger-disease-poverty 
nexus and set many people free from the bondage of poverty. It is essential that the 
poor should be involved in decision making that affects them than been assumed for 
them. Previous poverty alleviation programmes have been unsuccessful because 
organisers have failed to listen to the needs of the local communities who have lived 
experience. 
The fight against poverty and diseases should be a priority than choices about financial 
inclusion, budget deficit and privatisation. Poverty should not be viewed as a financial 
problem that requires new credit relation, but should be seen as monetary and non-
monetary problems to include dimensions of well-being and indicators of deprivation. 
To alleviate extreme poverty, Ghana needs to consider a shift in policy from the 
Washington consensus neoliberalisation market-based policy to active government 
participation to stimulate industrialisation as seen in some other Asian countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Financial reforms in Ghana 1986-2018 
Year Reforms 
1986 September Weekly Foreign Exchange Auction introduced for all sectors except for 
Pharmaceuticals, agricultural machinery and petroleum products. 
1987 September Decontrolled Maximum Lending and Minimum Deposit Rates.  
1987 October In October, a Weekly Auction of Treasury Bills introduced. 
1987 November Consolidated Discount House established. 
1988 February Decontrolled Minimum Banking Savings Rate. Removal of sectoral 
controls except for agriculture. 
1988 April Foreign Exchange Bureaus established. 
1988 September 90-day Bank of Ghana bills introduced for banks 
1989 July Comprehensive restructuring plan for banks adopted. 
1989 August Enactment of a revised Banking Law providing minimum capital 
disclosure and prudential lending guidelines. 
1989 September Insurance Law enacted. 
1989 December Non-rediscount able, medium term BOG instruments for banks with 180- 
day, 1 year, and 2-year maturities introduced. 
1990 January Appointment of new bank managers for the public sector banks. 
1990 March Two New Merchant Banks Licensed. 
1990 April Unified bank cash reserve requirement on demand, savings and time 
deposits. 
1990 May Official and Parallel Exchange Rates Unified. 
1990 September Non-Performing Assets (Loans, Investments) Recovery Law enacted to 
expedite recovery of non-performing assets. 
1990 November Cash reserve ratio reduced to 22% and secondary reserves ratio 
increased to 20%. Credits to agricultural sector removed. 
1990 November Stock exchange opened, 30-day and 180-day Bank of Ghana bills 
introduced. 1-year and 2-year treasury bills, 5-year government stock 
available to the non-bank sector. 
1990 December Remunerated cash reserves at 3%. Private sector non-performing loans 
of state-owned banks swapped with Bank of Ghana issued FINSAP 
bonds. 
1991 March Private sector non-performing loans to sound banks swapped with Bank 
of Ghana issued FINSAP bonds. 
1991 June Second discount house opened. Establishment of First Private 
Commercial Bank.  
1991 July Cash reserve ratio reduced to 18% and secondary reserves ratio 
increased to 24%. 
1992 January A leasing company licensed. 
1992 October Bank of Ghana Law enacted providing for stronger supervisory and 
regulatory powers. 
1993 March Remuneration on cash reserves increased to 5%, cash reserve ratio 
reduced to 10% and secondary reserves increased to 32%. 
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Year Reforms 
1993 May The Financial Institutions (Non-Banking) Law, enacted to provide 
supervisory and regulatory framework for non-bank financial institutions 
and to encourage competition among commercial banks. Home 
Mortgage Finance Law, enacted to support development of 
housing finance. 
1993 June Finance lease law enacted to further develop the leasing industry. 
1998 Finance lease law enacted to further develop the leasing industry. 
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) cheques introduced. 
Securities Regulatory Commission established 
2002 Bank of Ghana Act, giving operational independence to the Central 
Bank. 
2003 Introduction of universal banking 
2004 National Micro Finance Administration established 
2006 Foreign Exchange Act: introduction of partial capital account 
liberalisation 
2007 Passage of credit reference Act, and currency redenomination 
2008 Increase in minimum capital requirements for banks from GHC 7 million 
to GHc 60 million 
2012 Increase in minimum capital requirements for banks from GHC 60 
million to GHc 120 million 
2018 Increase in minimum capital requirements for banks from GHC 120 
million to GHc 400 million 
Source: Author’s estimates using data from the Bank of Ghana (various years) 
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Appendix 2: Econometric model of financial deepening, economic growth and poverty 
Poverty               
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.4339848 0.1403361 3.09 0.002 0.1589312 0.7090385 
 L2. -0.0559817 0.1344182 0.42 0.677 -0.3194365 0.2074731 
 
 
DPgrowthannual       
 L1. -0.207704 0.355212 0.58 0.559 -0.9039067 0.4884987 
 L2. 0.246109 0.339394 0.73 0.468 -0.4190911 0.911309 
 
 
DPrivateCredit       
 L1. 4.897282 1.752773 2.79 0.005 1.461909 8.332654 
 L2. 1.980529 1.671364 1.18 0.236 -1.295284 5.256343 
 
 
LFinacial 
Depeening       
 L1. -11.7649 14.03888 0.84 0.402 -39.28059 15.7508 
 L2. 8.693804 14.13329 0.62 0.538 -19.00693 36.39454 
 
 
Mobile Money       
 L1. -1.416379 2.371152 -0.6 0.55 -6.063751 3.230993 
 L2. -6.31304 2.43391 2.59 0.009 -11.08341 -1.542664 
 
 
Dlife Expectancy at Birth      
 L1. 15.45562 23.08804 0.67 0.503 -29.79611 60.70735 
 L2. -22.73136 23.43003 0.97 0.332 -68.65338 23.19065 
  Constant 56.8508 13.66286 4.16 0 30.07209 83.6295 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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GDP 
growth 
annual GDP growth annual             
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.0483361 0.0537342 -0.9 0.368 0.1536532 0.0569811 
 L2. 0.043948 0.0514683 0.85 0.393 -0.056928 0.144824 
 GDP growth annual       
 L1. 0.3572749 0.1360095 2.63 0.009 0.0907011 0.6238487 
 L2. 0.0142603 0.1299529 0.11 0.913 0.2689633 0.2404427 
 DPrivateCredit       
 L1. 0.2753283 0.6711314 0.41 0.682 -1.590722 1.040065 
 L2. 2.089467 0.63996 3.26 0.001 0.8351686 3.343766 
 LFinacial Depeening       
 L1. 10.3237 5.375443 1.92 0.055 0.2119753 20.85937 
 L2. -8.911888 5.411591 1.65 0.1 -19.51841 1.694636 
 Mobile Money       
 L1. -1.310523 0.9079065 1.44 0.149 -3.089987 0.4689415 
 L2. 1.132419 0.9319363 1.22 0.224 0.6941425 2.958981 
 DLife Expectancy       
 L1. -2.16615 8.840338 0.25 0.806 -19.49289 15.16059 
 L2. 4.614021 8.971284 0.51 0.607 -12.96937 22.19741 
  Constant -1.705644 5.231464 0.33 0.744 -11.95913 8.547837 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Dprivate 
Credit Dprivate Credit             
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.0038114 0.0138248 0.28 0.783 0.0232848 0.0309075 
 L2. 0.0065767 0.0132418 -0.5 0.619 0.0325302 0.0193768 
 GDP growth annual       
 L1. 0.0499994 0.0349928 1.43 0.153 0.0185851 0.118584 
 L2. 0.0337771 0.0334345 1.01 0.312 0.0317533 0.0993075 
 DPrivate Credit       
 L1. 0.3526587 0.1726698 2.04 0.041 0.0142322 0.6910852 
 L2. 0.1059031 0.1646499 0.64 0.52 0.4286111 0.2168048 
 LFinancial Depeening       
 L1. -1.591165 1.383002 1.15 0.25 -4.3018 1.11947 
 L2. 1.520948 1.392303 1.09 0.275 -1.207916 4.249811 
 Mobile Money       
 L1. 0.194267 0.2335876 0.83 0.406 0.2635564 0.6520904 
 L2. 0.2252775 0.2397701 0.94 0.347 0.6952182 0.2446631 
 DLife Expectancy       
 L1. 1.156365 2.274456 0.51 0.611 -3.301488 5.614217 
 L2. -1.524077 2.308146 0.66 0.509 -6.04796 2.999807 
  Constant 0.3346511 1.345959 0.25 0.804 -2.303381 2.972683 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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LFinancial 
Depeening LFinancial Depeening             
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.0020896 0.0016944 1.23 0.217 0.0012314 0.0054105 
 L2. 0.0001175 0.0016229 0.07 0.942 0.0032984 0.0030634 
 DPgrowthannual       
 L1. 0.0059497 0.0042888 1.39 0.165 0.0024562 0.0143555 
 L2. 0.0056069 0.0040978 1.37 0.171 0.0024246 0.0136385 
 DPrivateCredit       
 L1. 0.0114095 0.0211627 0.54 0.59 0.0528877 0.0300687 
 L2. 0.0060973 0.0201798 -0.3 0.763 -0.045649 0.0334545 
 LFinancial Depeening       
 L1. 1.113839 0.1695035 6.57 0 0.7816178 1.446059 
 L2. 0.2142021 0.1706434 1.26 0.209 -0.548657 0.1202528 
 Mobile Money       
 L1. 0.0292542 0.028629 1.02 0.307 0.0268575 0.085366 
 L2. 0.0002452 0.0293867 0.01 0.993 -0.057842 0.0573517 
 DLife Expectancy       
 L1. 0.0631196 0.2787619 0.23 0.821 0.4832436 0.6094829 
 L2. -0.099616 0.282891 0.35 0.725 0.6540721 0.4548402 
  Constant 0.0773868 0.1649635 0.47 0.639 0.2459356 0.4007092 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Mobile Money Mobile Money             
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.0217861 0.0083367 2.61 0.009 0.0381258 -0.005446 
 L2. 0.0074904 0.0079852 0.94 0.348 0.0231411 0.0081603 
 DPgrowthannual       
 L1. 0.0159905 0.0211015 0.76 0.449 0.0253678 0.0573487 
 L2. 0.0202232 0.0201619 1 0.316 0.0192933 0.0597397 
 DPrivateCredit       
 L1. 0.2132088 0.1041243 2.05 0.041 0.0091288 0.4172887 
 L2. 0.1796395 0.0992882 1.81 0.07 0.0149618 0.3742407 
 Lfinancial Deepening       
 L1. 0.7274668 0.8339864 0.87 0.383 0.9071165 2.36205 
 L2. 0.0125448 0.8395948 0.01 0.988 -1.633031 1.65812 
 Mobile Money       
 L1. 0.5672025 0.1408594 4.03 0 0.2911231 0.8432818 
 L2. 0.2032194 0.1445876 1.41 0.16 -0.080167 0.4866059 
 Dlife Expectancy at Birth       
 L1. 0.2755223 1.371556 -0.2 0.841 -2.963723 2.412678 
 L2. 1.05071 1.391872 0.75 0.45 -1.677309 3.77873 
  Constant 0.1598426 0.8116485 0.2 0.844 -1.430959 1.750644 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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 Dlife 
Expectancy at 
Birth Dlife Expectancy at Birth           
 Poverty       
 L1. 0.0002261 0.0001612 -1.4 0.161 0.0005421 0.00009 
 L2. 0.0002758 0.0001544 1.79 0.074 0.0000269 0.0005785 
 DPgrowthannual       
 L1. 0.0001327 0.0004081 -0.33 0.745 0.0009326 0.0006673 
 L2. -0.000282 0.00039 -0.72 0.47 0.0010463 0.0004823 
 DPrivateCredit       
 L1. 0.0000557 0.0020139 0.03 0.978 0.0038915 0.0040028 
 L2. 0.0017592 0.0019204 -0.92 0.36 0.0055231 0.0020046 
 Lfinancial Deepening       
 L1. 0.0247514 0.0161304 -1.53 0.125 0.0563664 0.0068637 
 L2. 0.0200719 0.0162389 1.24 0.216 0.0117558 0.0518996 
 Mobile Money       
 L1. 0.0026891 0.0027244 0.99 0.324 0.0026507 0.0080288 
 L2. -0.000278 0.0027965 -0.1 0.921 0.0057591 0.0052031 
 Dlife Expectancy at Birth       
 L1. 1.889696 0.0265278 71.23 0 1.837702 1.941689 
 L2. 0.9905988 0.0269207 -36.8 0 -1.043362 -0.937835 
  Constant 0.0378619 0.0156984 2.41 0.016 0.0070936 0.0686302 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Test of vector auto regression of model 
Vector Error Auto-regression 
     
      
Sample:  1968 - 2016     Number of obs 49  
Log likelihood  -184.0662  AIC 10.6966  
FPE             0.0019  HQIC 11.8391  
Det(Sigma_ml)   0.0001  SBIC 13.7081  
      
Equation           parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
Poverty               13 10.2297 0.8874 386.0031 0.0000 
GDPgrowthannual       13 3.9169 0.4408 38.6277 0.0001 
DPrivateCredit        13 1.0078 0.2545 16.7312 0.1600 
LFinancialDeepening      13 0.1235 0.9407 777.5248 0.0000 
Mobile Money 13 0.6077 0.9651 1354.0990 0.0000 
DLifeExpectancy     13 0.0118 0.9969 15793.5200 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Granger Causality Test of Model Results-Wald Tests-Life Expectancy vs other variables 
Equation Excluded  chi2 df Prob > chi2 
DLifeExpectancy Poverty  3.4983 2 0.174 
DLifeExpectancy GDPgrowthannual 1.0091 2 0.604 
DLifeExpectancy DPrivateCredit 0.84421 2 0.656 
DLifeExpectancy LFinancialDepeening 2.8673 2 0.238 
DLifeExpectancy Financial Inclusion 1.9608 2 0.375 
DLifeExpectancy ALL 14.269 10 0.161 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Correlation matrix 
  Life Expectancy  Poverty Mobile Money Private Credit GDP Per Capita Liquid Liability Government spending 
Life Expectancy  1             
Poverty -0.377965885 1           
Mobile Money 0.689919997 -0.852228483 1         
Private Credit 0.551560987 -0.481017878 0.720749053 1       
GDP Per Capita -0.022478584 -0.041056008 -0.005328393 -0.011009828 1     
Liquid Liability 0.45559189 -0.457195835 0.630125489 0.949487036 -0.105065054 1   
Government spending 0.753747644 -0.477149061 0.798025174 0.769649972 -0.028688793 0.674617066 1 
Inflation rate (CPI) -0.194410738 0.133410399 -0.266362311 -0.444893545 -0.1020684 -0.314883385 -0.325061781 
Trade Openness -0.647151514 0.603874724 -0.565309772 -0.070256234 -0.003147639 0.012890583 -0.373367576 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.43890325 -0.183017769 0.30666985 0.261371559 0.255262147 0.143763048 0.398640412 
Bank per 1000 km sq 0.734810049 -0.70608808 0.952499797 0.731084738 -0.019564482 0.623155659 0.891682792 
ATMs per 1000 km sq 0.734810049 -0.70608808 0.952499797 0.731084738 -0.019564482 0.623155659 0.891682792 
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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Summary statistics 
Summary Statistics of Ghana Data (1965 to 2017) 
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Life Expectancy  15.44973396 7.225904156 0 32.0643 
Poverty 18.98225172 2.531938344 13.86304836 22.11297892 
Mobile Money 27.90710328 27.34456318 -8.422485898 122.8745146 
Private Credit 60.17294942 36.08927636 0 174.7027345 
GDP Per Capita 3.631390837 4.550037177 -12.43162902 14.04712365 
Liquid Liability 15.44973396 7.225904156 0 32.0643 
Government spending 18.98225172 2.531938344 13.86304836 22.11297892 
Inflation rate (CPI) 27.90710328 27.34456318 -8.422485898 122.8745146 
Trade Openness 60.17294942 36.08927636 0 174.7027345 
GDP growth (annual %) 3.631390837 4.550037177 -12.43162902 14.04712365 
Bank per 1000 km sq 5.388445733 1.555577043 3.062230569 8.597382706 
ATMs per 1000 km sq 7.025749496 3.169760397 3.844062491 11.53087287 
     
Source: Author’s estimates using Stata/SE 15.1 
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